Just-Is: Contingency, Desire and Temporality : An Inquiry on the Relation between Law and Justice by Taillefer, Javier
1 
 
 
 
 
Just-Is: Contingency, Desire and Temporality. 
  An Inquiry on the Relation between Law and Justice 
 
 
 
 
Javier Taillefer 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Psychosocial Studies 
 
 
 
 
Birkbeck College 
University of London 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
I, Javier Taillefer, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work 
  
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the formation of subjective understandings of justice in 
relation to law. Liberal theories of justice and legal theory have frequently 
addressed this question on a macro scale, respectively approaching justice as a 
given balance between freedom and equality or focusing their attention on the kind 
of political and legal reforms that would be necessary in order to provide citizens 
with higher levels of justice. However, the role of the particular subject who 
demands justice has not received as much attention as the law-maker or the judge 
in these studies. Using a psychosocial approach that puts emphasis on the relation 
between the political and psychic life of the subject, this research aims to fill such 
lacuna by looking at the way in which particular subjects come to develop diverging 
understandings of justice as a result of their interactions with the law. 
This dissertation is organised in five chapters. The first chapter reviews the work 
done by four different schools of legal thought, locating the particular subject who 
seeks justice as a common blind-spot to all of them and also as the departing point 
for this research. Building on this, the second chapter considers normativity and 
generality as the two basic features that define the relation between law and the 
subject; pointing to subjectivity, contingency, and justice as the three constituent 
limits of the law that become visible in the light of the abovementioned features; 
and positing contingency, desire, and temporality as the three basic dimensions in 
the study of the emergence of subjective understandings of justice. Focusing on the 
first of these dimensions, the third chapter focuses the role played by contingency 
in the law and in the subject’s own narrative of justice, considering Walter 
Benjamin’s notions of “fate” and “character” as opposite ways of articulating it. 
The fourth chapter investigates the role of “desire” and “jouissance” in the 
production of such narratives and how, in turn, they appear as two possible and 
diverging ways of understanding justice in view of the shortcomings of the law. 
Finally, the fifth chapter centres its attention on the temporality of law and justice, 
considering Heidegger’s notions of “expectation” and “anticipation” as opposite 
ways of conceiving the temporality of the latter. 
In summary, this research offers a new approach to the study of justice by 
focusing on the way in which this term comes to be used and understood by 
particular subjects in their interactions with the law. It addresses the relation 
between three dimensions in the process of formation of subjective understandings 
of justice, also suggesting that these processes appear as a response to a structural 
failure of the law to provide justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Sense of Perplexity 
 
 
If there is something that was engraved on my memory during my first year as 
an undergraduate student it would have to be watching the news with my 
roommates after class. Later on, that little tradition we used to have would affect 
my life and research interests in ways that I could not even begin to fathom at that 
time. It was the academic year 2006-2007, and the protests organised by different 
groups of victims of terrorist attacks were receiving extensive media coverage. 
In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court had passed what would come to 
be known as the “Parot Doctrine.” This case-law1 entailed that certain convicted 
criminals (particularly those accused of having committed terrorist attacks) who 
were tried and sentenced according to the Criminal Code Act of 1973 would see 
their effective sentences extended from 20 to 30 years. This is due to a new 
interpretation of the law, according to which it would be read henceforth in the light 
of the new and more punitive Criminal Code Act of 2003. Taking its name from 
Henri Parot, former member of the Basque separatist group ETA, and incarcerated 
at that time, it is commonly accepted that the Supreme Court decided to adopt this 
resolution in response to the ongoing protests led since 2004 by the Association of 
Victims of Terrorism (AVT) and the conservative People’s Party (PP) against the 
imminent release of a significant amount of former members of ETA who had been 
arrested and prosecuted during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
By the time I moved to Granada to study political science and law, all this had 
already happened. The inmates affected by the Parot Doctrine had appealed to the 
Constitutional Court, and more protests had followed. The AVT sought to sway the 
Constitutional Court in the same manner that they had managed to affect the 
decision made by the Supreme Court, and thus they started rallying people and 
                                                          
1 The Parot Doctrine appears explained in further detail in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. 
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organising demonstrations. This is what I remember the most, and what has haunted 
my research ever since. In some of these rallies thousands of people would take to 
the streets and show their discontent with the political and judicial institutions from 
which they expected a favourable resolution. In others, a few hundred would 
demonstrate in front of the prisons where former members of ETA were still serving 
their sentences. And yet, notwithstanding the particularities of each and every 
protest, all of them presented a common element: a demand for justice.  
Having recently learned the basics of the law and its mechanics I could not help 
but to feel puzzled by these events. In our first day of class we had been taught that 
law and justice are not the same. The latter, while being a desirable side-effect of 
the law, is not a priority nor a necessary consequence of it. We had learned about 
the importance of the rule of law and the danger entailed by exceptions and 
precedents with the potential to disrupt it. We had also studied the non-retroactivity 
of freedom-restraining legal norms. Even entertaining the possibility that justice 
and legal punishment could be treated as equivalents, the people taking part in these 
protests had already been provided with all the justice that the rule of law could 
provide. Moreover, they had been provided with “justice” beyond the rule of law.2 
Hence my feeling of perplexity before such events, and the emergence of a series 
of questions that would eventually become the seed for this research project: What 
do they really want, what do they really mean, when they say that they want 
“justice”? Are they simply after the enactment of harder legal punishments? If so, 
and accepting the possibility that they could take justice and law enforcement as 
equivalents, how severe should these punishments be in order to satisfy their urge 
for justice? If their desire for justice remained unsatisfied regardless of the severity 
of the punishments approved and inflicted upon these subjects, could it be 
something other than justice that they really want? Revenge perhaps? And, if so, 
why do they seek to cloak their wish for vengeance with the appearance of a demand 
for justice? 
 
                                                          
2 The resolution adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012 –confirmed in 
October 2013– stated that the prolonged imprisonment of those inmates affected by the 
approval of the Parot Doctrine by Supreme Court violated articles 5 and 7 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and article 9 of the Spanish Constitution.    
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Et tibi, Politicorum? 
Following this line of reasoning, I started looking for answers. Given the fact 
that my bewilderment had its origins in the disparity between my (very basic) 
knowledge of the functioning of the law and the events that I had witnessed, I turned 
to politics in the hope to find a complement with the potential to fill this lacuna. 
Visiting the library in the search for a theory of justice that could provide me with 
an explanation for the protests that I had seen on TV, I eventually came across and 
became familiar with the work of political theorists such as John Rawls, Michael 
Sandel, Robert Nozick and Michael Walzer. The discovery of their work left me 
with mixed feelings regarding the character of their theories of justice and the true 
nature of my inquiry. Notwithstanding their differences, they all seemed to consider 
justice as a form of balance between freedom and equality. An approach that, on 
the one hand, did not apply to the kind of phenomenon I was interested in; and, on 
the other, seemed to displace the core of the problem onto the spheres of freedom 
and equality instead of addressing justice as such. I started to realise that I was not 
as interested in having a definition of justice as in the process through which a 
subject may come to develop a particular understanding of it. An understanding of 
justice that could significantly differ from “legal justice.” 
After these first encounters with political theory, I turned again to the law in 
search of answers. The protests that I had seen during my first years as an 
undergraduate student could not be explained through the study of positive law 
insofar as my sense of perplexity arose, in the first place, from the contradiction 
between them and all the principles that were part of my academic formation. The 
political theorists whose work I had read seemed more intrigued by the tension 
between freedom and equality in Western societies than in the kind of phenomenon 
I was interested in. Surely I could find an answer, at least, in legal theory? – I could 
not be the first one to wonder about the origins and nature of the understanding of 
justice of a subject who goes before the law demanding it. In other words, I could 
not be the first one to think “We may have such and such ideas about justice, but 
what is it that a justice-seeking subject really means by justice, what is it that this 
subject truly wants when he asks for justice?” Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Legal 
Realism, Critical Legal Theory, all of these schools presented the relation between 
law and justice in a different fashion –as the concordance between law and a higher 
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moral order, as a form of judgement external to the validity and efficacy of law 
itself, or as an ideological construction. Given their differences and considering 
their own understandings of the law and its functioning, all of these schools offered 
different solutions and institutional reforms meant to improve the law and secure 
higher levels of justice. Nevertheless, they did not appear to give great importance 
to the possibility that the understanding of justice of the subjects whose lives they 
were meant to improve could differ from their own understanding of justice, or to 
the way in which the law itself could affect such views on justice. 
Aut viam inveniam…aut faciam 
Realising that I would not be able to find a straightforward answer to the 
questions that had been haunting me, I decided to circumnavigate the problem. I 
became interested in political philosophy, sociology, ideology, discourse analysis, 
psychoanalysis, and pretty much any other discipline that could carry within itself, 
even if only indirectly, the promise of filling the lacunae that legal theory and liberal 
theories of justice seemed unable to explain. 
The fortuitous, when not outright accidental, discovery of the existence of a 
transdisciplinary approach to the analysis of psychic, social, and political 
phenomena called “psychosocial studies” meant a significant change in my way of 
addressing this problem. None of the disciplines that I had approached before could 
offer a comprehensive view of the kind of phenomenon I was interested in but, 
given the possibility of combining and complementing several of them, I could 
come up with a theoretical apparatus of my own specifically designed to address 
this issue. In other words, I had the chance to ostensibly be the first to lay the ground 
for the study of the meaning-making processes behind the use of emotionally-
charged and politically-significant concepts such as justice: processes in which the 
urge to confer meaning on this type of concept in/through our social interactions 
may respond to the need to construe and make sense of our own subjectivity. 
Considering the fact that the two areas of study taking justice as one of their 
central problems (namely, liberal theories of justice and legal theory) had seemingly 
neglected the role of the subject demanding it –along with the processes through 
which this subject may come to conceive it, and the expectations generated by such 
processes– I had come across a blind-spot that presented me with the opportunity 
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to make my own contribution to the study of justice. On the one hand, taking this 
lacuna as the departing point for my research project could finally help me get closer 
to the kind of answers I sought; and, on the other, it also appeared as the chance to 
complement the work done by scholars working in the fields of political and legal 
theory with a psychosocial approach. An approach that, notwithstanding the 
broader political and legal implications of justice as an object of study, could also 
give some insight into its role in the production of subjectivities, and the way in 
which the unconscious may condition our own understanding of justice. In this 
regard, one could arguably say that the research conducted in this project represents 
a theoretical –although non-normative– contribution to the study of the relation 
between justice, law, and subjectivity. Instead of trying to offer a definition of 
justice or proposing political and legal reforms that could improve it, the goal of 
this research is simply to comprehend the way in which the subjects constituting 
the citizenry of a given state may come to understand justice through their 
interactions with the law qua embodiment of the political status quo. Something 
that, hopefully, could eventually inform and complement the study of justice 
developed in other disciplines. 
Trying not to fall between two (or more) stools 
In this respect, there are two points that require further clarification at this stage: 
one regarding the relation between previous studies of justice and my own research, 
and the other about the role of the law in it. On the one hand, my research does not 
seek to debunk but to complement the work done by scholars such as Rawls or 
Nozick. Here, their work is to be considered as highly elaborated forms of the very 
subjective understandings of justice that constitute the cornerstone of this project. 
On the other, and this is not to be underestimated, it  is important to notice that 
although this thesis is chiefly focused on the relation between law and justice, the 
former plays a rather metonymic function in this analysis: it appears as the formal 
and primal embodiment of the economic, social, and political status quo. This 
means that, for the sake of this research, whatever subjective notions of justice 
could emerge from a direct interaction with the law should be read as well as the 
possible outcome of a more or less direct confrontation with the status quo at such 
levels. 
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Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the relevance of these issues, one could 
arguably imagine that being faced with the opportunity (and the challenge) to lay 
the ground for the study of justice not as a substantive concept or as an aspiration 
of the legal and political system, but as a category of understanding (as the way in 
which a subject my come to use and understand this term) has entailed as well a 
significant change in the questions driving this research. Thus, as interesting as they 
may have been in their own right, the questions originally arising from my 
experiences as an undergraduate student eventually evolved into more basic but 
also more pertinent ones: When do we start talking about justice? What kind of 
circumstances could move us to do so? What kind of unconscious processes could 
lead to the production of such subjective understandings of justice? What is the role 
of the law in their emergence? How do we come to perceive the possibility of 
attaining justice through these meaning-making processes? What do we need in 
order to feel that justice has been served? How does it affect our relationship with 
the law? 
The purpose of this project is, in the end, to investigate the formation of 
subjective understandings of justice through –and as a result of– our encounters 
with the political, social, and economic relations of power crystallised in the law. 
Considering that there may be as many subjective understandings of justice as there 
are subjects who have ever demanded it, this project cannot and does not pretend to 
offer an all-encompassing solution to the problem of justice and how each and every 
subject conceives it. Its goal, on the contrary, is to provide a theoretical framework 
that could help future researchers to navigate the conundrums and implications of 
this problem without having to study from scratch its most basic dimensions of 
analysis. With that purpose in mind, this research aims to build a theoretical 
framework capable of providing a basis from which to comprehend the formation 
of particular understandings of justice and their problematic relation with the law. 
A theoretical framework which will be complemented, illustrated, and informed 
throughout the second half of this thesis with the introduction of two cases of 
victims of terrorist attacks: Angeles Pedraza and Irene Villa. Two cases that, acting 
as a recurring guiding theme, are aimed to anchor the most abstract aspects of this 
theoretical construction to the real-life experiences of two subjects who, in spite of 
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having gone through arguably similar dramatic experiences, have developed two 
radically opposed understandings of justice . 
It is important to bear in mind the illustrative character of these cases. 
Notwithstanding their importance in the development of the argument presented 
over the following pages nor the fact that they have also helped me ground the most 
theoretical aspects of this research to the real-life experiences of two actual justice-
seeking subjects, their role is largely exemplifying. This means that, regardless of 
their ostensible and actual relevance, they are not to be considered as case studies 
but as a common guiding theme aimed to link together several aspects of this study 
whose connection could otherwise be overlooked. Undoubtedly one may argue that, 
given their importance, it may be worth it to treat them as proper case studies and 
develop a more empirical approach in which their particularities could be analysed 
more thoroughly. Having considered that possibility myself, I finally opted to 
discard it for two reasons. The first one follows logistical motives, and the second 
one obeys the need to prioritise one aspect of my research over another. In the first 
place, I decided to focus on the analysis of the interviews, speeches, and public 
appearances of Pedraza and Villa instead of conducting direct interviews or 
transcribing their life histories because the degree of privacy required by such 
practices could arguably jeopardise the illustrative character that I sought in these 
two well-known and publicly-reported cases. Secondly, when I started considering 
the possibility of including the experiences of these two subjects in my research I 
had to decide whether I preferred to focus almost exclusively on the specificities of 
these cases or to emphasise their public and exemplary character in order to lay the 
ground for a theoretical apparatus that could open the door to a new approach in the 
study of justice. After much consideration, I finally opted for a more theoretical 
approach in which the experiences of Pedraza and Villa would not be treated as 
proper case studies but as a recurring guiding theme in my analysis of the formation 
of subjective understandings of justice. 
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Crystallising justice 
At this point one may also wonder about the true role of the law and political 
violence –“terrorist attacks”– in this project: Why focus on the relation between 
justice and the law when it would also be possible to discuss its relation with politics 
(democracy, representation) or the economy (inequality, distributive justice)? Why 
that interest in criminal law rather than in other fields such as constitutional, 
property, or international law? Why focus on uncommon but fairly visible cases of 
political violence when it may also be interesting to investigate the relation between 
justice and the disproportionate legal punishment for minor offences leading to the 
massive incarceration of marginalised minorities? 
Insofar as the law appears as the formalisation of social, political, and economic 
structures of domination, it also plays a metonymic role in the study of the relation 
between justice and these spheres. The discrimination of collective subjectivities on 
the basis of their gender, ethnicity, or religion may give rise to the appearance of 
demands for justice. A lack of political representation may lead as well to the 
emergence of such demands. Increasing levels of economic inequality may also 
trigger their appearance, as we have seen since the beginning of the Great Recession 
in 2007. However, it is in the law where the status quo generated by such structures 
of power and domination becomes officialised. It is in the law where certain 
relations of power that may have only existed de facto up until that point become 
normalised as a de jure state of affairs that should be accepted and respected by all 
those involved. Hence the metonymic character of the law in this study of the 
formation of subjective understandings of justice. We may come to develop new 
ways of conceiving justice through our interactions with the structures of 
domination found in other spheres, but it is in the law where such structures become 
more clearly visible and equally subject to questioning. 
The decision to restrain this research to the analysis of the relation between 
criminal law and the emergence of new subjective understandings of justice 
responds to arguably similar reasons. Even if criminal law could be considered, as 
one professor told me once, as “the law applied to vagrants, whores, and thieves” 
and civil law as “the law applied to regular people,” it is not as if other disciplines 
such as tax or property law did not help perpetuate such forms of domination and 
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marginalisation. The reason behind the focus on this particular branch of law is that 
the cases it is applied to –murder, abduction, terrorism, etc. – seem to generate a 
considerably more emotional and forceful response than others such as breach of 
contract or tax evasion, giving further visibility to the emergence of subjective 
understandings of justice that in other less “appealing” cases would otherwise go 
unnoticed.  
Finally, the emphasis on cases of political violence –such as the terrorist attacks 
at the root of the demonstrations that gave rise to my initial interest in this topic– 
appears as a consequence of the decision to focus this research on the relation 
between law and the emergence of new ways of conceiving justice. As will be 
explained in further detail over the following pages, these subjective understandings 
of justice do not only appear in response to certain events that may require the 
intervention or mediation of legal and judicial institutions, but also as a result of 
their shortcomings in this regard. As a result of the feeling that these institutions 
have not or cannot deliver the kind of justice that they had promised in the first 
place. Having Walter Benjamin’s A Critique of Violence ([1921] 1996) and Jacques 
Derrida’s Force of Law (1990) as two major sources of inspiration, the possibility 
of focusing this research project on cases of political violence rather than on other 
circumstances in which the law may have been breached offered a unique 
opportunity. According to the work of these authors on the subject, the legal 
punishment for breaching the law responds not only to the damage that such 
behaviours could cause to those directly affected by it, but also, if not primarily, to 
the challenge that such actions pose to the very authority of the law. In the case of 
political violence this aspect becomes even more prominent: the primary goal of 
breaching the law in such a way is not to obtain profit or achieve some form of 
enjoyment, but to question the might and authority of law itself. Hence the response 
of legal and judicial institutions to these cases tends to be swifter and harder than 
in others insofar as they call into question their very existence, giving further 
visibility to the gap between the true end and functioning of these institutions and 
the interests of the subjects whom they are supposed to defend. 
In this manner, having this thesis revolve around the relation between justice 
and the law, criminal law, and cases of political violence responds to three issues: 
the metonymic potential of the law in the study of the relation between justice and 
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other spheres such as politics or the economy; the clearer response and demands for 
justice that cases of criminal law tend to generate in comparison with others; and 
the higher visibility of the gap between the interests of the law and those of the 
subjects it is supposed to protect when its authority becomes openly challenged. 
Keeping these clarifications in mind, the argument presented here is that 
subjective understandings of justice arise, in the first place, when the life of a 
subject is severely disturbed by the irruption of a series of arguably unforeseeable 
circumstances (political violence) that may lead this subject to seek help from the 
law in order to see his particularity of experience recognised and his life restored to 
normality. Secondly, the law delivers the sheer enforcement of the norms that 
constitute it instead of providing the subject with the kind of recognition and 
restoration that he initially hoped for. That is to say that a particular way of 
conceiving justice may be prompted by the occurrence of certain unexpected 
circumstances but only becomes consistent and clearly visible through an encounter 
with the limits of the law and its structural impossibility to provide justice: through 
an encounter with the abyss between the actual functioning and enforcement of the 
law, and its unfulfilled ideological promise of justice. 
At an epistemological level, this psychosocial incursion on a subject 
traditionally reserved to the fields of political and legal theory aims to fill some of 
the lacunae that they seem to present in the study of this topic. On the one hand, it 
seeks to offer a non-normative account of justice beyond the idea of “justice as 
fairness” and its tendency to treat it as a given balance between freedom and 
equality; and, on the other, it also aims to complement legal theory by positing a 
series of questions that should be considered before making suggestions regarding 
the improvement of our legal and judicial systems. Rather than invalidating the 
findings made by scholars working in the abovementioned disciplines, this research 
seeks to complement them: raising a series of questions with the potential to open 
a transdisciplinary dialogue with them while also bringing the field of psychosocial 
studies closer to these disciplines. 
While this argument and the theoretical framework presented here have been 
designed to offer a new approach to the study of justice, this does not entail that it 
may not be adapted to the analysis of other emotionally-charged and politically-
20 
 
relevant concepts –e.g. democracy, freedom, tolerance, peace– which may be 
subject to similar meaning-making processes. Moreover, this theoretical work may 
also constitute a departing point for more empirically-oriented studies aimed to 
scrutinise the development of new political scenarios such as the peace process in 
Colombia. However, the novelty of this study of the formation of subjective 
understandings of justice does not lie in its epistemological relation with political 
or legal theory, nor in its potential applications to the study of other political 
phenomena. What makes it unique is its goal to place the subject at the forefront of 
an eminently political problem, emphasising the role played by politics in the 
psychic and social life of the subject, and thus going beyond the feminist motto “the 
personal is political” in order to defend that the political is equally personal.  
Thesis structure 
Considering the interest of this research in justice as a term whose content 
appears largely dependent on the meaning-making processes resulting from the 
irruption of disturbing and unforeseeable circumstances in the life of a particular 
subject, and the latter’s subsequent interactions with the law and its limits, the 
structure of this introduction has intentionally sought to mirror the way in which a 
sense of perplexity before certain unexpected –sometimes trivial, sometimes life-
changing– events can lead up to the production of a way of thinking about the 
subject that tends to break with the normality that was called into question by such 
events. 
Following this introduction, Chapter One provides insight into the decision to 
take legal theory, instead of liberal theories of justice, as a departing point for this 
thesis while also detailing the basics of four major schools of legal thought (Natural 
Law, Legal Positivism, Legal Realism, and Critical Legal Studies), the way in 
which they tend to depict justice, and how all of them seem to neglect the particular 
subject who demands it. This is the particular subject who appears, in the end, as a 
common blind-spot to all of them and as the basis for this study on the formation of 
particular understandings of justice, as is explained in Chapter Two. Here, the 
particular subject who goes before the law in the hope of attaining justice is put in 
relation to two basic characteristics of the law: generality and normativity. This 
relation reveals, in turn, subjectivity, contingency, and justice as constituent limits 
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of law qua system. Limits that, once considered along with the abovementioned 
characteristics of the law, open a window of opportunity for the study of three basic 
dimensions in the analysis of the formation of subjective understandings of justice: 
contingency, desire, and temporality. 
The second block of the thesis is devoted almost exclusively to the study of each 
of these dimensions. Introducing the cases of Ángeles Pedraza and Irene Villa, 
Chapter Three addresses the way in which a life-altering contingency can be 
articulated, through a meaning-making process, into a narrative of justice that can 
oscillate between two extremes defined by Benjamin’s concepts of fate and 
character –and respectively identified with the abovementioned cases. Chapter 
Four deals with the unconscious mechanisms that act as a driving force for the 
abovementioned meaning-making processes. These mechanisms oscillate, in turn, 
between desire and jouissance, and are once again identified with the cases of 
Pedraza and Villa. The last chapter of this block, Chapter Five, investigates the way 
in which a narrative and the unconscious mechanisms behind it can lead to the 
appearance of one or another form of temporality and a certain way of 
understanding justice that fluctuates between the Heideggerian concepts of 
expectation and anticipation. 
The last part of this block, the Interlude, aims to clarify the connection among 
these three dimensions of analysis. Presenting them as three differentiable although 
deeply intertwined aspects of a single phenomenon (the formation of subjective 
understandings of justice), this section argues that such phenomena appear crossed 
by the two opposing poles considered in each of these dimensions. This interlude 
uses the extremes that were previously identified with the radically opposed ways 
of understanding justice embodied by the cases Ángeles Pedraza and Irene Villa, to 
demark a spectrum of possible ways of conceiving of justice in which a number of 
intermediate and arguably ideal positions could be located. 
Finally, the Conclusion summarises this research’s major findings while also 
emphasising its most relevant theoretical and methodological contributions. Among 
them, a particularly relevant finding is the possibility that a wish for vengeance may 
not appear, as it had seemed at first, as a result of an unfruitful interaction with the 
law in which the desire for punishment of the subject had been left unsatisfied. 
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Instead, it seems to emerge as the result of the presupposition that the law is 
completely unable to provide the subject with the kind of satisfaction sought. This 
entails that, insofar as the subject does not see the law as an authority capable of 
providing him with justice, there is no need for the subject to articulate a demand 
for justice. In other words, this presupposition leads to a lack of discursive 
interaction with the potential to prevent the emergence of a desire for justice from 
the very beginning. Besides this, the Conclusion also discusses the political 
implications and emancipatory potential of the kind of analysis developed 
throughout this thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Legal Theory and Its Lacunae 
 
 
"From all you have told me, dear brethren, make out clearly that though they have punished 
you for your faults, the punishments you are about to endure do not give you much pleasure, 
and that you go to them very much against the grain and against your will, and that perhaps 
this one's want of courage under torture, that one's want of money, the other's want of 
advocacy, and lastly the perverted judgment of the judge may have been the cause of your 
ruin and of your failure to obtain the justice you had on your side. […] Moreover, sirs of the 
guard," added Don Quixote, "these poor fellows have done nothing to you; let each answer for 
his own sins yonder; there is a God in Heaven who will not forget to punish the wicked or 
reward the good; and it is not fitting that honest men should be the instruments of punishment 
to others, they being therein no way concerned. 
(Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote, Part One, Chapter XXII) 
 
Why legal theory? 
The troublesome relationship between justice and the law haunts philosophy. It 
haunted Plato, and it keeps haunting us. The debate between Socrates and 
Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic regarding the “great question” –what is justice? 
– constitutes a perfect example of this. In their discussion, Thrasymachus claims 
that “justice is the interest of the strongest,” and Socrates counter argues saying that 
justice is “everyone having and doing what is appropriate to him.” Ultimately, 
Socrates’ views had an enduring influence that can still be appreciated in Roman 
law under the maxim that defines justice as “giving each their due” –ius suum 
cuique tribuere. This influence also becomes manifest in the relatively recent 
revival of justice as a major philosophical issue: today, justice as “giving each their 
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due” survives in the work of John Rawls and some as his critics, such as Michael 
Walzer, Robert Nozick or Michael Sandel. 
In the view of the above, it may seem “strange” to start a dissertation on justice 
with a literature review on legal theory. So why legal theory and not any of these 
recent theories of justice? 
There are two main reasons for this. The first one is that these modern theories 
of justice do not face the question of justice head on, tending to displace it onto the 
spheres of liberty and equality. In this sense, authors such as Nozick, Sandel or 
Walzer have followed Rawls’ footsteps bringing about new theories in which they 
try to determine what is to be considered as just or unjust in a liberal socio-political 
context; normally, trying to reconcile liberty and equality under the label of 
“justice.” Nevertheless, and from the point of view of this research, referring the 
problem of justice to another problem –such as the troublesome relationship 
between liberty and equality– would constitute an unacceptable exercise of idle 
talk.  
In talking about justice in these terms –as a balance between equality and 
liberty– “justice” itself remains concealed; an understanding of it appears as always 
already presupposed in these debates. This sort of idle talk “omits going back to the 
foundation of what is being talked about” (Heidegger, [1927] 2010, 163). Saying 
that a given balance between liberty and equality is “just” assumes that the idea of 
justice itself is already understood; and, nevertheless, the never-ending debate about 
the reasons why it is just or unjust conceals and precludes the debate about our very 
understanding of justice. 
The second reason stems from the first one. In the work of these authors the 
definition of justice as “giving each their due” survives under various guises, as 
different balances between liberty and equality. Nevertheless, this understanding of 
justice as “giving each their due” always implies that we know who “each” is, what 
“their due” is, and who gives what; assuming that we know the answer to these 
questions entails, in the last analysis, that an understanding of justice is always 
already presupposed. However, the approach taken in the work of the 
abovementioned authors ignores the most relevant part: Who decides over these 
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questions? Who decides who is “each”? Who decides what is “their due”? And who 
decides who gives what? 
These are the kind of questions that must guide us in our inquiry. And it is 
precisely because of these questions that the departing point of this dissertation can 
never be a literature review of debates about justice that presuppose an 
understanding of the term. Ultimately, this research cannot presuppose an 
understanding of justice that leaves unexplained  who “each” is, what “their due” 
is, who gives what, and, most importantly, who decides over these questions. 
Nevertheless, this questioning haunts every debate about justice, even if the 
meaning of justice itself is commonly left undiscussed. So if this research is to meet 
and address these questions, the circumstances that give rise to debates about justice 
are to be identified. Fortunately, the very etymology of “debate” sets us on the path 
to that goal: the Latin origin of “debate” as dis-battere – to fight apart, in different 
directions– reveals the importance of investigating the circumstances in which we 
“fight” over the meaning of justice. It compels us to investigate the circumstances 
in which different understandings of justice are put into question; the circumstances 
in which we become alienated from a presupposed understanding of justice. That is 
to say, the conditions of our everydayness under which we doubt who “each” is, 
what “their due” is, and who gives what: the conditions under which we turn to that 
who decides over these questions…to that who prescribes. If this research is to 
investigate the circumstances that give rise to debates about justice, it must turn its 
attention to the norms that establish the basic parameters of these debates. In other 
words, if this research is to address the question of justice head-on, it must take as 
a departing point the extant relation between norms and justice. 
Undoubtedly norms can be found in almost every single aspect of human 
activity –games, language, religion, morality, etc. – but there is a specific type of 
norm that stands out in its relation with justice: legal norms. One may say that the 
rules of a given game are “unbalanced” and thus they are unjust; one could also say 
that the norms of a certain religion discriminate some of its followers and thus they 
are unjust, or even that the norms of a given language reflect a sexist bias among 
its speakers…and yet most debates about justice take place in a different sphere: in 
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the relation to the legal norms that crystallise and rule the social and political 
institutions of a polity.  
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws 
and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished 
if they are unjust (Rawls, 1971, 3) 
If we have a conflict with our fellow citizens and we cannot solve it by 
ourselves, we seek the mediation of the “administration of justice”, we go to the 
“courts of justice” –funded by the “Ministry of Justice” or the “Department of 
Justice” – in which we demand and plead for justice, and “a Justice” deals out 
justice. We seek justice in the law and the institutions that it regulates. Eventually, 
if we are left unsatisfied in our demand, we claim to be the victims of injustice…and 
in turn we deem these institutions and laws as unjust.  
Gaining a better understanding of the question of justice requires a better grasp 
of the debates in which this question is discussed; and thus we need to analyse in 
depth the context in which these debates arise: we need to study the relation between 
justice and the law. Hence the departing point of this research is not this or that 
theory of justice, but legal theory and what it has to say about the relation between 
law and justice.  
The role of the ordinary citizen 
This chapter began drawing our attention to the classical origins of current 
academic debates about justice, to the ways in which justice as “giving each their 
due” seems to hold sway over these debates. However, as was stated above, if this 
research is to address the question of justice in itself, instead of displacing it onto 
the spheres of liberty and equality, it must study the conditions that allow the 
emergence of a questioning of justice: it must study the ways in which legal norms 
and their application open a window of opportunity for this questioning at the same 
time that they affect our very understanding of justice. But what do the law and 
legal theory tell us about justice? What do they tell us about the relation between 
legal norms and justice? What do they tell us about the ways in which individual 
human beings relate to both justice and legal norms? 
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Once more, going back to the “classics” may help us cast some light on these 
questions. Justinian the Great (482 – 565), a Byzantine Emperor who gained fame 
among other things for building the church of Hagia Sophia and reconquering many 
of the former territories of the Western Roman Empire, left us another legacy of an 
entirely different nature. Namely, a series of judicial reforms and revisions of 
Roman law –Corpus Iuris Civilis– that gave shape to modern Civil Law: a legal 
system chiefly based on codification and still applied under various forms in around 
150 countries. However, what is truly relevant about Justinian in this case is his 
understanding of the law. In his opinion the existence of every political community 
is essentially based on the law, which has its ultimate cause in the human person 
for whose sake it is made. To a certain extent this project aims to recover this point 
of view: focusing its attention on the relation between the law and the particular 
human being for whose sake it is –purportedly– made, and investigating the way in 
which this subject may come to understand the relation between law and justice.  
In the light of Justinian’s views, this goal could seem rather trivial. However, 
as I will try to prove along these pages, that is not the case. Law is not a recent 
phenomenon and consequently many have theorised about its nature and 
functioning. This chapter will revisit four major currents of thought within legal 
theory: Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Legal Realism, and Critical Legal Studies –
each of them respectively concerned about the content of the law, its form, its 
enforcement and its connection with power– with one simple question in mind: 
“What is the role of an ordinary citizen and his or her subjectivity in this theoretical 
edifice?” 
Following this line of reasoning I will try to demonstrate two things: first, that 
most legal theories have symptomatically neglected the question of subjectivity and 
the role of ordinary citizens in the law by treating them as mere objects while 
focusing on the relationship between the law and legislators, judges, courts, etc. 
And secondly, that a psychosocial approach to the matter has the potential to bridge 
that gap in legal theory. 
The object of study of legal theory is law as a universal socio-political 
phenomenon, and more precisely, as a normative social practice. And yet, law 
presents a series of particularities in this regard that make it radically different from 
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other normative practices. When compared to morals, for instance, one may feel 
inclined to think that what makes law different is its formal character: its 
codification, or its institutionalisation through the legislative and judicial powers. 
However, the uniqueness of the law as a social phenomenon lies in its radical 
normativity. Surely morals are normative too, but the role of the state monopoly on 
violence and the enforceability of the law introduce a significant qualitative 
difference between them. For that reason, even if some theories tend to focus on the 
content and form of legal norms –that is, on that which makes the law “lawful” or 
even just– this research supports the idea that what really lies at its core is the very 
lack of a substantive nature: that it appears, in the end, as pure normativity; as a 
formal command backed by state monopoly on violence; as the Great Dragon of the 
desert: Thou shalt (Nietzsche, [1883] 2006). 
Any attempt to conceptualise the law requires a choice between different 
possible ways in which it can be conceptualised (Perry, 2001). What was said in the 
previous paragraph intends to meet such requirement, and surely different departing 
points could have been chosen, but this focus on normativity allows us to centre our 
attention on the interconnection between law and subjectivity with no further 
concerns about the validity of the law in reference to an external framework –
namely certain ideals or morals. 
Each of the following sections will be devoted to a specific current in legal 
theory along with its main ideas and representatives: Natural Law (Ronald 
Dworkin), Legal Positivism (Hans Kelsen), Legal Realism (Carl Schmitt) and 
Critical Legal Studies (Costas Douzinas, Drucilla Cornell). All of them will be 
analysed and criticised keeping in mind the fundamental question of this chapter 
regarding the role of an ordinary citizen and his or her subjectivity in legal theory. 
Finally these currents will be analysed altogether in relation to two of the 
hypotheses of this chapter: (1) that most legal theories have symptomatically 
neglected the question of subjectivity and the role of ordinary citizens in the law, 
and (2) that a psychosocial approach to the matter has the potential to bridge that 
gap. 
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Natural Law 
Among the four legal theories studied here, Natural Law remains as one of the 
oldest and most popular tendencies. Its basic premise states that independently of 
the positive law of any state there is an existing universal law determined by nature 
and discoverable by human reason. Therefore, as one may imagine, the main 
concern of Natural Law is how and why the law can provide its subjects with sound 
reasons to act in accordance with it: the main concern of Natural Law is thereby the 
judgement of the validity of the law according to an external theoretical framework. 
Its origins can be traced back to the Stoics, who proclaimed that a rational being 
could live in accordance with a rational and purposeful universal order by means of 
natural law and virtuous action (Strauss, 1968). These ideas were further developed 
by Augustine of Hippo, Gratian, and especially, Thomas Aquinas and his Summa 
Theologiae –who saw natural law as the rational creature’s participation in the 
eternal law; but since the latter could not be fully comprehended by human reason, 
the former needed to be complemented by the Holy Scriptures. These first 
supporters of Natural Law put great emphasis on what was previously said about 
the need to judge every positive law in the light of its conformity to natural law, 
giving origin to the famous adage “Lex iniusta non est lex” –an unjust law is no law 
at all. According to these iusnaturalists, the validity of a law depends upon nothing 
but its accordance to a “higher order”. Moreover, following these authors one could 
even dare to say that, from the point of view of Natural Law, the very legal character 
of a law relies on its conformity to the higher order of the eternal law. 
Thus, for these iusnaturalists, the law is meant to be radically teleological and 
equally deontological: if a law does not fulfil its mission of getting human persons 
closer to the divine, such a law is a failure and no law at all. The implications of 
this type of legal reasoning are enormous, having the potential to back, at the same 
time, the most radical and the most conservative juridico-political claims. Yet 
before getting to that point it is necessary to analyse some features of the evolution 
of this school of thought, and some key elements and authors in current theories 
within Natural Law. 
Even if the origins of Natural Law can be traced back to the Stoics, its roots are 
eminently theological. Aquinas maintained that the eternal law is the rational plan 
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by which the creation is ordered, and natural law is the very way in which humans 
can freely participate in this eternal law –unlike irrational creatures who are directly 
determined by God’s plan (2006). Thus, for this doctor of the church, natural law 
is the basic principle of practical rationality, being universally and naturally binding 
–beyond any mundane positive regulation– due to its capability to guide us towards 
the particular and general good. Natural law is hence binding in two different ways: 
from God’s point of view, it is binding due to its position in the Divine Plan; and 
from a human perspective, it is also binding due to its graspable precepts of practical 
reason that lead us towards good. This means that from a theological perspective 
the laws of God always apply because God wills it; but, since these laws are not 
necessarily understandable to human reason, natural law needs to be complemented 
by the Holy Scriptures 
It is easy to see that Thomas Aquinas’ views on natural law demand a very 
specific set of beliefs in order to be accepted –they make absolutely no sense from 
an atheistic or agnostic point of view– however, that does not make this school of 
legal thought unacceptable to sceptical readers insofar as Natural Law itself would 
undergo a process of secularisation over the centuries. Presenting its most basic 
premises in a more earthly way, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan describes natural law 
as “a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to 
do that which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the 
same; and to omit that by which he thinks it may best be preserved” (Hobbes, [1651] 
2005). This contractualist theorisation of natural law and Hobbes’ negative views 
on human nature –according to him, in the pre-contractualist state of nature there is 
a “war of every man against every man” and human life is “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short”– constituted a direct attack against some key aspects of the 
previous tradition, associating its purpose and idea of “good” to self-preservation 
and common good rather than happiness and virtue. However, Hobbes’ depiction 
of natural law would be revised later on in a more positive way by authors such as 
Cumberland, Pufendorf, Grotius –who would definitely detach natural law from 
theology with his argument etsi Deus non-daretur3– and Locke, who would turn 
Hobbes’ argument in favour of the rule of the sovereign –namely, that laws must 
be observed regardless of how tyrannical a sovereign could be, since tyranny is 
                                                          
3 Grotius meant that we should act as if God did not exist, or, at least, care. 
31 
 
better than the “war of every man against every man” in the state of nature– the 
other way round by saying that  if a ruler went against natural law and failed to 
protect "life, liberty, and property," his people would be justified to overthrow the 
existing state and create a new one (Locke, [1689] 2004). 
Besides their common claims concerning the need for adequacy of the law to 
certain standards of validity in relation to a higher order, and despite their 
disagreement in some theoretical aspects, all these authors appear as precursors of 
modern secular Natural Law and, in consequence, we can perceive certain patterns 
and common elements throughout all of them: (1) that there is such a thing as a 
certain human nature, (2) that there are natural goods, and (3) that these goods 
precede every right in positive law. It does not matter whether one adopts a negative 
Hobbesian view of human nature, an Aristotelian perfective or completing 
approach, or a Platonic essentialist view, all claims in Natural Law rely upon the 
existence of a certain human nature that is intrinsically connected to the 
achievement of certain natural goods. Regardless of the approach, these goods are 
always knowable in Natural Law: “to show that the human good is grounded in 
nature is to show that human nature explains why certain things are goods, and it is 
hard to see how one could affirm that claim while entirely rejecting the possibility 
of derivationist knowledge of the human good” (Murphy, 2001). Not forgetting the 
fact that some have accused this derivationism of trying to conclude normative 
truths from a set of non-normative truths, most iusnaturalists agree that that problem 
can be solved or at least bridged by giving account of certain truths.4 And, finally, 
in Natural Law these goods precede and are meant to be the foundation of every 
positive right 
Natural Law theories maintain that a certain nature can be understood by 
understanding certain capacities inferred from acts, which in turn are understood in 
reference to their objects. Ontologically this implies that anything that is good for 
us is a result of our nature; epistemologically, that any understanding of our nature 
depends on an understanding of what kind of objects of choice are good for us. And, 
according to Natural Law theorists, every right in positive law must be preceded 
and based upon such natural goods. 
                                                          
4 What these “bridging truths” could be remains a mystery. 
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Both classic and contemporary texts treat the law as a morally problematic 
phenomenon insofar as it can be used either for the achievement of great good or 
as a tool for evil and tyranny. The most common solution to this problem is to 
utterly dismiss any law “used as a tool for evil” by denying its legal character. Even 
more utilitarian approaches to natural law face this dilemma: not putting it in terms 
of “good” and “evil”, but describing it as a “a sharp knife, whose sharpness makes 
it apt for life-saving surgery but equally for stealthy callous murders” (Raz 1979, 
224–226). Therefore the key question for any theory within Natural Law is “Why 
is there a moral obligation of compliance to law?” 
Most theories agree that the first and foremost reason to abide law is no other 
but the desirability of avoiding the Hobbesian state of nature and the war of every 
man against every man, creating the conditions for a “good life” by means of 
principles of practical reason –which, in turn, gain moral strength by being taken as 
a whole under the lead of categorical imperatives which depict other human beings 
as ends rather than as the means. 
The most prominent among current Natural Law theorists is the recently 
deceased Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013), who, going against traditional Natural Law 
and yet moving away from positivism, maintained that morals and the law are not 
strictly separated, but related in an epistemological rather than ontological sense. 
His contribution to legal theory is chiefly characterised by his writings on moral 
principles and interpretativism, 5  his call for a moral reading of the American 
Constitution, his understanding of the law as a rule and principle, the right answer 
thesis, and some of his writings on topics such as liberty, equality and legality. 
Dworkin’s interpretativism upholds that legal rights and duties are ultimately 
determined by a “scheme of principle” able to offer the best justification for the 
political practices of a certain community. A scheme that becomes graspable 
through the interpretation of these practices and the values that they are supposed 
to serve. In other words, Dworkin considers that legal rights and duties are but the 
product of a set of moral values and practices, and thus the content of the law and 
its validity depend on its harmony with a specific set of moral values and practices, 
leaving judges little space for discretion since they should always interpret any legal 
                                                          
5 Term coined by Dworkin. 
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materials following that specific moral scheme. And it is precisely from this that 
Dworkin infers his right answer thesis, maintaining that as long as the law is 
properly interpreted it will always give a right answer –although this does not imply 
that everyone will get to the same exact one. Accordingly, he also defends a moral 
reading of the American Constitution. 
Despite the popularity of Dworkin’s theories among many scholars, it is easy to 
see that there is a gap in his theoretical edifice between moral principles and legal 
rules that the author seems to save by some sort of leap of faith. However, he 
considers that this problem is solved by means of certain legal principles that exist 
as long as they are derived from the best moral and political interpretation of 
pertinent legal materials, bridging the gap between moral values and legal facts. 
Surely the whole idea of the existence of these legal principles –stemmed from 
moral values and legal facts, and capable of bringing together these separate 
spheres– could appear as an empty construction masking an actual leap of faith, 
since from his point of view moral principles are what they are on the basis of their 
content, legal rules are solely dependent on their institutional source and enactment, 
and legal principles become valid due to a mix of both requirements (Dworkin, 
1998). However, even if this lack of substantial content in legal principles 
represents a significant flaw in Dworkin’s theories, it is but one of the many 
criticisms that can be made to both Dworkin and Natural Law. 
Taking in consideration the direct and intimate connection between law and 
morals in Dworkin’s work –an epistemological rather than ontological connection 
in his view– it seems clear that, for him, the validity and binding force of the former 
stems from the latter: Lex iniusta non est lex. The binding force of the law is entirely 
content-dependent and relies on its adequacy to a very specific set of moral values, 
acting in this manner as a proxy between a higher order and the mundane issues of 
everyday life. However, if Thomas Aquinas theories were controversial due to their 
theological character, the same could be said about Dworkin and other 
contemporary Natural Law scholars. Not because their theories are based on a 
certain belief in God, but because their theories are based on a secularised belief in 
God: morals. If Aquinas’ views were unacceptable for atheists and agnostics, 
contemporary Natural Law theories are just as unacceptable from a sceptical or 
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relativist stand towards morals. Ultimately, these theories are utterly flawed unless 
these authors’ belief in morals is shared.  
There are plenty of criticisms that could be made with regard to this secularised 
belief in God, but I would like to highlight just two of them that I consider 
significantly relevant to the topic and do not require having to go through a whole 
“genealogy of morals.” The first and more obvious one is that making the law 
depend on morals immediately raises a question about the very existence of morals. 
Explaining the validity and binding force of the law by referring to morals or God 
does not solve this quandary at all, for the only thing accomplished by doing so is 
to defer and mask the problem by alluding to a different theoretical framework: “if 
a law becomes binding because it stems from a set of moral values…what makes 
these values binding?” Undoubtedly, some Natural Law theorists would argue that 
these values point towards certain “goods,” however, a questioning about what 
makes these goods desirable would follow, thus any further reasoning in that 
direction would inevitably lead to a sterile debate in which the critical question 
remains postponed ad infinitum. In Natural Law the validity and binding force of 
the law is explained through a succession of empty frameworks (moral values, 
natural goods, human nature, etc.) that could lead us either to a sterile debate where 
the key question is eternally postponed, or to some sort of tautological reasoning 
(this law is binding because it stems from these moral values, which are binding in 
turn because they help us to reach certain natural goods that are worthy to be legally 
protected). Nevertheless, what seems to lurk behind all these attempts of 
rationalising the law in the light of morals is a clear and cold “because I – the law, 
morality, God– say so”: what lurks behind the rationale of Natural Law is the bare 
draconian thou shalt described by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra ([1883] 
2006). 
Scholars working in the field of Natural Law defend the moral imperatives that 
must guide the law, but do not question their nature, for they consider that moral 
principles are what they are due to their content, and their validity is purely content 
dependent (Dworkin, 1998). Nevertheless, this reasoning –upholding moral values 
as the ultimate goal and primary source of the law– reveals something else; namely, 
a deep-rooted ideological bias. Following the account of ideology provided by 
Louis Althusser in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus ([1970] 2001) one 
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could easily argue that these claims are ideological inasmuch as they maintain that 
laws must stem from morals, although these moral values remain as an empty 
signifier ready to be used in the best interest of the law maker and the judiciary. 
Undoubtedly, some may disagree about morals being a set of empty signifiers –due 
to their purportedly graspable character through an understanding of the social 
values and practices that they entail– but it is important to remember two things: 
first, and following Nietzsche in On Genealogy of Morals ([1887] 1994), it would 
be naive to consider such values and practices as innocent or neutral; and second, 
the universal acceptance and validity of such values is highly questionable, and 
thus, their legal enshrinement may appear as a radically ideological imposition. 
This ideological bias in Natural Law makes it highly susceptible of being used 
for conservative and radical political projects alike. It has the potential to back 
political agendas as different as the American Declaration of Independence written 
by Thomas Jefferson –Article I: All men are born free and equal, and have certain 
natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right 
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and 
happiness– or the anti-abortion agenda supported by Ronald Reagan –“More than 
a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of fifty states 
statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the 
lives of up to 1.5 million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this 
tragedy will some day pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. 
Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its 
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected.” 
Although all these criticisms reveal important flaws in Natural Law, the most 
relevant one from the point of view of this project is yet to be made. Here, the 
question about the role played by an ordinary citizen and his or her subjectivity in 
this theoretical framework exposes a new flaw in Natural Law, for in the face of its 
thorough focus on the content of the law, its recipient –the ordinary citizen– 
becomes a purely passive object, appearing as a means for the achievement of 
moral-ideological ends. In Natural Law the human element is restrained to the 
legislative and judicial powers, which are meant to write and interpret the law in 
the light of certain moral values, whereas the ordinary citizen and the question of 
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subjectivity remain utterly irrelevant in their role as lifeless objects. In Natural Law, 
citizens are reduced to an ignorable contingency.  
It would be unfair to say that citizens are completely ignored by Natural Law –
after all, they surely have their own values and opinions regarding the principles 
that should inform positive law. Nevertheless, in Natural Law this human element 
is reduced to its minimum: citizens are only relevant to the extent that they represent 
the material embodiment, the vessel, of a certain morality…but nothing else. On 
the contrary, this project aims to subvert this situation by taking these citizens in 
their “ignorable contingency” as a departing point for the study of the relation 
between law and justice. 
Legal Positivism 
In contrast with Natural Law –which is mainly concerned with the moral 
content of the law– Legal Positivism focuses on the form of the law in order to 
determine its validity. Rejecting the necessity of any sort of metaphysical 
assumptions, Legal Positivism establishes that the binding nature of the law does 
not depend on its content, nor does a law stop being legal due to its merits or 
demerits. The first renowned legal scholar to propose such a daring view against 
historically mainstream Natural Law was John Austin (1790-1859), who claimed 
in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined ([1832] 1998) that “(t)he existence 
of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one 
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different 
enquiry.” Thus it is easy to see what stance is taken in Legal Positivism from its 
very beginning: A law is not law because it is good, just or moral. A law is a law 
because it is the law.  
The logics underpinning Natural Law and Legal Positivism are radically 
different, for while the former bases the binding and legal character of the law on 
an external judgement of morality –goodness, justice, religion, etc. – the latter bases 
it on an internal judgement of formal validity: a law is legal and binding if it is 
passed in the right form by the right institution following the right procedure. Legal 
Positivism does not deem the merits of the law to be unimportant or irrelevant, it 
simply says that they do not determine whether a law is legal or binding –thus 
rejecting the legal maxim given by Thomas Aquinas “Lex iniusta non est lex”. This 
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leap, from Natural Law to Legal Positivism, can only be understood as the legal 
echo of the transition to modernity. That is to say, as the legal mirror of the 
transition from substantive to formal ethics fostered by Kant’s categorical 
imperative: Du kannst, denn du sollst –“You can because you must.” 
In Legal Positivism, the law is not to be obeyed due to its inherent goodness or 
its relation to a higher moral order, but due to the sheer fact of it being law. 
However, Legal Positivism can hardly be considered to be a unified theory, and 
albeit they have not been officially established, it is possible to identify at least three 
different currents of thought within Legal Positivism:  Radical Legal Positivism, 
Legal Formalism, and Legal Pseudo-Realism. The first of them finds little –if any– 
academic support, yet it is remarkably common in popular culture and everyday 
life. Radical Legal Positivism (RLP) is a full-fledged inversion of Natural Law, for 
in opposition to the requirement of a law being just or moral in order to be 
considered as legal, RLP establishes that legal equals just, good or moral: whatever 
that is established by law is good. Such a stand lacks academic support (either from 
the point of view of legal theory or moral philosophy); however, it is largely 
supported in media: how many times do we hear in the news the use of the term 
“legal” as a synonym for “good” or “just”, and how many times do we hear the use 
of the term “illegal” as a synonym for “bad” or “unjust”? Such usage is certainly 
widespread despite its lack of support among scholars, so one could wonder –as 
Critical Legal Studies fittingly does– about the ideological motives behind a 
reasoning that places the state at the level of God, law at the level of religion, and 
legal theory at the level of theology. Notably intriguing and appealing, the study of 
this form of Legal Positivism deserves a more careful and serious consideration 
that, unfortunately, exceeds the scope of this research. 
The other two currents could be identified either as Legal Formalism and Legal 
Pseudo-Realism, or as Continental Legal Positivism and Anglo-American Legal 
Positivism. The rationale for calling them Legal Formalism (LF) and Legal Pseudo-
Realism (LPR) is that whereas the other classification could obey what may seem 
an artificial distinction –for instance, one can easily imagine an American scholar 
basing his or her theories on the work of Hans Kelsen, and a French or German one 
basing his or her writings on Joseph Raz’s theories– this chapter opts for adopting 
an arguably more fair approach strictly based on the content of such theories. As its 
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very name shows, LF is chiefly concerned with the form of the law, whose legal 
and binding character depends on it being passed in the right form, by the right 
institution and following the right procedure. The most prominent author within this 
particular current of thought is Hans Kelsen, whose theories and most relevant 
writings will be analysed in this section. However, a brief overview seems right in 
order to gain a sense of the existing differences between this approach and LPR. 
Legal Formalism can be easily seen as Legal Positivism at its purest: as a theory 
that upholds that the legal and binding character of a legal norm is strictly dependent 
on the law and its form, alien to any further consideration regarding morals, people 
or politics. It places law as a separate sphere or system that, while appearing 
profoundly connected to those of economics and politics, remains independent from 
them. The most relevant work in this field is Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, first 
written in 1934 and considerably expanded later on in 1960. Presenting the law as 
a chiefly hierarchical phenomenon, this book argues that the hierarchical character 
of the law acts as a binding norm in and by itself: every norm in a legal system is 
derived from the Grundnorm or “basic norm” –usually likened to the constitution 
of a given legal system– which is at the same time the base and top of the legal 
pyramid. All norms derive from it and owe their validity, legality and binding 
character to their accordance to the Grundnorm, hence enclosing the legal system 
in itself, and making it blind to any extra-legal source –whether that source is God, 
morals or politics. 
Legal Pseudo-Realism, on the other hand, found greater echo among analytic 
philosophers and Anglo-American scholars. I have chosen to name this current of 
thought as LPR since it appears to stand in a middle ground between Kelsen’s pure 
formalism and other theories that could be placed within Legal Realism. Although 
this current also rejects the metaphysical presuppositions of Natural Law, it can be 
differentiated from LF inasmuch as its main focus shifts from the formal 
requirements of the law and its place in the hierarchy of the legal system, to the 
social facts and structures of government that permit its very existence. Here, unlike 
what happened in Kelsen’s theory, the spheres of law and politics are much closer 
to each other in an almost-symbiotic relationship. The most prominent supporters 
of LPR are H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. 
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On the one hand, Hart considers that the law cannot find the ultimate ground of 
its authority in force, morals, or in law itself. The difference with Kelsen is clear, 
for any sort of Kantian transcendentalism is rejected in favour of a more 
empirically-based approach. According to Hart, the authority of the law is 
intrinsically social: no imaginary pre-established Grundnorm can be its source of 
validity, but only customs and effective social practices. On the other hand, Raz 
takes a slightly more Kelsenian approach, arguing that the law is to be seen as a 
legitimate authority if its legitimacy can be determined in its own terms –instead of 
being derived from evaluative concerns such as morals. This explains why Joseph 
Raz eventually entered in a debate with the late Ronald Dworkin –as well as some 
morally inclusive trends in Legal Positivism–concerning the positivist or anti-
positivist nature of the law, while also standing between Kelsen’s pure formalism 
and Legal Realism. 
The theoretical roots of these three prominent authors –Kelsen, Hart and Raz– 
can be traced back to some aspects of Hobbes’ contractualism, and the works of 
Hume and Jeremy Bentham. Some of Bentham’s theories were eventually adopted 
and re-elaborated by John Austin who, as it was previously said, became the actual 
precursor of Legal Positivism: the first legal scholar to openly challenge Natural 
Law and consider law as a mere social construction. However, most legal scholars 
lost interest in Austin’s positivism by mid-twentieth century, and it would not be 
until Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law that Legal Positivism would regain its lost 
importance.  
As stated above, Pure Theory of Law was first written in 1934 and then 
expanded in 1960. In this book, Kelsen describes the law as a highly hierarchical 
structure that places this very hierarchy as a de facto binding norm: every norm in 
a legal system must be derived from the Grundnorm or “basic norm” –commonly 
assimilated to the constitutional text of a given legal system– which stands 
simultaneously as the base and top of the legal pyramid. All norms derive from it 
and owe their validity, legality and binding character to their accordance to the 
Grundnorm, enclosing the legal system in itself and making it blind to extra-legal 
sources –unlike Natural Law. This is considered one of the most original 
contributions ever made to legal theory, and it distinguishes between the static and 
dynamic aspects of the law: the former establishes that individual legal norms are 
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related to each other in a superiority-inferiority basis; and the latter analyses the 
relationship between law and the sphere of the political, and, more specifically, its 
relationship with the legislative power of the state. In this aspect, law is eventually 
recognised to be politically and ethically charged due to the debate that takes place 
in the process of writing and passing laws. And it is precisely this dynamic aspect 
of the law that leads Kelsen to identify it with the state as a single entity that relates 
to other entities –other nation states– in a considerably more “primitive” way 
through international law. 
In relation to the previous section of this chapter, Legal Positivism can be seen 
as a rejection of the inherent ambiguity of Natural Law insofar as the metaphysical 
assumptions of the latter –regardless of their religious, political, moral or 
ideological character– can easily be seized and used for particular interests and 
goals. Nevertheless, even if Legal Positivism –and, more precisely, the work of 
Kelsen and his Legal Formalism– provide a neat and sharp critique of Natural Law, 
it creates some new problems of its own. 
One of the criticisms that can be made from the point of view of this research is 
its top-down approach. According to Kelsen, the law is an indirect system of 
guidance that compels the courts of justice to apply certain sanctions if certain deeds 
are committed. Instead of telling citizens what to do, Legal Positivism upholds that 
the law is meant to tell judges and courts to treat these citizens on the basis of their 
actions and the existing legal stipulations. Much like Natural Law, Legal Positivism 
reduces citizens and their subjectivity to mere passive objects, utterly insignificant 
to the functioning and ends of the law. Thus one might wonder about what sort of 
argument could be provided by Legal Positivism in order to justify the prohibition 
of certain behaviours and conducts. 
From a Kelsenian perspective, the answer would be that such prohibitions are 
fully justified due to their compliance with a higher norm and, ultimately, with the 
Grundnorm. As can be seen, such an answer is purely formal and lacks any sort of 
substantive content, making it a target of harsh criticism from the point of view of 
many theorists ascribed to Natural Law. In response to these criticisms Kelsen 
recognised the presence of a certain ethical and political element in the debates prior 
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to the passing of a law; but in his opinion such features should remain irrelevant 
from a normative point of view. 
The question of normativity, however, is not exempt from criticisms and intense 
debates either. In this matter Kelsen upheld that the law is essentially normative and 
that the normativity and validity of any legal norm stems from its compliance with 
the Grundnorm. His views gave rise to fierce objections coming from legal scholars 
subscribing to Natural Law and Legal Realism: mostly against the very idea of the 
Grundnorm. From the point of view of Natural Law, if a law is considered to be 
valid because it has been written and passed in a legally established form, following 
a legally established procedure by an institution that is legally established and 
constitutionally recognised…what happens with this constitution or Grundnorm? 
How is it established? Where does its authority come from? And since Kelsen 
would reply that such authority is “presupposed” and that the first constitution is to 
be obeyed, one could wonder if, in the end, he is simply upholding it as “good” or 
“just”, and thus concealing some sort of Natural Law by means of a mirror-game in 
which the validity and bindingness of any law is explained by referring to another. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of Legal Realism, the question of the 
Grundnorm seems just as dubious. Even if we were to accept Kelsen’s claims on 
legal validity being exclusively dependent on the compliance of legal norms with 
the Grundnorm, certain aspects such as the origins, nature and authority of the latter 
would remain utterly unknown and unexplained –unless it was simply accepted as 
purely “given” or “presupposed”. The question of sovereignty remains unanswered 
and symptomatically ignored in Legal Positivism and Kelsen’s theoretical edifice. 
Such is the origin of one of the most relevant controversies in the history of legal 
theory: that between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Whereas the former considered 
the state and the law as the same entity, the latter saw the law as a by-product of the 
state and the sphere of the political. In this debate, that started in the 1920s and 
would continue after the dead of Hans Kelsen in 1973, Schmitt tried to point out 
what appears as a clear void or blind-spot in Kelsen’s theory: he tried to ‘crack the 
mirror’ and put an end to the tautological reasoning by which the validity of any 
law is explained through a reference to another law ad Grundnorm –which 
apparently is self-explanatory– by putting emphasis on the question of sovereignty 
and the origins of such Grundnorm. According to Carl Schmitt, whose main ideas 
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will be further explained in the following section, the foundation of the Grundnorm 
is radically political and has its origins in the sovereign who –against Kelsen’s 
views– is considered not to be that who rules in normal circumstances of legality, 
but that “who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, [1922] 2005): not just by 
governing the polity in the exception, but also by deeming certain circumstances to 
constitute an exception. Despite his disagreements with Schmitt, Kelsen himself 
partially acknowledged such a notion of sovereignty by accepting that judges and 
tribunals are compelled to decide over any matter they are competent to, even in the 
presence of a legal lacuna, which they must fill in order to grant the rule of law and 
the efficacy and stability of the whole legal system. 
The mirror game proposed by Kelsen places Law in a separate and autonomous 
sphere, alien to political facts and questions on subjectivity, giving rise to 
questionings concerning the efficacy of the law and its enforceability –for even if a 
law is perfectly written and passed following Kelsen’s scheme…could it be still 
considered to be law if it is not de facto enforced? 
Legal Realism 
The question of the efficacy and enforcement of the law is, precisely, the main 
concern of Legal Realism; and whereas Natural Law and Legal Positivism could be 
respectively identified under Thomas Aquinas’ maxim “Lex iniusta non est lex” and 
the Kantian “Du kannst, denn du sollst”, at this point we can revisit Goethe and 
rephrase Faust’s reply to Mephisto ([1808/1832] 1993) in order to crystallise Legal 
Realism in one phrase: “Die Tat ist alles, nichts die Form(sache)” –the deed is 
everything, the (legal) form nothing.6 There is a permanent dialogue and debate 
among these three schools and following it one may see how, for instance, Legal 
Positivism appears as an answer to Natural Law’s metaphysical ambiguities, and, 
in turn, Legal Realism as a response to Legal Positivism’s concealed metaphysical 
assumptions. Each of them tries to fill a relevant void in the theoretical edifice of 
the other two by emphasising the content, form and validity, or efficacy of the law. 
The ultimate goal of Legal Realism is to analyse law in purely factual terms. 
Instead of focusing on the adequacy of its content to a given set of moral values or 
                                                          
6 The original quotation says: Die Tat ist alles, nichts der Ruhm – “The deed is everything, the 
fame nothing” 
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its formal validity, it puts emphasis on the efficacy of the law and how it is 
implemented and enforced. From the point of view of Legal Realism a law that is 
not enforceable can hardly be considered to be a law, and thus one may imagine the 
case of a hypothetical immaculate law in terms of morality –e.g. a law that may 
compel every citizen to be “nice and friendly” to other citizens– or a formally 
perfect law –e.g. the case of a legally recognised parliament that passes under the 
right form and following the right procedure a law reversing the law of gravity– 
which would be absurd in the end due to its lack of enforceability, and consequently 
could not be considered as  properly normative and legal in the terms of this 
perspective. Legal Realism emphasises the normative character of the law in an 
external judgement of efficacy, and by doing so it also casts doubts about the 
ultimate relevance of the external judgement of morality fostered by Natural Law 
and the internal judgement of validity defended by Legal Positivism.  
However, this current of thought helps us realise a point that is essential to the 
aim of this research: the displacement of a certain set of beliefs that takes place in 
the production of every legal theory. In this sense Natural Law underwent a process 
of secularisation that shifted its emphasis from religion and the belief in God to 
morality and natural goods, and yet they could be seen as the same set of beliefs 
expressed under different names as a consequence of the progressive secularisation 
of Western societies. From this perspective one could understand the development 
of Legal Positivism as a final attempt to put God out of the question, but the auto-
referential explanation of the authority and binding power of the law provided by 
Kelsen can be read, in turn, as the attempt to allocate –positive– law the role 
previously played by God in Natural Law. Therefore we may wonder if, in this 
Kantian turn towards formal imperatives, Legal Positivism is but placing God –qua 
specific set of beliefs or ultimate justification– in a different guise: sweeping God 
under the carpet of the Grundnorm. 
In this regard, Legal Realism can be understood as a Nietzschean turn that 
actually tries to kill God in legal theory: as a theoretical framework that asserts the 
importance of the “is” in opposition to a metaphysical or tautological “ought to be”. 
Certain sets of beliefs are displaced in the switch from Natural Law to Legal 
Positivism…but does that apply to Legal Realism as well? In order to answer that 
question it is important to consider whether we are reading Legal Realism in a 
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descriptive or normative way. Surely the normativity of the law is in the very kernel 
of this theory, and still that does not imply the normativity of the theory itself. As 
has been said, Legal Realism emphasises the difference between “is” and “ought to 
be”, and for that very reason it is profoundly descriptive in comparison with other 
schools of legal thought –especially Natural Law. A descriptive reading of Legal 
Realism provides us with an invaluable analytical tool for critical thinking –as many 
authors such as Giorgio Agamben, Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Derrida, Antonio Negri 
or Slavoj Žižek have proved in their readings of Carl Schmitt– but if the approach 
taken is a normative one –“things ought to be like this because this is how they are” 
– it is very hard to imagine a more conservative and despotic system of thought. If 
Legal Realism is read in this fashion, there is –as happened before with the 
secularisation of Natural Law and the development of Legal Positivism– a 
displacement of a set of beliefs. If Legal Realism is read in a normative way, the 
sovereign becomes invested with the powers and authority of God. 
The use of these theological expressions is no coincidence. They have been 
deliberately chosen for one simple reason: the importance given to “political 
theology” in the work of Carl Schmitt, one of the most prominent authors in Legal 
Realism –and the one which this section will focus on. However, before dipping 
into Schmitt’s system of thought it is important to mention and briefly summarise 
the development of a parallel line of development in Legal Realism: the school of 
American Legal Realism –first developed in United States in the early 20th century 
and constituting an open attack against the positivism that considered law as a self-
enclosed system uncontaminated by politics, economics or morals. The most 
relevant of its forerunners was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who in his book The 
Common Law ([1881] 2007) denounced the pretentions of depicting law as a 
science by stating that “(t)he life of law has not been logic; it has been experience.” 
Over the course of his life, Holmes would maintain that Law is what the courts 
decide, and nothing else. 
Holmes remains important in the context of this chapter for two different 
reasons. The first one is that his view on the law as that which the courts decide 
combined with his theory of “the bad-man” – for whom a legal duty is but “a 
prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable 
consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment” (ibid.) – is the 
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closest approach that we can find to the main concern of this chapter: the role played 
by an ordinary citizen and his subjectivity in legal theory. The second reason is that 
the importance given to judicial decisions in his work directly connects him with 
Carl Schmitt and his theory of the sovereign, placing the judge in a central position 
due to his capacity to decide on the exception created by the ultimate indeterminacy 
of the law.7 
However, in Schmitt the question of sovereignty is not limited to the role of 
judges and courts in the enforcement of the law –which may depend on highly 
arbitrary factors such as the mood of the judge at that moment– but exceeds this 
micro level and flows into politics at a macro level –where, in a realist fashion, and 
following Mao Zedong, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and the 
law would be but the rationalisation of such power (Derrida, 1990).  
Independently of the level and magnitude of the indeterminacy we are dealing 
with, the “sovereign is who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, [1922] 2005). The 
sovereign governs de facto in the exception, but what is even more relevant is that 
he also determines the exception itself: an emergency situation has to be politically 
deemed as exceptional in order to be considered as such. Nietzsche, in his 
notebooks, stated that there are no facts, only interpretations; and the same thing 
can be said, mutatis mutandis, about the exception in Schmitt: that there are no 
situations of exception, only a political interpretation of situations as exceptional. 
The emphasis placed on the question of sovereignty and the exception is meant to 
crack the mirror game in Kelsen’s theory by undermining what seems to be a self-
referential Grundnorm and a tautological reasoning that aims to legitimise any law 
by referring it to further laws and that self-referential Grundnorm.  
In opposition to Kelsen, Schmitt’s main concern is the foundational moment 
and conditions of Law, for according to him that who manages to govern on the 
exception is capable of creating the conditions of possibility and guiding lines for 
the legal normality that follows it. The exception is a moment of pure “mythic 
violence” (Benjamin, [1921] 1996) by means of which a decision is made and a 
                                                          
7 The question of the indeterminacy of the law has been one of the most important debates in 
legal theory in the last few years. 
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new juridico-political order is established. At a micro level the functioning of the 
exception can be explained using the following imaginary case:  
There is a minor parent whose baby urgently needs a kidney transplant in order to survive. 
Nevertheless, the problem is that despite this minor parent being the only potential donor 
and the only chance of survival of the baby, a law aimed to protect minors forbids them 
from donating organs; therefore –at least in principle– such a transplant could not be made. 
A judge influenced by Legal Realism would create a legal lacuna –an 
exception– in order to save the baby. In order to protect a public good such as life, 
the judge could step out of the rule of law by arguing its indeterminacy; stating, for 
instance, that this specific law does not say anything about “minors who have their 
own children” and that due to this indeterminacy and his obligation to make a 
decision, he hereby authorises the transplant in order to protect the constitutionally 
established value of “human life”. Going back to Goethe’s Faust we may dare to 
say “Law is mighty, mightier necessity.” 
Notwithstanding the potential reading of the case in terms of values and Natural 
Law, the relevant point is that here the judge –qua member of the judicial power, 
and thus as a power of the state– creates an exception, governs on it, and puts 
himself in the place of the sovereign: the place of that able to decide in matters of 
life and death. This correlation between sovereignty and the exception also applies 
to what happens at a macro level, as Giorgio Agamben illustrates in State of 
Exception (2005), when he puts the example of American politics post September 
11 attacks in 2001. The decision over life and death, the “right to bare life” –“vita 
nuda” in Italian, and “ζωή” or “zoe” in Greek, is pure biological life absent of any 
political value per se– is also developed by this author in Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (1998), where he agrees with some of the views provided by 
Derrida in Force of Law (1990) concerning how the state can commit acts of pure 
violence for the sheer need of self-legitimation. According to Agamben, the 
sovereign who governs on the exception and commits such acts of pure violence 
creates the “homo sacer”, “a being that cannot be ‘murdered’ or ‘sacrificed’ but just 
killed” (Agamben, 1998), for the bare life of the homo sacer lacks any sort of 
political symbolism in itself: it is an object, a mere means towards the consecution 
of an end, self-legitimation.  
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Thus it is clear that for Schmitt and all those authors influenced by him –
Agamben and Derrida among them– law is a highly political phenomenon. 
According to The Concept of the Political (Schmitt, [1927] 2007), the political is 
not reducible to party politics: on the contrary, it is the very kernel of politics and 
overflows its own field reaching and contaminating spheres such as that of 
economy, religion or law. The political appears wherever there is a friend-enemy 
distinction, and the law does so by introducing differentiations such as that between 
“victims” and “criminals”. This view is summarised in one of the letters sent by 
Leo Strauss to Schmitt in 1932: “Because man is by nature evil, he therefore 
needs dominion. But dominion can be established, that is, men can be unified only 
in a unity against other men. Every association of men is necessarily a separation 
from other men... the political thus understood is not the constitutive principle of 
the state, of order, but a condition of the state” (1995). 
Strauss’ summary of Schmitt’s views reveals something that remained 
concealed in previous legal theories until now: the ideological character of the law. 
However, and although Schmitt was the first to hint at such a possibility, he did not 
take his analyses any further in that direction. It would not be until the development 
of Critical Legal Studies in the 1970s and 1980s that this feature of law would be 
studied in greater depth.  
Many criticisms can be made of both Legal Realism and the work of Carl 
Schmitt: from the point of view of Natural Law it could be argued that the sheer 
effective enforcement of a law does not make it legal, for it may not respect –or 
even go against– certain moral values, becoming thus an instrument for tyranny. 
From the point of view of Legal Positivism it could be said that the mere 
enforcement of a norm that lacks the necessary legal requirements to be considered 
“law” would be no different from criminal actions committed by mafias or any other 
criminal organisations. And from the point of view of this research project, and 
even if Legal Realism is not completely blind to the human factor –insofar as it 
recognises the relevance of the judge and whoever places him or herself in the place 
of the sovereign– just as has happened with Legal Positivism, it can be accused of 
potential conservatism and of repeating the same top-down scheme adopted by 
other schools of legal thought due to its focus on the figure of the sovereign: it is a 
double-edged blade wielded by the sovereign over the head of its subjects. 
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Therefore, albeit all these arguments make perfect sense from the point of view of 
their respective theoretical frameworks, and although they admittedly contain 
elements of truth, the theoretical usefulness of Legal Realism cannot be so easily 
dismissed.  
After all, Legal Realism was the first legal theory to look at the actual 
functioning of the law and its relation to politics without any concealed or 
unconcealed moral reservations. And that is the reason why it has the potential to 
justify, at the same time, the highest and lowest political goals: “He who fights with 
monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And when 
you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you” (Nietzsche, [1886] 2002). 
Critical Legal Studies 
The current in legal theory known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is slightly 
different from the other schools of thought we have seen so far, and also the one 
that stands closer to the approach taken in this thesis. Natural Law, Legal Positivism 
and Legal Realism are in permanent communication and debate, contradicting each 
other in the terms respectively emphasised by each of them: moral content, form 
and validity, and efficacy and enforcement. Although in permanent debate, these 
positions are not mutually exclusive in every aspect, and we may imagine different 
combinations of two of them that set aside a third one. Therefore a combination of 
Natural Law and Legal Positivism prioritising the moral content and formal validity 
of the law would dismiss many of the insights provided by Legal Realism inasmuch 
as such combination would deem them as pure extra-legal violence. A combination 
of Natural Law and Legal Realism would exclude from its theoretical framework 
the emphasis on the form and validity of legal norms fostered by Legal Positivism, 
since what would really matter for that approach is nothing else but the ends of the 
law and the efficacy of the means to achieve its ends. And, finally, a combination 
of Legal Positivism and Legal Realism would give birth to a rejection of the 
possibility of legal norms having to be informed by moral values in their content, 
for what would matter from such a point of view is the inner validity of the law and 
its effective application. 
Although it is possible to be exclusively ascribed to any of the legal theories 
described so far, it is difficult to find a justification of the functioning of a whole 
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legal system combining these three approaches; more commonly, we find a 
combination of two of them in opposition to a third one. So if these theories are 
related to each other in such an intense way, what happens with CLS? 
The origins of CLS can be traced back to the 1970s with the work of the 
“Conference on Critical Legal Studies” in the United States and other similar 
groups operating in different countries around the world, such as the Critical Legal 
Conference in Britain in 1984. Influenced by American Legal Realism and the 
radical political culture of the 1960s, CLS was born as an attempt to “make the law 
free” (Thoreau, [1854] 1993), to re-humanise both the law and legal institutions by 
vacating them of concealed class-domination interests (Turley, 1987).  
Rather than being concerned with positing a “correct” legal theory or method, 
CLS criticised the purported neutrality of mainstream legal theory, calling for 
political commitment among legal scholars, while also avoiding sectarianism. And 
although the theoretical edifice of CLS is far from being either homogeneous or 
unified, it is possible to highlight certain features that give a minimal cohesion to 
this movement. Namely, that law is politics, that the law is political, that it is 
ideological, that its inner assumptions are not clear, and that the law is also 
ultimately undetermined. In the first place, CLS refuses to accept that law and 
politics could be considered as entirely separate spheres: despite differing in some 
aspects, both of them belong to the same “superstructure” aiming to guarantee the 
existence of a certain political community by granting the reproduction of its 
relations of power and domination. Nevertheless, from the CLS point of view, the 
law goes beyond “politics”: it is also “political” inasmuch as it relies upon a series 
of binary oppositions such as that of “victim” and “criminal” –following the friend-
enemy distinction provided by Carl Schmitt. Stemming from the previous two 
points, CLS also posits that the law is radically ideological insofar as it preserves 
the interests of those in power by depicting itself as a means of protection for those 
who are not. In addition to that, for many CLS scholars some of the most common 
assumptions in law are rather questionable –e.g. the hegemonic liberal 
understanding of citizens as fully autonomous and rational individuals, 
unconditioned by external factors such as politics, economics or the law itself. And, 
finally, CLS also embraces one last feature of Legal Realism in its defence of the 
ultimate indeterminacy of the law: upholding that there is an unbridgeable gap 
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between the abstract formulation of the law and its concrete application, 
constituting in this way an “exception” in which the government of the judge qua 
sovereign –as a power of the state– is established. 
In short: 
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in which legal 
doctrine and legal education and the practices of legal institutions work to buttress and 
support a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian relations. Critical theory works to 
develop radical alternatives, and to explore the debate of the role of law in the creation of 
social, economic and political relations that will advance human emancipation. (Fitzpatrick 
and Hunt, 1987, 1-2) 
In the opinion of Simon Critchley, philosophy commences with disappointment 
(2008), and the same could be predicated for CLS, whose departing point is defined 
by its disaffection with traditional legal theory. However, some scholars ascribed 
to this current –such as Alan Hunt– invite us to reflect on the future of CLS after 
this “reactive” beginning: “Can it go beyond its reactive origins and develop a 
viable alternative theorisation?” (Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987) 
Unsurprisingly, the difficulty of moving on and setting aside this reactive 
genesis has generated several conflicts among CLS scholars over the years: 
“Despite its youth, CLS has generated many histories of the movement itself in such 
a way that it is not only frequently and accurately characterised by its inwardness 
but is also depicted theoretically in terms of an uneasy self-referentiality” (Schlegel, 
1992 as cited in Douzinas, Goodrich and Hachamovitch, 1994, 7). Nevertheless, 
CLS does not seem to be sentenced to an eternity of stagnation and self-
referentiality. Over the decades it has managed to move from a preliminary 
emphasis on Marxist sociological theory, to structuralism following the works of 
Levi-Strauss and Althusser, and, finally, to a last stage in which it has switched to 
more modest political goals: gradual institutional reforms (Ibid, 9-13).  
In a certain manner, what we are witnessing here is a timid return of CLS to the 
shadow of traditional legal theory, for albeit it recognises contingency as the 
condition and limit of legal judgement, it fails to address critically the question of 
justice and subjectivity in a time in which legality and morality are normally 
separated: “In formal terms justice is identified with the administration of justice 
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and the requirements and guarantees of legal procedure. In substantive terms justice 
loses its critical character and acts not as a critique, but as critical apology for the 
extant legal system” (Ibid, 18). However, not all the scholars ascribed to CLS face 
this problem in the same way.  
Some, like Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1987), have addressed the question of 
justice indirectly, focusing their attention on the contingent and historical character 
of certain legal institutions that we tend to hold as natural, timeless, or universally 
valid. And, arguing that these institutions produce a certain form of knowledge in 
order to portray themselves as natural and ahistorical, they seek to invert the relation 
between such institutions and the living-breathing subject through a process of 
empowerment. 
Other authors, however, have taken a more head-on approach to the relation 
between law and justice. In this regard, we can find Costas Douzinas and Drucilla 
Cornell in opposite poles of the debate. In the opinion of Douzinas (1994, 22) the 
justness of any legal judgement depends on the capability of the law to give answers 
to the unique and singular demands of the person who comes to the law. Against 
this claim Drucilla Cornell supports a radical incompatibility between law and 
justice: “It is only when we accept the uncrossable divide between law and justice 
that deconstruction both exposes and protects in the very deconstruction of the 
identification of law as justice that we can apprehend the full practical significance 
of Derrida’s statement that ‘deconstruction is justice’” (1992, 157). 
In a way, both Cornell and Douzinas seem to be simultaneously right and wrong 
in their claims about the possibility of justice. A paradoxical situation only made 
possible by their attempt to theorise the limits of legal theory from within legal 
theory –instead of considering justice as a constituent limit of the law, and the law 
as a constituent limit of justice. But, what is the meaning of all this? 
The key to understanding the paragraph above lies in the systematic character 
of the law. Namely, that a system unavoidably requires being limited in order to 
exist. Nevertheless, getting a proper grasp of the importance of such constituent 
limits, and thus explaining what was stated in the previous paragraph, it becomes 
absolutely necessary to make a stop here and introduce Niklas Luhmann’s systems 
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theory.8  According to this German sociologist, every system is defined by the 
boundary –or, as we have called it here, “limit”– that differentiates such system 
from an infinitely complex environment, turning it into a zone of “reduced 
complexity” within the latter. However, the system does not appear fully isolated 
from its environment insofar as it also tends to select a minimum of information 
from the outside –information that becomes “meaningful” in the very process of 
being selected as relevant for the system– in order to ensure the good functioning 
of its inner communications. Such pieces of external information selected as 
meaningful are essential for the survival of the system itself –and, as such, they 
must be chosen very carefully– but if too many of them were selected, the inner 
complexity of the system would approximate that of its environment and thus the 
system as such would eventually cease to exist and dissolve back into the 
environment it emerged from at first (Luhmann, [1984] 1995). Therefore, following 
Luhmann, we could arguably say that if a system is to survive, its relations with the 
environment must be kept at a low level of complexity. That is to say that no system 
can fully encompass all the information surrounding it; or, in more Derridean terms, 
that there is no system capable of catching up with itself, hence needing a 
constitutive outside in order to exist (Cornell, 1992, 165). Therefore, according to 
Luhmann and Derrida, the possibility of attaining full presence in the law is but a 
myth: as a system, it requires being limited in order to exist. 
So, what are its limits? Why do I say that Douzinas and Cornell are 
simultaneously right and wrong about what they say regarding justice? What makes 
such a paradoxical situation possible? 
The limits constituting the law qua system are the already mentioned questions 
of contingency, subjectivity and justice; and there are at least two reasons for 
considering them as such. In the first place –and following the previous explanation 
on Luhmann’s systems theory– a thorough legal analysis of these phenomena or 
their full inclusion in the legal system would render the law inoperative and thus 
                                                          
8 The work of Ernesto Laclau on “empty signifiers” (2007) could be used for the sake of 
explaining this point –moreover since it opens a window of opportunity for the production of 
new “meanings” in terms of hegemony, making it more suitable for our analysis of justice. 
Nevertheless, I consider that Luhmann’s theories present the question of the limits in a simpler 
manner. So even if this research will turn later on to Laclau’s work, for the time being it seems 
reasonable to introduce this topic through the work of Niklas Luhmann. 
53 
 
useless. Inoperative and useless inasmuch as it is an expansive phenomenon 
supposed to be equally applicable to all the members of a given political community 
if such community is to exist as comm[on]-unity, and not as a mere multiplicity of 
personal identities (Althusser, [1970] 2001). The law must remain ultimately 
abstract in order to be generally applicable, because if it ever became so specific 
and detailed that it could foresee and rule the actions of any given subject –limit of 
subjectivity– in any possible situation –limit of contingency– and satisfy any 
imaginable demand –limit of justice– it would not be law anymore. In such a 
situation we would be left not with law but with a plethora of individual guides of 
behaviour so vast and extensive that no judge could ever hope to have full 
knowledge of them; and so complex and brief 9 that no legislator would ever have 
the capacity to give norms able to rule the behaviour of each and every citizen.  
The questions of contingency, subjectivity and justice have thus to remain 
partially excluded and simplified –a limit– if law as a system is to survive. The 
choice of the most suitable abstract norm to be applied to a contingent situation is 
left for the judge to decide. The extant differences between particular subjects are 
nullified through their labelling as abstract “citizens” or “individuals,” depriving 
them of their faces, their own names and whatever other features could ever make 
them different from their fellows: they are reduced to a unified and homogeneous 
Other that ultimately constitutes the system law as such. And last but not least, the 
satisfaction that legal norms can provide to particular demands for justice does not 
depend on the final satisfaction of the demanding subject, but on the procedural 
rules that determine what actions can be used to enforce the law.  
The full inclusion of these questions in the law would lead to its disappearance 
as a system. But if that is the case, why does it not simply exclude them in toto?  
This takes us to the second reason why these phenomena are taken as constituent 
limits. Namely, that even if they represent a limit that refuses to be fully 
comprehended in the law, the latter still needs contingency, subjectivity and 
demands for justice in order to come (back) into existence. On the one hand, the 
law needs of the disjuncture between abstract norms and contingent situations, 
subjects and demands in order to come into existence. This means that, in an abstract 
                                                          
9 Brief due to the “short life” of the citizens for which these regulations would be made. 
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world where abstract legal norms could be easily applied with no need to adapt 
them to specific cases –for there would be no contingency, specific subjectivity nor 
personal demands for justice– the law would become purely descriptive, losing its 
normative character. It would be impossible to enforce for there would be no need 
to enforce it; and, therefore, it could no longer be considered as law (Derrida, 1990).  
On the other hand, the law also needs this disjuncture in order to come back into 
existence: as authors such as Benjamin, Foucault and Derrida show us, legal norms 
need to be periodically enforced in order to survive –that is, in order to remain in 
force. Law demands to be obeyed and disobeyed at the same time: it demands to be 
obeyed in order to assert its authority, but it also demands to be disobeyed in order 
to actualise its authority (Borsch-Jacobsen and Collins, 1985).  
Law as a system cannot ignore contingency, subjectivity and demands for 
justice altogether; nor can it fully comprehend them within itself. These phenomena 
must remain out of it as a limit: simplified and partially ignored in order to ensure 
the good functioning of the inner communications of the system (Luhmann, [1984] 
1995). In other words, they must remain as constituent limits of the law. 
Nevertheless, and following Laclau and Hegel, we could arguably say that to 
think of the limits of something also implies thinking about what lies beyond such 
limits. If the law depends on contingency, subjectivity, and the articulation of 
demands for justice in order to come (back) into existence, but at the same time is 
unable to fully comprehend them, this means that in the end it is impossible to think 
about the law without thinking about its limits…and thus it is impossible to think 
about the law without thinking about what lies beyond these limits. And yet, the 
actualisation of that which lies beyond them would also “involve the impossibility 
of what is this side of the limit. True limits are always antagonistic” (Laclau, 2007, 
37).  
But what is the departure point for these reflections? When do we start thinking 
about these limits and what lies beyond them? What triggers the emergence of 
debates about justice within a legal framework? As stated above, the law needs the 
disjuncture between abstract norms and contingent situations, subjects and demands 
in order to come (back) into existence. And it is precisely in this chasm between the 
pre-existing legal norm and the contingent situation requiring its enforcement that 
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new debates about justice may appear. It is in this abyss, in this différance, between 
the legal representation of justice and the actual requirements of justice that the 
articulation of new demands for justice becomes possible. And thus, it is when these 
demands are made that we start thinking about and discussing the limits of the law 
and what lies beyond them. It is only when a contingent subject claims justice that 
the concept of justice as such irrupts into the politico-legal debate. But who is this 
contingent subject? 
Legal theory tends to consider subjectivity, contingency and justice as mere 
problems to be solved by, within, and for the sake of the law. Undoubtedly, this is 
intrinsically related to their partial exclusion and their role as constituent limits both 
of law and legal theory; but it also explains why legal theory tends to focus on the 
figures of the legislator and the judge rather than on those of the victim or the 
offender. Since these questions are usually seen as problems for the good 
functioning of the law, legal theory has focused on finding the best ways of getting 
rid of these disturbing elements with no further concern about their origin, nature, 
effects or raison d’être. And therefore, historically, it has focused on those figures 
who can exert power over the design of the legal framework in order to minimise 
the effects of these phenomena: the legislator and the judge. It has focused on the 
neutralisation of these matters. That is to say, it has attempted to remove the 
symptom straight away without understanding the origins and inner mechanisms of 
this disturbance of the legal order. But why should questions such as subjectivity, 
contingency and justice be considered as symptomatic in this context? And if they 
happen to be symptomatic… symptomatic of ‘what’?  
A symptom is, according to Freud ([1917] 1991), “a sign of, and a substitute 
for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence 
of the process of repression.” This definition provides a relevant insight about the 
concept of “symptom” but it does not answer the previous question: What is being 
substituted? What is being repressed? A first answer to these questions would be 
“revenge,” in the broadest sense of the word. What appears to be repressed would 
be the very possibility of taking justice into our own hands: 
Human life in common only becomes possible when it comes to gather a majority. A 
majority more powerful than each of the individuals, able to remain united against any of 
these. The power of such a community faces as “Law” the power of the individual, which 
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is stigmatised as “brute force” […]. The legal order, once established, shall not be violated 
in favour of an individual, being considered any violation of this kind as a pronouncement 
against the ethical value of such Law (Freud, [1930] 1963). 
Ultimately, the three phenomena studied here are symptomatic of the repression 
of the ‘power of the individual’, now stigmatised as ‘brute force’ in contrast with 
the law. They embody the return of the repressed: the return of that which had been 
ruled out by the law. The appearance of questions of subjectivity, contingency and 
justice within and against a legal framework puts into question the pretensions of 
universal applicability, validity and legitimacy of the legal norm: they appear as a 
sign of, and a substitute for, a non-mediated relation among human beings. That is 
to say, that which is culturally labelled as ‘revenge’ or ‘brute force.’ 
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives 
birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, 
and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge (Nietzsche, [1887] 1994). 
It is the very figure of the ‘victim’ –that which is denied ‘the true reaction, that 
of deeds’– the one that embodies the failure of the law and its pretensions. And 
thus, it is the figure that allows us to start thinking about the limits of the law and 
legal theory –and, in turn, about what lies beyond these limits. Therefore, the 
approach taken in this research is entirely different from that of classical legal 
theory. Instead of erasing the symptom, it intends to provide a deeper understanding 
of it; instead of focusing on the solutions for a problem to be solved, it intends to 
focus on the origins and potentialities of the “problem” itself; instead of assessing 
these elements as that which disturbs a purported normal functioning of the law, it 
intends to argue that these very elements are what allow the functioning of the law 
in the first place; and instead of addressing the figures of the legislator and the 
judge, it will address those of the victim and the offender. In other words, this 
research aims to focus on the contingent subjects that bring about claims and 
debates about justice within a legal framework: victims and offenders. 
Both embody the disturbing but necessary character of these phenomena within 
the legal framework. And thus, instead of focusing on ‘how to erase the symptom,’ 
this thesis aims to provide a deeper understanding of it, its origins, and its 
potentialities. In a rather Foucauldian fashion, and rather than focusing its attention 
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on a purportedly normal functioning of the law, this thesis will revolve around the 
particular struggles that reveal its structurally abnormal functioning. That is, its 
symptom. 
A preliminary definition of victim can be found in the 1985 United Nations 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power: 
‘Victims’ means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of 
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws 
operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of 
power…A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of 
whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless 
of the familiar relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. The term ‘victim’ also 
includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and 
persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent 
victimization (Annex A.1 and 2). 
It is important not to forget, however, that “offenders and victims are both 
victims” (Elias, 1986) since offenders –to a certain extent– are also victims 
inasmuch as they are usually denied the possibility of establishing a non-mediated 
relation with the victim in order to solve their conflict. They are victims as well, but 
their victimisation begins with their disempowerment by the state. 10  One may 
wonder then about the reasons underpinning the disempowerment of both parties in 
conflict. That is to say, one may wonder about the interests behind the mediation of 
the law in these particular struggles and its common “support” to the victims. An 
explanation can be found in the work of Walter Benjamin ([1921] 1996) and 
Jacques Derrida (1990). According to them, crime does not only cause pain and 
suffering to its victims, but also poses a threat to the authority of the law and the 
state monopoly on violence: the law needs to be enforced periodically in order to 
come (back) into existence and remain in-force. Therefore legal norms do not just 
regulate these conflictual relations, but they also need them in order to preserve 
their validity and normativity. There is a political interest in creating a social reality 
                                                          
10 A different case would be that of the state itself acting as a perpetrator or supporting them. A 
good example of this is the case of the death squads known as “GAL” –Grupos Antiterroristas 
de Liberación [Antiterrorist Liberation Groups] – established by the Spanish Government to 
fight the terrorist group ETA during the 1980s. 
58 
 
of victimisation that equals any attack on the victims to an attack on society as a 
whole. Such mediation fulfils an ideological function by means of which the law is 
depicted as a necessary good. And, by doing so, the state manages to posit itself –
and hence society– as another victim of crime, identifying the interests of the 
victims with the interests of the state.  
Well, my dear, you know the law is necessary, and what’s necessary and indispensable is 
good, and everything that’s good is nice. And it really is very nice indeed to be a good, 
law-abiding citizen and do one’s duty and have a clear conscience (Ionesco, [1953] 1958) 
However, this comes at a price: a degree of psychological damage and 
resentment on the part of the victims –which will be explained in further detail along 
the following section– appearing as a result of and in response to the shortcomings 
of the system. A sense of disappointment with the functioning of the law that, 
according to Jeffrey Reiman (as cited in Elias, 1986, 133) “is only in the eyes of the 
victim; for those in control, it’s a roaring success!” And it is this very perception of 
failure that may help us understand why certain authors talk about a crisis in 
contemporary liberal theories of justice. The simplification and partial exclusion of 
these extra-legal elements –symptomatic of the repression of the ‘power of the 
individual’ and its stigmatisation under the label of ‘brute force’– produces an 
increasing sense of disillusionment due, among other things, to the common narrow 
identification of justice with ‘procedural justice’ or ‘legal justice’ (Hunt, 1993, 
108). And it is precisely in the context of such miss-identification between justice 
and legal justice that this thesis seeks to provide a new theoretical framework that 
may allow us to get a better grasp of this ‘disillusionment’ with the law –of this 
‘uneasiness in culture,’ if we make a more accurate translation of Freud’s 
Civilization and Its Discontents (‘Das Unbehagen in der Kultur’ in the original 
German edition). 
But how can we do such a thing? How can we explain this allegedly widespread 
sentiment of disappointment and uneasiness in matters of law and justice? 
As it was explained above, there is not such a thing as an all-encompassing 
system: certain elements must always be left out of it. It must discriminate if the 
inner communications among its elements are to be preserved and functional. 
Therefore, it is not my intention to present here an all-inclusive view of law, 
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subjectivity, contingency and justice. No one can look right and left, nor “serve two 
masters” at the same time (Matthew, 6:24). Hence instead of trying to develop such 
an impossible project, the first two sections of the following chapter will focus their 
attention on the relationship between subjectivity and contingency –keeping the law 
as that unfathomable limit that closes the system and provides it with meaning while 
remaining ungraspable from within it. Building on this, the last section of the 
chapter will address the relationship that both justice and the law –as reciprocal 
constituent limits– seem to have with subjectivity and contingency. In a way, what 
this chapter seeks to do is to stand “back to back” with CLS, sharing its 
emancipatory goals and some of its insights, but looking in the opposite direction: 
towards the interconnection between subjectivity, contingency and justice. 
CLS is, by far, the branch of legal theory that stands closest to the approach of 
this research. And although many of its ideas and projects are not just shared, but 
also embraced, there is still an aspect of it that remains open to criticism. This 
chapter began recalling Justinian the Great and his claim about Law’s ultimate end 
being no other than the human person for whose sake it is made, and certainly, CLS 
seems to recover that long lost approach and aims to place the living breathing 
subject at the very centre of all institutions and social constructions: as their highest 
cause and as their highest end. CLS intends to subvert a historically deep-rooted 
bias that posits this living breathing subject as a problem to be solved, as a factor to 
be taken into account for the good functioning of any economic or political system, 
and as a means towards an end. Nevertheless, this research seeks to complement an 
aspect of CLS that does not fit in with this subversive goal. Namely, that even if the 
empowerment of a living breathing subject appears as its goal, its theorisations 
repeat the top-down approach of other schools of legal theory that place this subject 
in a prominently passive situation. CLS repeats this scheme and may sin, although 
unwittingly, by paternalism and by relegating the subject to a certain degree of 
infantilism. 
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Conclusion: the common blind-spot 
This chapter has aimed to describe four schools of thought within legal theory 
putting them in relation to one another, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of them from their own point of view and the others’. The order in which 
they have been presented is not casual or accidental. It was my intention to show 
how the premises of each of them are largely based upon the flaws presented by the 
previous ones, and how over time legal theory has been slowly moving in the 
direction of one of the main points of this project: the place of the subject in legal 
theory, the importance of his or her understandings of the relation between law and 
justice, and how these perceptions are affected by institutions such as the state 
monopoly on violence. 
Natural Law –along with its emphasis on the moral content and the importance 
of the ends of the law– provided a metaphysical framework that, while being 
capable of justifying radical political theories and projects –e.g. the American 
Revolution– could also promote institutional and political stagnation by means of 
what seems to be a rather ideological use of constructions such as “God” or 
“morals.” Such views were harshly criticised by Legal Positivism and its emphasis 
on the validity and the form of the law. By trying to enclose law in itself, Legal 
Positivism tried to fully secularise legal theory and get rid of the ambiguity of a 
previous set of beliefs, capable of justifying actions that could go against the rule 
of law and the stability of the whole system. In this sense, Legal Positivism could 
be understood as the legal mirror of modernity and the project of the enlightenment. 
It was criticised in turn by Legal Realism, which gave greater importance to the 
factual character of the law: its efficacy and application. The Nietzschean turn in 
Legal Realism gave the already damaged connection between the law and the 
metaphysical assumptions inherited from Natural Law –through Legal Positivism 
and its formal imperative– its coup de grâce. And, finally, Critical Legal Studies 
gazed at these theories and analysed their ideological implications in the 
reproduction of the existing relations of power and domination. 
All these theories have their own flaws in relation to one another; however, all 
of them seem to present a common flaw or blind spot to a greater or lesser extent: 
they ignore the place of the subject in legal theory, the importance of his 
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understanding of the relation between law and justice, and how these perceptions 
are affected by institutions such as the state monopoly on violence. Surely they are 
not completely blind to the human factor in the law, but they largely adopt a 
paternalist stand in which the living breathing subject remains as a problem to be 
solved, as a factor to be taken into account, or as a mere recipient of the law. And 
although CLS does it to a lesser extent, the scholars ascribed to this current also 
relegate the subject to a passive position in which the latter is told what to do, how, 
or in what form, regardless his views on the law and justice. 
Therefore this research aims to cover, over the following pages, that common 
blind spot by combining the use of psychoanalytic theory and different works in 
continental philosophy: adopting a psychosocial approach in order to deepen these 
subjective understandings of law and justice. Admittedly, the research must remain 
incapable of analysing certain aspects of Law that can only be studied from the 
point of view of legal theory, for “the possibility that psychoanalysis can ever 
interpret the Law is excluded. It is excluded by right, since the law provides the 
conditions of possibility of psychoanalytic interpretation” (Borsch-Jacobsen and 
Collins, 1985). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Thinking from-beyond the Limits of the Law 
 
 
Next him high arbiter 
Chance governs all. 
 
(John Milton, Paradise Lost) 
 
 
I am a subject 
And I challenge law: attorneys are denied me; 
And therefore personally I lay my claim 
To my inheritance of free descent. 
 
(William Shakespeare, Richard II) 
 
 
The previous chapter invited us to remember Emperor Justinian’s views on the 
law and how, in his opinion, its ultimate cause appears to be no other than the human 
person for whose sake it is made. In light of that idea, four different schools of 
thought were analysed and criticised, highlighting how all of them seem to present 
a series of common blind-spots: the place of the subject in legal theory, the 
importance of his or her understandings of the relation between the law and justice, 
and how these perceptions are affected by institutions such as the state monopoly 
on violence. 
It is very important to keep in mind this idea of “the human person for whose 
sake the law is made” if the goal of this research is to be suitably understood. 
Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
have focused so far on the relationship between the law and the figures of the judge 
or the legislator. And yet, none of them have approached legal theory or law itself 
from the point of view of the subject: “Nothing that passes as legal theory has ever, 
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to the best of my knowledge, adopted a victim or defendant perspective” 
(Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987, 10). Therefore, the common blind spot and limit of 
these four legal theories –even in the case of CLS– is no other than the question of 
subjectivity and its radical contingency in relation to the law, and how this affects, 
in turn, our understandings of both law and justice. 
That is, precisely, the departing point of this chapter: the subject before the law 
and the law before the subject. This chapter aims to lay the ground for a new 
theorisation of justice upon that blind spot. Using psychoanalytic theory and the 
work of philosophers such as Louis Althusser, Walter Benjamin and Jacques 
Derrida, it will try to present law from its limits and for its limits –subjectivity, 
contingency and justice. Thus one could arguably say that this chapter will explore 
the reciprocal relationship between law, justice and “[t]he man of flesh and bone; 
the man who is born, suffers and dies –above all, who dies; the man who eats and 
drinks and plays and sleeps and thinks and wills; the man who is seen and heard; 
the brother, the real brother” (Unamuno, [1913] 1972).  
Here I will focus on the questions of subjectivity and contingency and the way 
in which they seem to reveal three interlocked dimensions of analysis in the study 
of justice: contingency, desire, and temporality. Dimensions that will be studied in 
further detail throughout the second half of this thesis, devoting one chapter to each 
of them. Nevertheless, this postponement of the study of justice is not accidental. It 
responds to the need to show, in the first place, how subjectivity and contingency –
as constituent limits of the law– open a window of opportunity for debates on 
justice. For this reason, it is essential to elaborate an in-depth theorisation of 
subjectivity and contingency before this research can move on and address the topic 
of justice head on. On the one hand, the question of subjectivity requires further 
theorisation inasmuch as legal theory seems to reduce and nullify the extant 
differences between particular subjects, thwarting particular circumstances and 
characteristics that, ultimately, bring about and create the conditions of possibility 
for debates and claims about justice within a legal framework. And, on the other, 
contingency should also be studied in detail if we are to see how the chasm between 
any contingent case and the application of an abstract legal norm opens a space for 
the enforcement and re-enforcement of the law. 
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Making use of subjectivity and contingency as “constituent limits,” this research 
aims to introduce an original twist in our current understandings of law and justice 
in three different ways. In the first place, and unlike legal theory, it will try to adopt 
the perspective of the legal subject. In the second place, it will also try to go beyond 
the “faceless humanism” deployed by liberal political theories –such as those of 
Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls– in which the living breathing subject –the 
contingent finite subject with a name of his or her own– is reduced to a mere 
abstraction, nullifying every difference in an act of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 
1984) for the sake of rendering a theory universally valid. And last but not least, 
this study will not make a substantive analysis of the concept of justice trying to 
respond with a definition to the question “what is justice?” On the contrary, it will 
approach “justice” as a category of understanding rather than as a normative 
concept, allowing us to focus on different questions such as “how is it used?”, “how 
does it work?” or “how is it experienced?” 
That being said, the questions that guide the development of this chapter are no 
other than “what is the role of the subject before the law?”, “what is the role of the 
law in the formation of the subject?”, and “what is the function of the idea of justice 
in this reciprocal relationship?” 
Undoubtedly, giving a full answer to these three questions would require a 
whole dissertation of its own, but it is my intention to use this chapter as a route to 
provide an introduction to a series of concepts that will gain increasing relevance 
throughout this research. Consequently, the rest of the chapter is structured in the 
following way: The first section of this chapter will analyse the question of 
subjectivity in relation to the law; and the second one will address the question of 
contingency, also in its relation with the law. The last part of this chapter will be 
devoted to a preliminary analysis of the role of subjectivity and contingency as 
common constituent limits of law and justice; and how, in turn, justice and the law 
appear as constituent limits to one another.  
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Subjectivity 
Grounding the theory: the case of ETA and its victims 
Dealing with the question of subjectivity from a strictly theoretical point of view 
would be rather paradoxical insofar as it would entail making abstract something 
that is profoundly actual and contingent at its core; thus it seems necessary to 
introduce here a real case capable of anchoring this theoretical edifice to reality. A 
real case with the capacity to illustrate the analysis conducted here. Hence the first 
problem faced in this section is “what real case” to choose in order to do such a 
thing. As was explained in the Introduction, cases within criminal law may seem 
more suitable than others in this respect insofar as they are generally perceived as 
“less technical” and more “emotionally evocative.” It seems easier to have a 
subjective opinion regarding a case of homicide or rape than in one of trading in 
influence, or tax evasion.  But if that is so, what case within criminal law? An 
assault? A case of domestic violence? A case of murder? A case of rape? Or maybe 
a case of kidnapping? 
Surely there are countless options. But in this regard, and among many other 
possibilities, there is a particular case that may be of special interest to this research: 
the case of the terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – “Basque Country and 
Freedom” – also known as ETA.11 Beyond my initial curiosity about the reactions 
of some of its victims, there are several reasons for the usefulness of this case in the 
present analysis of the question of subjectivity. One of them was already mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, and it is that, just like other cases of criminal law, terrorist 
attacks constitute a highly controversial and socially sensitive issue. Another one is 
that in a long-standing conflict –such as this– the effects of the law, and questions 
of justice and contingency on matters of subjectivity and identity-formation become 
visible than in shorter processes. And last but not least, the political character of 
terrorist attacks highlights, in turn, the political character of the law12 due to its 
tendency to react particularly swiftly and harshly in cases of political violence –
                                                          
11 The case of ETA and its victims will be studied in more detail over the following chapters. 
12As stated above, the political character of Law is one of the main theses defended by legal 
scholars ascribed to Critical Legal Studies. 
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which also helps us see more clearly the chasm between the true ends and actual 
functioning of the law, and the interests of the subjects which it is meant to protect. 
Since its creation in 1958 ETA has killed 829 people –with all that implies: 
decades of victims, arrests, trials, penalties, legal reforms, political interventions, 
news… However, this chapter will focus its attention on the last years of ETA (2006 
– 2013) and what has been called “the Parot Doctrine”. Hence let’s take a step back 
in time. January and February 2006 were months of intense demonstrations and 
protests in Spain, in front of penitentiary institutions and courts of justice. The 
reason? About twenty ETA terrorists were about to be released from prison that 
year. What caused such a juridical and political commotion was that despite some 
of them being sentenced to nearly 4,000 years of imprisonment in the 1980s, they 
were about to be released after 20 years. The numbers were shocking: how could it 
be possible to reduce a prison sentence of millennia to 20 years?  
In the 1980s –when these terrorists were arrested, judged and sentenced– the 
Criminal Code Act of 1973 was in force, and this law provided a maximum time of 
imprisonment of 30 years as long as the crimes committed were interrelated. In 
addition, all prisoners could reduce their sentences: two days’ work for one day’s 
reduction. Whether one agrees with the provisions of this law or not, there is a clear 
legal explanation for the release of these terrorists: since all their crimes were 
deemed as terrorist actions they appeared interrelated and thus the maximum 
penalty that they could face was, de facto, 30 years. And since it was possible to 
reduce their sentence by one day for each two days worked, their time in prison 
could be effectively reduced by one third: hence they could actually be released 
after 20 years in prison. 
Such was the maximum penalty that Spanish criminal law could provide at that 
moment. However, having the front pages of some of the most relevant newspapers 
full of news about terrorists being released “too soon” rapidly triggered social 
outrage and soon different Governments started to realise that the commitment of 
the law with social reinsertion might be a little “excessive” for their taste –that is, 
if they were to remain in office– so they reformed the Criminal Code Act, first in 
1995 and then 2003, in order to make sentences tougher for certain crimes –
including terrorist attacks. The 1995 reform put an end to the possibility of reducing 
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sentences by means of prison work, and the 2003 reform raised the maximum time 
in prison for these crimes from 30 to 40 years while also establishing that any prison 
benefit had to be applied to the full extent of the penalty instead of the maximum 
time of imprisonment. After these reforms the victims and Spanish public opinion 
were pretty much satisfied and convinced that, from now on, terrorists would serve 
their entire sentences. Nevertheless, everyone seemed to forget about the Spanish 
Constitution (SC), whose article 9 states as follows: 
The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, the 
publicity of legal enactments, the non-retroactivity of punitive measures that are 
unfavourable to or restrict individual rights, the certainty that the rule of law will prevail, 
the accountability of the public authorities, and the prohibition against arbitrary action on 
the part of the latter.13 
Therefore in 2006, just three years after the 2003 reform, there was a generalised 
outcry on the part of the victims of ETA when they learned about some twenty 
terrorists who were about to be released after 20 years in prison: What had just 
happened? Did not the Government say that from now on terrorists would serve 
their entire sentences? What happened with terrorists being imprisoned for 40 
years? What was wrong with the legal system? What happened to justice? 
As stated above, after the reform of the Criminal Code in 2003 everyone seemed 
to forget about article 9 of the Spanish Constitution, which prohibits any retroactive 
application of punitive measures that could be unfavourable to or restrict individual 
rights. Despite the reforms of 1995 and 2003 the terrorists that were about to be 
released were judged and sentenced according to the Criminal Code Act 1973 and 
thus these reforms could not affect their sentences since the changes that had been 
introduced were more restrictive and unfavourable to individual rights than the 
original regulations. Doing otherwise would go against the Constitution –and also 
against article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). So why 
did (almost) everyone believe that these terrorists should remain imprisoned if 
                                                          
13 Original text: “La Constitución garantiza el principio de legalidad, la jerarquía normativa, la 
publicidad de las normas, la irretroactividad de las disposiciones sancionadoras no favorables 
o restrictivas de derechos individuales, la seguridad jurídica, la responsabilidad y la interdicción 
de la arbitrariedad de los poderes públicos.” 
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according to the law –and more importantly, according to the “rule of law” – they 
had to be freed? Why did people talk about “injustice” if the state had provided 
them with all the justice they could hope for according to Law? 
There are several possible answers to these questions. One could arguably say 
that the Government that passed the reform in 2003 had an electoral interest in 
making people believe that they were about to vanquish ETA and that the victims 
–politically enshrined to the status of civic martyrs or even living saints– never 
again would have to see ex-convicts of ETA in their neighbourhoods and towns. 
Another answer could rely on the idea of fantasy as an escape in order to explain 
why people unconsciously preferred to ignore the existence of that article in the SC. 
Perhaps it was a severe case of legal ignorance. It would also be possible to answer 
that Spanish politicians simply did not see this coming. There are many possible 
explanations and most of them are, to say the least, partially valid. All these answers 
raise, in turn, a set of questions –such as why the victims had been publicly 
enshrined to that position– that demand answers themselves. 
The Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the Government were 
subjected to enormous social pressure. A social pressure so intense that the 
Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT) even accused the Spanish Government 
of “betraying the dead” and being “pro-ETA”. Finally, all this had consequences 
and the legal-political apparatus of the state bowed to the outcry of the victims –
turned de facto into a lobby. In order to avoid further conflicts the Supreme Court 
decided to introduce a radical change in its jurisprudence and established the so-
called “Parot Doctrine”. This new jurisprudence read the Criminal Code Act of 
1973 in the light of its reforms in 1995 and 2003, promulgating that the sentences 
against crimes committed before the reform that took place in 1995 could actually 
be reduced by means of work or study…but these reductions would apply to the 
absolute total term of the sentence instead of the maximum sentence of 30 years. 
Hence the convicts would remain imprisoned up to 30 years unless they achieved 
the virtually impossible goal of reducing a sentence of more than 4,000 years to less 
than 30. 
The state, the victims and the media depicted this change as a victory over 
terrorism. It seemed like a win-win solution: newspapers sold countless copies, the 
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victims proclaimed that justice had been done, and the state pictured itself as the 
epitome of democracy as it could listen to and satisfy the demands of its people. 
Imprisoned ETA terrorists thought differently: Inés del Río Prada, sentenced in 
1987, was one of the members of ETA that had to be released between 2006 and 
2008 –as was Henri Parot, the prisoner after whom the new jurisprudence was 
named. In application of the Parot Doctrine she had to remain imprisoned until 2017 
–instead of 2008– and thus she appealed to the Constitutional Court arguing that 
the rule of law had been flouted since article 9 of the Spanish Constitution and 
articles 5 and 7 of the ECHR prohibit any retroactivity of this kind, as was 
previously stated. The Constitutional Court –whose members are chosen de facto 
by the two great parties and thus is highly politicised– declined del Río’s appeal 
and supported the new jurisprudence. Facing this situation, del Río decided to take 
her case to a higher instance and appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
using the same arguments: in 2012 the Court ruled that she was right, and although 
the Spanish Government appealed the new sentence –which rendered the Parot 
Doctrine invalid– the European Court ratified it in October 2013. Spain was 
compelled to release her immediately along with dozens of other convicts also 
affected by the late doctrine, being forced to pay them tens of thousands of euros in 
compensation. 
“History repeats itself”, as Marx would say. But in 2006 and 2013 history was 
repeating itself first as farce, and then as tragedy. First as farce since in 2006 Spain 
violated its own rule of law in order to satisfy the demands of the victims and 
reinforce its own power –power beyond the law– against ETA. Something that was 
inevitable –the release of the terrorists– had been socially repressed, and seven 
years later the “tragedy” occurred when it reappeared with renewed and increased 
strength: Spain had violated its own laws. Moreover, Spain had violated the human 
rights of a group of convicts that had been politically dehumanised and transformed 
into enemies and the incarnation of evil for decades. The enshrined victims were 
told that they –“the good ones” – were doing something wrong by demanding 
longer imprisonments for the terrorists –“the evil ones.” From their point of view 
the resolution of the European Court went beyond injustice: it was an insult. The 
last months of 2013 witnessed statements and demonstrations of the victims against 
the new sentence –going as far as demanding the Spanish Government to disobey 
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and leave both the EU and the ECHR. However, had changed since 2006. On the 
one hand, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire and cessation of armed activity 
verifiable by international observers in October 2011; on the other, the conservative 
“People’s Party” (PP) –which between 2004 and 2011 had backed and supported 
the demands and protests of the AVT against José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s 
Socialist Government– won the elections in November 2011. These events 
profoundly affected and altered the social perception of the new sentence with 
respect to what happened in 2006: First, in view of the inevitable and forthcoming 
end of ETA, greater segments of society harboured hopes of permanent peace and 
seemed less concerned about the release of a bunch of convicts who would have to 
be released in any case in three or four years; thus the social resonance of the 
demands of the victims –which started to be perceived as putting “justice”, perhaps 
even vengeance, before an end to violence– decreased substantially. And second, 
the party that used to be their greatest support in the past won the elections by an 
absolute majority. Mariano Rajoy’s new Government had to abide and comply with 
the sentence of the European Court in Strasbourg –surely leaving the EU and the 
ECHR due to the demands of an increasingly less popular lobby, whose expiry date 
had been established by ETA’s forthcoming disappearance was not an option– and 
could afford to “ignore” their demands for some time until the next general elections 
in December 2015. 
Since October 2013 various groups of victims –especially the AVT– and several 
politicians subscribed or (now) previously subscribed to the PP have shown their 
uneasiness and disagreement with the current situation. Their reactions have ranged 
from the denial of the defeat of ETA –a position defended by Jaime Mayor Oreja, 
former Prime Minister Aznar and some other senior PP leaders– to the creation of 
a new right-wing party called “Vox” by members of the PP that no longer approve 
the policy of the Rajoy Government, or the demonstrations held by the AVT in 
Basque towns and villages where ETA ex-convicts have returned or are expected 
to return. However, all these responses have something in common: they all demand 
justice for the victims. 
Where does it all come from? What prompts them to deny the defeat of ETA 
and even accuse the Government of treason? What makes them suggest via Twitter 
that Amnesty International is pro-ETA? Why are they proposing now to do away 
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with the Supreme Court? Why would a victim such as José Antonio Ortega Lara –
who was abducted for almost two years– accuse Spanish politicians of ‘prostituting 
the Constitution’? What makes them say that ETA has won and defeated democracy 
and the rule of law? 
In the light of the above explanation regarding the Parot Doctrine these 
reactions seem utterly disproportionate and senseless: ETA had not been able to kill 
since March 2010 –when they murdered a French Gendarme during a chase near 
Paris– and over the last few years its leaders would not last more than few months 
until being arrested; the Supreme Court and the Government had gone as far as to 
go against the Constitution and rule of law in order to satisfy the demands of the 
victims until the European Court finally ruled otherwise and restored the rule of law 
enforcing article 9 of the Spanish Constitution. So several questions must be asked: 
What leads to such a “misinterpretation” of reality? Why did the victims change 
their position and start seeing the rule of law as a source of injustice instead of a 
means of ensuring justice? Why do they deem this situation as unjust when these 
terrorists have been sentenced to the maximum penalty allowed in Spanish law? 
Why do they consider this situation as unjust when they have been provided with 
the “maximum justice” that Spanish law could offer at that moment? Why do they 
feel betrayed then? 
All these questions could be easily answered by saying that it has been the 
change introduced by the European Court what has provoked this situation. 
However, such an explanation appears ultimately shallow and flawed. Surely the 
resolution of the European Court triggered these reactions, but nothing else. If the 
causes behind this behaviour are to be found it is essential to deepen into a particular 
understanding of the relationship between Law and justice. It is to say, it is 
necessary to investigate the matters of subjectivity that lead to this misinterpretation 
of the role of the law and its relation with justice.  
Undoubtedly similar behaviours can be observed in other cases –abduction, 
murder or rape– echoed by mass media, but as it was noted above, the long duration 
of the case of ETA presents an advantage: it shows the effects of both the law and 
justice on subjectivity and identity-formation dynamics more clearly. 
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From now on, and in light of this example, I will address the question of 
subjectivity in relation to the law. And, more particularly, the unbridgeable gap 
between the legal need to turn subjects into abstract faceless entities equally 
susceptible of trial and legal judgement regardless of their differences –regardless 
of that which makes them who they are– and the radical subjective impossibility of 
experiencing the law as non-subjective abstract citizens. Once more, quoting 
Unamuno ([1913] 1972) we could say that the main concern of this section is the 
relation between “[t]he man of flesh and bone; the man who is born, suffers and 
dies –above all, who dies; the man who eats and drinks and plays and sleeps and 
thinks and wills; the man who is seen and heard; the brother, the real brother” and 
the law: the construction of the legal identity of this subject, and his views on the 
relation between the law and justice. 
This very research is, in its own way, ‘out of joint’ in as much as it requires to 
maintain an almost impossible but necessary and delicate balance between radical 
subjectivity and abstraction. It is true that a purely abstract approach would 
jeopardise this attempt to emphasise the question of subjectivity. But it is equally 
true that even if one endorses Unamuno’s understandings of subjectivity, being 
mainly concerned about this ‘subject with a name of his or her own’, a minimum 
level of abstraction is needed whenever a new theoretical framework is to be 
posited. In the very moment that these concrete subjects are grouped under the term 
“subjects” we are already betraying their actual existence, we are already betraying 
what and who they are. Ultimately, we cannot give them full presence in any theory: 
Perhaps even more than constituted authority, it is social uniformity and sameness that 
harass the individual most. His very "uniqueness," "separateness" and "differentiation" 
make him an alien, not only in his native place, but even in his own home. Often more so 
than the foreign born who generally falls in with the established (Goldman, 1940). 
However, this structural limitation to the possibility of offering a theory of 
subjectivity offers no excuse not to try to address this question, and thus I intend to 
keep a balance between both tendencies and bring this analysis as close as possible 
to the “uniqueness” of the subject. 
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Law and the production of subjectivity 
Claiming that a phenomenon such as the formation of the subject is restricted 
to the latter’s interactions with the law and its subsequent effects would be a 
tremendously dangerous simplification or reductionism. Language, ideology, 
morals, ethics, religion and other cultural codes and practices also take part in this 
process. However, all of them have something in common: they belong to the 
Lacanian register of the Symbolic: and so does the law. Ultimately these 
phenomena constitute part of the social universe into which, following Heidegger 
([1927] 2010), individual human beings are thrown at birth. The place of the law in 
subject formation processes can thus be understood in terms of its symbolic and 
ideological dimension (Hunt, 1993, 91). As stated previously, one of the most 
remarkable features of the law is its normativity: its capacity to prescribe and forbid 
certain behaviours. This implies that if citizens followed legal norms in every case 
and every situation, law itself would become purely descriptive and thus all laws 
along with their enforcing mechanisms would be rendered ultimately useless: the 
law would not meet its regulatory function. In order to preserve such a function it 
must be normative and demand obedience –although also disobedience14– to its 
rules and norms in the same way that speaking a language requires the use of a 
specific set of words and grammatical rules, or in the same way that professing a 
religion demands faith in a specific deity and the observance of certain rites. All 
social phenomena belonging to the register of the Symbolic impose norms on the 
subject, and by doing so they also constitute it as such: they are based on and 
reproduce relations of power and dependence which are the departing point for any 
subject formation process, as Judith Butler points out in The Psychic Life of Power 
(1997). Several questions could be raised at this point, but arguably the most 
pressing ones are “Why is the law to be understood in terms of its ideological 
dimension instead of, let’s say, a religious or moral dimension?” and “How does 
the symbolic-ideological dimension of the law actually produce subjectivities?” 
It is possible to find a response to the first question in the works of Louis 
Althusser and Sigmund Freud. The former sustained that “[i]deology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” and also 
                                                          
14 This demand of disobedience is made in order to actualise its authority (Borsch-Jacobsen and 
Collins, 1985). 
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that it has “a material existence” ([1970] 2001). And the latter, in Civilization and 
Its Discontents, argues that “the term culture describes the sum of productions and 
institutions that separate our life from that of our animal ancestors and serve two 
purposes: protect men against Nature and regulate the relations among them” 
([1930] 1963). In the 21st Century the “protection of men”15 against nature can 
arguably be taken for granted,16 and it would seem to have more of a technical 
character than otherwise. Hence of these two goals that culture is supposed to meet 
according to Freud, the second one seems to be, by far, the most relevant nowadays. 
And, following that reasoning, one could also say that, at the end of the day, the law 
appears as an outstanding element within this second dimension of culture insofar 
as its normative character entails prescription and/or prohibition of certain 
behaviours, hence regulating relations among human beings in their everyday life. 
To a certain extent it would even be possible to posit that law constitutes the very 
kernel of culture. However, this role of the law within culture reveals something 
else: inasmuch as it regulates and prescribes relations among human beings, it does 
not describe the actual relation among them. Here is where Freud and Althusser 
meet: the law establishes an imaginary relation among human beings instead of 
describing their actual relations. It prescribes an “imaginary” relationship in 
opposition to the actual conditions of existence of individual human beings: it 
creates a “false consciousness.”17  
It is obvious that such explanation falls short and that the ideological dimension 
of the law might actually be way more complex than that. Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that this analysis of the question of subjectivity in relation 
to law –as well as its connections with contingency and justice– has an introductory 
character, for all these questions will be explained in further detail throughout this 
thesis.18 
Following on from the previous explanation, something similar could be 
predicated in relation to the second question –“How does the symbolic-ideological 
                                                          
15 This sort of sexist language is common in the work of many pre-World War II authors, such 
as Freud or Unamuno.  
16  Except for large-scale natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes. The case of 
environmental law is unique insofar as its most immediate goal is not to protect us from our 
nature, but to protect nature from us. 
17 Arguably, in Lacanian terms, Law prescribes an imaginary relation to the Symbolic. 
18 Particularly in Chapter Four. 
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dimension of the law actually produce subjectivities?” The extensive body of 
literature on the topic reveals almost immediately that the description of the process 
of subject formation cannot be reduced to a paragraph if it is to be academically 
rigorous. Nevertheless, it becomes pressing at this point to provide a preliminary 
explanation of this topic in order to unravel some basic theoretical assumptions of 
this research.  
As in the case of our previous question, it is also possible to find an answer for 
this one in the theories developed by Freud and Althusser. If the law is ideological 
inasmuch as it is normative and creates “false consciousness” regarding human 
relations and society, there must also be a way by which it can become vested with 
the power and authority to regulate such relations. And, in this regard, Freud’s 
views on the origins of society –and the law– may be useful: 
Human life in common only becomes possible when it comes to gather a majority. A 
majority more powerful than each of the individuals, able to remain united against any of 
these. The power of such a community faces as “Law” the power of the individual, which 
is stigmatised as “brute force” […]. Thus the first cultural requirement is that of justice. It 
is to say, the certainty that the legal order, once established, shall not be violated in favour 
of an individual,  being considered any violation of this kind as a pronouncement against 
the ethical value of such Law ([1930] 1963). 
For his part, Althusser seems to refine and complete Freud’s statement when he 
argues that domination is inherent to society: without structures of domination there 
would be a complexity or aggregate of human beings, but not a society. The latter 
only comes into existence when its members stand as a unity ([1970] 2001). That 
is to say that both society and the law exist as such insofar as (1) they are imposed 
on individuals and (2) they provide these individuals with a sense of belonging or 
unity. In Nietzschean terms we may even say that they only begin to exist when a 
hundred men stand together, and each of them loses his mind and gets another one. 
The law becomes capable of producing subjectivities through its enforcement: 
through its imposition upon individual human beings. Such is the normative 
character of the law, which imposes itself upon individual human beings and in turn 
legitimates itself by doing so, as Derrida explains in The Force of Law (1990). The 
“majority more powerful than each of the individuals” prevents these individual 
human beings from giving way to their desires under the threat of force and 
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punishment. Most certainly these reasoning may require further explanation, but for 
the time being it would not be unreasonable to consider the enforcement of the law 
and the threat of legal punishment as the socio-political manifestation of the “reality 
principle” –Freud– that provokes a turning back of the individual upon itself –
Nietzsche– constituting the individual as a (legal) subject within a given set of legal 
relations with other subjects under the same legal order. 
Turning back upon oneself: constituting victims as victims 
The answers provided so far may look rather abstract or even confusing. 
However, they become much clearer in the light of the case of ETA and, more 
specifically, its victims. Maybe ‘man’ is condemned to be free (Sartre, [1943] 
2003), but truth be told, the only common condemnation to all human beings is that 
of death: we are condemned to die and disappear. No one escapes such a fate.  
Death [i]s the ultimate constitutive outside shared by all of us mortal beings. It belies the 
myth of full presence. [And] the fear of death is the fear of object loss; it is the fear of being 
helpless before our own grief and of being powerless to bring the other back (Cornell, 1992, 
55-56). 
Those who are still here witness how those they love eventually fade away and 
die. Those who are still alive, those who remain, are in turn sentenced to loss and 
the suffering that it entails. As we live and interact with others they eventually 
become part of our lives, part of ourselves: as we internalise languages, mores and 
norms by entering the Symbolic we also internalise our relations with others, and 
by doing so they eventually become part of who we are and how we think of 
ourselves. Hence every loss we experience entails a partial death: a partial death of 
our-selves. A premature fading away that announces an inescapable tragic fate19 
which in turn discloses an utter helplessness and powerlessness that challenges our 
sense of control over our own lives. Loss entails suffering, but a suffering that 
transcends loss itself insofar as it also reveals our impotence and lack of control, 
making it even harder to accept. “There must be a reason for this suffering, this 
cannot be in vain” –we are prone to think. “If we are lacking control and power it 
is because it has been taken from us. It must have gone somewhere: it cannot simply 
                                                          
19 “Tragic” in a purely Nietzschean sense: “Tragedy sits in sublime rapture amidst this 
abundance of life, suffering and delight” ([1872] 2003). 
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disappear.” As Nietzsche well noticed, it seems more difficult to accept that such 
control never existed than that it may have been “taken away” or “stolen” by 
someone else, and thus we seek someone to blame in order to regain part of our lost 
control. Our wounded pride compels us to blame someone to regain part of a power 
that we never had, and thus we never lost. 
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still 
more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering –in short, some living thing 
upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in 
effigy…This…constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, 
and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects…to deaden, by means of a more 
violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and 
to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect as 
possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all (Nietzsche, [1887] 1994). 
So why do not victims try to take revenge against the terrorists they blame for 
their suffering? Would it not be healthier to avenge the death of their beloved ones 
and get rid of that unbearable pain? 
That is where the law and the state monopoly on violence come in. The threat 
of legal punishment in addition to their current pain prevents victims from taking 
vengeance: they cannot give way in their desire without undergoing additional 
suffering. As Walter Benjamin notices in A Critique of Violence ([1921] 1996), the 
state cannot afford to leave personal vendettas unpunished. Not just because of the 
intrinsic damage of their actions –in cases of terrorism such as the ones considered 
in this thesis, a lot of people would arguably be more than understanding with a 
victim wanting to take revenge against the offender– but because of the political 
damage that they entail: the authority of the state relies chiefly on its legitimate 
monopoly on violence. If people start taking “justice” in their hands, the violence 
exercised by the state could no longer be considered to be a monopoly, nor 
legitimate.20 Therefore, victims are encouraged, when not forced, to rely on the 
state to provide them with justice for their loss. 
Undoubtedly, this has a deep impact on the way in which victims perceive 
themselves and their relations with other citizens, including terrorists. On the one 
                                                          
20 A good example of this is the constitution of “Self-Defence Groups” in Michoacán (Mexico) 
as a response to the inoperability of the police and the army against the Narco. 
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hand, the demands of the state and the rule of law –in addition to the loss caused by 
a terrorist attack– worsens the sense of powerlessness of the victims, making their 
wish to regain control even more pressing. On the other, and in the same way that 
the state takes stronger measures against political crimes –terrorism, treason, 
secession– than regular transgressions –robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, assault, 
aggression– it also has a special interest in promoting the figure of the victim. A 
promotion which has some other effects of its own. First, by highlighting their 
confidence in the rule of law and the actions of the state –which is far from being 
natural or spontaneous– despite their terrible situation, the state seeks to sets an 
example, a model of behaviour, for all citizens. And second, by doing so it also 
enshrines the victims, turning them into living martyrs and saints that –besides 
being a model of civic virtue for all citizens– play a key role in the creation of a 
sense of conflict between “good” and “evil”: in one corner the good suffering 
victims and the institutions supporting them; and, in the other, the bloodthirsty 
terrorists who seek to destroy society. 
At this point it becomes possible to draw some conclusions and make certain 
assumptions about the victims of ETA and the production of their subjectivity in 
relation to the law. First, the victims suffer from loss and disempowerment due to 
their lack of control over the situations –terrorist attacks– that put an end to life as 
they had known it. Second, this suffering is reinforced by further disempowerment 
due to the effects of state monopoly on violence and the rule of law –that is to say 
that due to the threat of legal punishment, they are encouraged to sublimate and 
shift their desire for vengeance to a more socially acceptable behaviour, such as 
demands for legal punishment. Third, the state qua political entity has an interest in 
enshrining victims for two different reasons: on the one hand, it is invested in their 
submission/confidence in the rule of law they insofar as they may come to represent 
a model of behaviour for all citizens; on the other, and by promoting the 
righteousness of the victims in their claims, the state also manages to polarise its 
conflict with the terrorists in terms of “good” and “evil”. Fourth –and this is the 
ultimate consequence of the process described in the previous points of these 
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paragraph– the identification between concepts such as “damnificados,” 21 
“victims”, “state”, “rule of law”, “democracy”, “righteousness”, “justice” and 
“good” under a same chain of empty signifiers (Laclau, 2007) simultaneously 
contributes to (1) the polarisation of a conflict which is reduced to sheer friend-or-
foe dichotomy (Schmitt, [1922] 2005) and (2) the reinforcement of the will of the 
victim to seek “a cause for his suffering, [or] more exactly, an agent; [or] still more 
specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering –in short, some living 
thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in 
effigy” (Nietzsche, [1887] 1994). The ultimate consequence of this process is then 
the constitution of the damnificado into victim: the production of the victim as such. 
Wounding attachments22 
Notwithstanding the role that mourning and melancholia may play in the 
production of the victim as a subject, it is important to highlight here that the 
ideological creation of these “imaginary” relations –in the words of Althusser– also 
entails the production of a specific kind of subjectivity –that of the victim as such– 
which in turn implies an identification with (1) a sense of legal/moral righteousness 
and (2) the endurance of loss and suffering. This socially-recognised sense of moral 
righteousness that becomes, however, a poisoned chalice for the victim insofar as 
it is based upon pain and sorrow. A poisoned chalice that produces a wounding 
attachment to suffering and prevents the victim from moving on whenever there 
may be a chance to do so. 
This idea of “wounding attachments” (Brown, 1995) represents an invaluable 
theoretical tool in gaining a better understanding of the attitude of some of the 
victims of ETA towards the end of violence and the resolution of the European 
Court against the Parot Doctrine. This topic will be elaborated further on in the 
following chapters but, for the time being, it is possible to say that if the victims 
were to accept the defeat of ETA, their ongoing suffering –from which they never 
                                                          
21 This Spanish term is normally translated as “victim” but it literally means “damaged” or 
“hurt”, allowing us to see the difference between one who has been wronged by another citizen, 
and the legal constitution of this “damaged person” as victim of a crime. 
22 The idea of “wounding attachments” refers to Wendy Brown’s concept of wounded 
attachments (1995). The change in terminology from “wounded” to “wounding” is intentional 
and refers to the lasting and continuous effects of these attachments on the constitution of the 
subject. 
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recovered due to an attachment produced by the factors explained above– would 
eventually be rendered meaningless: “it would have been all for nothing.” 
Ultimately, they would be compelled to face what made their suffering unbearable 
in the first place: its inevitability, meaninglessness, and irrationality. And yet, this 
may not be possible for them insofar as their suffering has also become sharper, 
deeper, and even more difficult to accept than in the past due to the fact that, at this 
point, they have already been disempowered on three different occasions: first by 
ETA, then by the rule of law, and finally by the end of the conflict. The current 
scenario presses them towards a point that they refuse to reach: that in which they 
would perceive their suffering –and hence themselves qua victims– as useless and 
meaningless. If ETA fades away, their identity as “victims of ETA,” to which they 
clung for years, is equally condemned to fade away at some point. The new situation 
shakes the foundations of their reality –the way in which they imagine reality– and 
the whole of it does not make sense to them anymore. Nietzsche said that in cases 
of “weakness” and “disempowerment” suffering becomes the measure of all things 
([1887] 1994). So what happens in this case –in which the suffering of the victims 
was once enshrined to the highest expression of civic virtues– when “the measure 
of all things” is rendered no-longer applicable? Does the existence of the victim 
have any purpose after the disappearance –although not destruction– of the enemy? 
If “the measure of all things” is no longer applicable is he or she still a victim? If 
so, for how long? 
Being a victim can become a relevant part of who they are and how they relate 
to the world; and thus victims may not let suffering go: they may not want to let it 
go. If the actual person responsible for their loss is missing, he or she must be 
arrested, judged and sentenced. If arrested, and taken to court, any sentence other 
than the maximum penalty is considered too short and thus unjust. If sentenced to 
the maximum penalty, the latter is still considered to be too short in comparison 
with the crime committed. If the sentence is extended –as happened with the Parot 
Doctrine– that is not sufficient, for the criminal does not regret the crime. If the 
criminal regrets it that is not sufficient either, for that does not change what he or 
she did in the past and it does not change the fact that ETA keeps abducting and 
murdering people. If ETA says that it wants peace that is not enough, because they 
have not ceased fire unconditionally. If ETA unilaterally declares the permanent 
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cessation of violence that is not enough either, because they have not admitted all 
the suffering inflicted. If ETA recognises the unfair infliction of such suffering, that 
does not suffice for they have not apologised. If ETA apologises, that does not 
suffice either, for they “would not recognise” the legitimacy of the state and their 
intention would be that of entering the institutions in order to achieve the 
independence of the Basque Country, and so on and so forth… 
Law implies a production of truth that goes beyond punishment or sanction, 
introducing guilt alongside truth (Hunt and Wickham, 1994). But what happens 
when there is a change in the production of truth? 
Victims may find themselves living in melancholia: in the eternal postponement 
of the mourning and acceptance of their loss. They may find themselves 
experiencing a situation in which no resolution of the conflict appears to be the kind 
of resolution, the kind of justice, they sought. Their demands for legal punishment 
may be satisfied by the state, their desire for justice is sentenced to remain 
unsatisfied. In this regard, Lacanian psychoanalysis provides a distinction between 
demand and desire capable of giving an account of the unattainability of such 
desires. It will be studied in further detail in Chapter Four but, for the time being, it 
is important to point out that it raises –in conjunction with what has been said so 
far– certain questions: Would it be possible to think about the unattainability of this 
desire as a way of ensuring the persistence of the subjectivity of the victim as 
victim? If so, when does this subjectivity emerge? When ideology –law – triumphs, 
as Althusser says? Or when ideology fails, as Lacan would say? 
As can be seen, the issue of subjectivity in relation to the law is far more 
complex than one may expect, and prompts the emergence of many questions of its 
own that exceed the limits of this section. And although certain aspects (such as 
mourning, melancholia, or the difference between demand and desire) and points 
of view (what about criminals?) have been left largely unexplained, the aim of this 
section is to theorise as particular that which has commonly been seen as 
homogeneous and universal: the legal subject. This is something that Wendy Brown 
(1995, 67) notices when she suggests that the inclination to see the legal subject in 
such a way appears as a consequence of the inner paradoxes of capitalism –“liberty 
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vs equality”, and “individualism vs homogeneity”–; and also Douzinas and 
Warrington in their analysis of liberal legal theory: 
If the legal person is an isolated and narcissistic subject who perceives the world as a hostile 
place to be either used or fended against through the medium of rights and contracts, (s)he 
is also disembodied, genderless and a strangely mutilated person. The other as legal subject 
is a rational being with rights, entitlements and duties like ourselves […]. But this 
conception of justice as fairness must necessarily reduce the concreteness of the other, it 
must minimise the difference of need and desire and emphasise the similarities and 
homologies between subjects (1994, 172) 
Thus the main concern of this section and its future developments is unravelling, 
revealing and deepening into that which makes the legal subject something –or 
better said, someone– notoriously complex that escapes the theoretical framework 
of traditional legal theory. Namely, how the process of legal subjectivation 
additionally produces something that eludes generalisation and abstraction: a 
“Sensation S” of justice.23 
Contingency 
Contingency, prohibition and judgement: the book of Genesis 
The previous section began with an argument against the incongruity of trying 
to theorise subjectivity in purely abstract terms, and in order to avoid such 
inconsistency it started with the example of ETA and its victims, so there would be 
                                                          
23 The Sensation S appears in a thought experiment proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his 
Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967, §258). The association of the recurrence of a certain 
sensation or feeling with a sign –such as “S” in his example, or “justice” in the context of this 
research– constitutes a case of “private language.” This implies that the “Sensation S” cannot 
be defined using other terms, nor can it be explained by means of ostensive definition. In the 
case of a Sensation S, “whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that 
here we can’t talk about ‘right’” (ibid.). 
The importance of the “Sensation S” and the impossibility of placing it in public language 
becomes manifest in an example provided by Douzinas and Warrington in Justice Miscarried 
(1994, 223): 
“The claim that fear and pain can be rationalised through the shared understanding of their cause 
puts the victim in a double bind. Either he is in fear of he is not. If he is, he should be able to give 
facts and reasons for it which, as they belong to the genre of truth, should match the assessment of 
the judge; if they do not, the refugee is lying. If, on the other hand, he cannot give ‘objective’ 
justifications for his fear, the refugee is again lying” 
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a minimal grounding of the theory. Nevertheless, and despite the attempt of 
grounding theory to reality by analysing this case, this theorisation of subjectivity 
was ultimately doomed to remain “out of joint”: a purely abstract approach would 
have jeopardised any attempt of emphasising the question of subjectivity, but even 
if one is mainly concerned about a ‘subject with a name of his own,’ a minimum 
level of abstraction is required whenever a new theoretical framework is to be 
posited. 
Something similar happens with the question of contingency. It acts as a floating 
signifier –one single word meant to comprehend an infinite number of possible and 
actual situations– and yet it also stands in stark contrast with the abstractness of 
legal norms –meant to be equally applicable in all cases, in their totality, without 
referring to each of them in their specificities. A contrast between contingency and 
the law that opens the door to the appearance of certain question: is it possible to 
theorise contingency without turning it into a mere abstraction or generalisation? Is 
it possible to provide a proper theorisation of contingency via contingency –that is, 
via analysing a series of contingent situations in relation a given legal framework? 
Once again, this research finds itself out of joint. And once again it seems 
impossible to choose between these two possibilities. If this study took a fully 
theoretical approach it would inevitably turn contingency into norm: into the 
generalisation of an infinite number of possible situations. For the sake of trying to 
comprehend all of these situations, it would finally comprehend none; and thus, it 
would turn out to be its very opposite: a general norm trying to rule out difference.  
However, the option of theorising contingency via contingency seems equally 
unfeasible insofar as it seems virtually impossible to analyse an infinite series of 
actual contingent situations. Not to speak of an infinite series of possible situations. 
How to escape this impasse? How to theorise our object of study without 
betraying it? How to theorise contingency without turning it into the totality of 
possibilities? How to theorise it without turning it into its opposite? As happened 
before it seems impossible to escape this disjuncture, and the only way out seems 
to be not choosing any of the roads in front of us. The only way out is to make a 
way. But what kind of way?  
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The previous section introduced the case of ETA and its victims as a means to 
illustrate and contextualise the relevance of the question of subjectivity in this 
thesis. And, mutatis mutandis, I intend to do the same here with a different example. 
Its aim is to show how judgements about what is just or unjust appear as a result of 
contingent actions and struggles, and not prior to or without them. Nevertheless, it 
is important to highlight at this point that the case introduced here differs quite 
significantly from the previous one: it is not taken from “real life,” but from a 
commonplace. This is, the Christian interpretation of the book of Genesis: the 
biblical story of Adam, Eve, the Original Sin and the fall of man from innocent 
obedience to guilty disobedience.24  
The biblical account of the fall can be structured in creation, commandment, 
innocence, temptation, disobedience, and acquisition of knowledge-guilt. The Bible 
says that after creation “[t]he Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of 
Eden to work it and take care of it. And the Lord God commanded the man, ‘You 
are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die’” 
(Genesis, 2: 15-17). This passage encompasses the first two parts of the story: 
creation and commandment. On the sixth day, God created man in his image and 
likeness, and gave him dominion over all creatures: he gave him absolute power. 
But he also gave man one simple commandment: not to eat from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil. This reveals two things. The first one reminds us of 
the normative character of the law, and reflects that man could actually eat from 
that tree –for if he could not, there would be no need to forbid it. The second one is 
that this prohibition is not followed by any judgement in terms of “good” or “evil”: 
the tree from which Adam was forbidden to eat was “the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil”, but God’s commandment was “you must not eat from the tree”, not 
“you must not eat from the tree because that is bad.” Surely one may argue that 
“for you when eat from it you will certainly die” entails that sort of judgement, but 
that seems inaccurate. In this biblical passage, God sets a rule and the consequence 
                                                          
24 Given the vast body of literature on this topic, addressing the question of the Original Sin 
here in its full extent would be virtually impossible. Therefore, this research will not enter into 
theological debates. It will simply use the case of Adam and Eve –in a rather theologically naïve 
reading of the story– as an example in which the relevance of contingency in relation to the law 
can be appreciated.  
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of breaking the rule in terribly descriptive terms: it is not a “if you do ‘X’, I will do 
‘Y’”, but a “if you do ‘X’, ‘Y’ will happen.” In the same exact way as Nietzsche 
argued that there are no moral facts –but only a moral interpretation of them– there 
is no value judgement in this passage. God sets a rule, and God sets its consequence: 
whether this consequence is good or bad, he does not say. Therefore it is very 
important to keep in mind that the prohibition precedes any notion of “good” or 
“evil.” 
The story continues with the creation of Eve and the state of innocence: “Adam 
and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame” (Genesis, 2: 25). This passage 
is open, at least in principle, to two different interpretations: the first one would be 
that they felt no shame because, at that time, being naked was “good;” the other 
would be  that they felt no shame because there was not such a thing as “bad” or 
“evil,” and, in consequence, there was nothing to be ashamed of. Following the line 
of thought presented in the previous paragraph, this second interpretation seems the 
most accurate one: if the concepts of “good” and “evil” had not yet been introduced 
into the world, man had no reason to feel ashamed of his acts, and thus could be 
considered to be in a state of innocent ignorance. The fourth part of the story, 
temptation, brings about a turn of events: “’You will not certainly die’, the serpent 
said to the woman. ‘For God knows that when you eat from it your eyes will be 
opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil’” (Genesis, 3: 4-5). At 
this point the serpent reveals an “unknown known,” namely that God’s prohibition 
implied the very possibility of breaking it: that God’s prohibition reflected man’s 
power and freedom of choice. The question of freedom –and the anxiety that it 
entails (Kierkegaard, [1844] 2014) – is undoubtedly fascinating and worthy of a 
more in-depth analysis; however, the most pressing issue at this point of the story 
is that man is offered a way out of his ignorance: a way that may allow him to know 
–good and evil– and become like God. That is, he is offered the possibility of 
making value judgements. Interestingly enough, though, before this point only God 
had made this kind of judgement, and only after seeing his creations –that is, after 
creating– and only in terms of good. Man is offered the possibility of doing 
something that only God had done before: judging. And even more, he is offered 
something that God had never done: judging good and evil. One may wonder if 
man was tempted to be just like God or more than God. Like the “noble moralities” 
86 
 
described by Nietzsche ([1887] 1994), God appears as a triumphant affirmation of 
himself: everything that he does is intrinsically good because he does it. Therefore, 
he could never do evil. Following this idea, the sin of man would not have been the 
wish to be like God –judging good– but ambitioning to be more than God: being 
able to judge, both good and evil. And thus, the sin of man would have been wanting 
to judge in terms of good and evil, not only his own actions, but also 
others’…everything! In the end, the sin of man would have been no other than 
wanting to judge himself, and the world, in terms of good and evil.  
God appears as a triumphant affirmation of himself: everything that he does is 
good because he does it. And he could not possibly judge otherwise because he 
could not act in a different way. In contrast, if man is to judge the world in terms of 
good and evil his actions could no longer be intrinsically “good”: they must be 
either good or evil. After eating the forbidden fruit man abandons his previous state 
of innocent ignorance and enters a reality of anxious uncertainty. The prohibition 
entailed the possibility of breaking it, and thus reflected man’s own freedom; after 
eating the forbidden fruit man remains equally free, but, unlike before, his actions 
are now subjected to the possibility of being either good or evil: they are subjected 
to uncertainty. However… did the serpent not say that “when you eat from it [the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil] your eyes will be opened, and you will be 
like God, knowing good and evil”? How could man enter a reality of anxious 
uncertainty if he knows good and evil? And, ultimately, why would that happen? 
After eating from the tree man becomes familiar with the notions of “good” and 
“evil”, and, in principle, that should be the end of the story: once he is able to judge 
in these terms, everything that exists should fall within one of these categories with 
no room for uncertainties. Nevertheless, that is not the end of the story, for 
judgements can only be made a posteriori. Surely one may argue that it would be 
possible to make a judgement a priori; yet that would not be a judgement, but a pre-
judgement: a pre-judice. A priori judgements do not judge the facts, but establish 
our predisposition to facts that are yet to happen. As Kierkegaard said, “life can 
only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards” ([1843] 1938). It is 
impossible to judge “good” and “evil” a priori, for in order to judge anything, this 
“anything” must have happened before. In order to understand, we must live. And, 
ultimately, what provokes this state of anxious uncertainty in man is not knowing 
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if, in the end, his actions will be “good” or “evil.” What provokes this state is not 
committing a mistake, but knowing that one might be committing a mistake: being 
uncertain about the outcome of one’s actions. And that is why after eating from the 
tree “the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked; so 
they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves” (Genesis, 3: 7). 
After eating from the tree, in their nakedness, they felt exposed, unsecure, and 
uncertain about their very nature. They found themselves unable to judge something 
that they had not done –their own bodies– and something that they had not done yet 
–live– and, therefore, they feared the presence of God and his judgement: they 
feared an uncertain outcome.25  
Then the man and his wife heard the sound of the Lord God as he was walking in the garden 
in the cool of the day, and they hid from the Lord God among the trees of the garden. But 
the Lord God called to the man, ‘Where are you?’ He answered, ‘I heard you in the garden, 
and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid.’ And he said, ‘Who told you that you were 
naked? Have you eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to eat from?’ (Genesis, 3: 
8-11) 
God’s questions in this passage are profoundly revealing. After calling Adam, 
his first question is “Who told you that you were naked?”, and it is only after that 
question that he asks “Have you eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to 
eat from?” God was not searching for Adam to punish him: it was Adam’s 
uncertainty and embarrassment that revealed to God what had happened. It was the 
contingent reaction to a contingent action that triggered the judgement. A 
judgement that, nevertheless, was not made in terms of “good” or “evil,” but in 
terms of setting the specificities of the consequence established when God 
commanded not to eat from the tree. 
But what is contingency? What is its connection with this reading of the fall of 
man? And more importantly, why is it relevant to this research? 
 
 
                                                          
25 As stated above, God told Adam that he would certainly die if he ate the fruit from the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil. But this outcome remains uncertain inasmuch as “death” 
itself had never been experienced before, and thus it remained unknown. 
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What is contingency? 
To put it simply, contingency is the character of that which is not necessary nor 
impossible. That is, contingency belongs to the realm of possibility: to the realm of 
that which may or may not happen. And because of that, contingency can also be 
understood as a consequence of the freedom of choice –implicit to any prohibition– 
and the unpredictability of its outcomes. Its connection with the biblical story 
presented above lies precisely in this aspect. God’s commandment not to eat from 
the tree reflected man’s freedom: Adam and Eve could eat from the tree, for if they 
could not there would be no need to forbid such an action. In a very similar way, 
lawmakers do not legislate over –or against– the law of gravity or the laws of 
thermodynamics –after all, what punishment, if any, could be imposed over nature 
if these laws stopped working tomorrow?– since it would make no sense at all to 
forbid something which is either impossible or unavoidable: we only forbid or 
regulate that which is possible, that which can be done, and thus that which is 
contingent. 
The connection and relevance of contingency to this research appears clear at 
this point: contingency is the very thing that creates the conditions of possibility for 
legal norms and legal theory. It is its primary limit, but also its ultimate limit. 
Without contingency, there can be no law; and yet, laws have to be applied to any 
possible situation meeting certain characteristics established in the legal text. The 
problem is that legal norms must remain abstract if they are to be applied to a totality 
of situations; situations that, nevertheless, are contingent inasmuch as they may 
happen or not, and contingent inasmuch as their specificities cannot be fully 
detailed in the legal norm –if the latter is to remain as such. That is to say that, 
although the law needs contingency to come (back) into existence, it cannot provide 
the latter with full presence. 
Contingency is an ontological requirement of the law, a constituent limit that 
creates the conditions of possibility for legal norms and legal theory. However, its 
role as a constituent limit does not end there. Contingency is a “bottom limit” –
creating the conditions of possibility of/for the law– but also an “upper limit”: it is 
that which the law can never reach or grasp. It is that which is so specific, precise, 
unpredictable, and, ultimately, random, that cannot be given full presence in a legal 
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text. And it is the departing point of the law, but also the unbridgeable chasm 
between the abstract legal norm and its application. It is a specific actual conflict 
that takes place at one particular moment and place, between specific subjects with 
particular backgrounds, ideas and interests: a necessary space of undecidability that 
the law cannot occupy, at least not completely. 
What actuality is cannot be rendered in the language of abstraction. Actuality is an inter-
esse [between being] between thinking and being in the hypothetical unity of abstraction. 
Abstraction deals with possibility and actuality, but its conception of actuality is a false 
rendition, since the medium is not actuality but possibility. Only by annulling actuality can 
abstraction grasp it, but to annul it is precisely to change it into possibility. Within 
abstraction everything that is said about actuality in the language of abstraction is said 
within possibility. That is, in the language of actuality all abstraction is related to actuality 
as a possibility, not to an actuality within abstraction and possibility. Actuality, existence, 
is the dialectical element in a trilogy, the beginning and end of which cannot be for an 
existing person, who qua existing is in the dialectical element. Abstraction merges the 
trilogy. (Kierkegaard, [1846] 1992) 
Nevertheless, the relevance of contingency for this research is not limited to its 
role as “bottom” and “upper” limit of the law. In fact, the biblical story of the 
creation and fall of man reveals something much more relevant. Namely, that it is 
only in the face of contingent struggles that we start debating about what is just or 
unjust in relation to the law. As stated above, “life can only be understood 
backwards; but it must be lived forwards” (Kierkegaard, [1843] 1938). It is only 
after Adam and Eve had eaten from the tree that their actions could be judged. It is 
only after they broke the law that the latter could be enforced. And, in the same 
way, it is only after the law has been enforced that we can start thinking about the 
adequacy, validity and legitimacy of the punishment it imposes. Therefore 
contingency acts as the bottom and upper limit of the law, but also as another sort 
of limit: a sort of limit that unavoidably puts into question its very functioning.  
The law has to be enforced in order to come (back) into existence, but its very 
enforcement provokes and triggers debates about its functioning, calling it into 
question. And this is the reason why contingency is highly relevant to this research: 
it constitutes a “bottom” and “upper” limit, but also permits and problematizes the 
functioning of the law –creating a space in which the other two limits, subjectivity 
and justice, can enter the debate.  
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The disturbing effects of contingency: creating a space for debate 
Mutatis mutandis, contingency could also be seen, in this sense, as the irruption 
of the Real in the register of the Symbolic: something that disturbs the normal 
functioning of the structure but at the same time reflects the constituent limits that 
permit its functioning. Doubtlessly, this claim may seem bold and rather speculative 
since the disturbing effects of contingency may not seem sufficient to consider it as 
“the irruption of the Real”. Nevertheless, two reasons support this idea. The first 
one is that contingency can be considered as the irruption of the Real in the 
Symbolic order of law inasmuch as it escapes full symbolisation –by definition, 
legal norms must remain abstract if they are to be universally applicable, and thus 
they cannot comprehend all the specificities inherent to a particular case: the names 
of the subjects, their body or the specific date and place. The second one is that 
contingency as such lacks ontological consistency –it is but floating signifier that 
stands for an infinite number of possible situations– and yet it has to be presupposed 
in order to create the conditions of possibility for the enforcement of the law and 
allow it to come (back) into existence. Hence contingency acts as the irruption of 
the Real in the register of the Symbolic: it acts as an impenetrable kernel resisting 
full symbolisation, and as a pure chimerical entity with no ontological consistency. 
It is lived onwards, but constructed and understood backwards, and creates a space 
in which the other two limits, subjectivity and justice, can enter the debate. 
Contingency and language 
 The later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein –Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 
1967) – may be useful in order to clarify this and explain how contingency allows 
the emergence of questions of subjectivity and, especially, justice in relation to law 
and legal theory. Against the arguably essentialist approach taken in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus ([1921] 1981), the later Wittgenstein upheld that most 
philosophical problems –such as ‘what is justice?’– are but the consequence of 
conceptual confusions in language; so even if we struggle to provide a clear 
definition of justice in purely abstract terms, in the end, “meaning is use.” Thus, 
according to the Philosophical Investigations, there would not be such a thing as a 
“Platonic justice” whose existence could ever be independent and unaffected by 
that of just and unjust deeds. But how can we possibly talk about justice if we cannot 
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refer to a clear concept of it? Can we ever be sure that we are talking about the same 
thing as our interlocutor? If we are not… would it be possible to fully understand 
what our interlocutor is trying to tell us? Could we reach an agreement? What 
factors could affect the nature of this agreement? 
As with many other major philosophical concepts, “justice” is, first and 
foremost, an abstract concept. Unlike what happens with the law, in the case of 
justice there is no clear text we can refer to and say “this is justice.” The abstractness 
of the concept makes it very difficult to provide clear ostensive definitions of it 
insofar as the use of concrete examples –“just deeds”– could vitiate the pretentions 
of generality of the concept.26 And, ultimately, the intention of providing a clear 
definition of justice through an example would be rendered useless due to a lack of 
general projection, for any definition based on an example would automatically fail 
to explain the role and meaning of justice in any other contingent situation. In view 
of this one may also think that providing a purely abstract definition of justice would 
be more suitable; however, such a definition would be meaningless and purposeless. 
To an extent, it would be tantamount to a legal norm with no stipulations 
whatsoever about the characteristics of the cases to which it is to be applied. A 
purely abstract definition of justice would be meaningless inasmuch as it would 
exclude in toto the contingent situations in which debates about justice are brought 
about: trying to overcome the difficulties entailed by the use of examples by means 
of providing a purely abstract definition of justice would lead to an aloofness from 
social reality and the specificities of actual debates about justice. And it would also 
be purposeless because, indeed, it would be possible to have a definition of justice; 
but what is the point in having a definition of the concept if it is impossible to apply 
to actual controversies about justice? Ultimately, it would be but an exercise of 
metaphysical chauvinism with no real concern for the actual use of the term. 
If we are to think about justice as a constituent limit of the law and legal theory 
it is necessary to avoid this sort of abstraction and focus on the actual use of the 
term. That is to say, that it is necessary to focus on justice, not as a concept, but as 
a category of understanding: how it is used, under what circumstances, and for what 
purpose. Thus if we are to think about justice as a constituent limit, we have to think 
                                                          
26 See Philosophical Investigations, §27-34, §258 and §270. 
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about contingency: we have to think about the use of the term “justice” and its 
relation with the law. As happens with the word “game” (Wittgenstein, [1953] 
1967, §66), it might be impossible to provide a clear definition of justice, but that 
does not matter: even if we do not have a definition, we still use the word. And that 
use is always contingent. 
As discussed above, contingency appears as a constituent limit of the law in 
three different ways: as a bottom limit –creating the conditions of possibility of/for 
the law– as an upper limit –that which the law can never reach or grasp– and as an 
ontological limit –permitting and, at the same time, problematizing the functioning 
of the law. Legal norms need to be enforced in order to come (back) into existence, 
in order to remain in-force; and yet, this enforcement also brings about debates 
regarding the very functioning of the law: calling it into question and creating a 
space in which the other two limits, subjectivity and justice, can enter the debate. 
Therefore contingency appears relevant inasmuch as it problematizes the 
functioning of the law, but also inasmuch as it underlies the other two limits: 
subjectivity and justice. On the one hand, a legal norm requires particular struggles 
in order to come (back) into existence; and yet, it does not need “this” or “that” 
struggle, but “a” struggle. It needs a conflict which may or may not happen –neither 
necessary nor impossible, and thus contingent–; and, therefore, it does not need 
“the” subjects of “this” or “that” struggle, but the contingent subjects of a contingent 
struggle. On the other hand, this need of contingency and contingent subjectivity 
also entails contingent debates about justice. A contingent struggle with contingent 
subjects may have as an ultimate philosophical consequence a future debate about 
the very idea of justice; but, in the end, what it brings about is a specific debate 
about the justness or unjustness of the law in relation to a particular case: it brings 
about a contingent debate about the use of the term “justice” in a particular context. 
That is, the meaning that the different parties in conflict confer on the word 
“justice”. And, ultimately, meaning is use… and every use is contingent.  
The very idea that the world or the self [in this case, justice] has an intrinsic nature […] is 
a remnant of the idea that the world is a divine creation, the work of someone who had 
something in mind, who Himself spoke some language in which He described His own 
project. […] To drop the idea of languages as representations, and to be thoroughly 
Wittgensteinian in our approach to language, would be to de-divinize the world. Only if we 
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do that we fully accept the argument I offered earlier –the argument that since truth is a 
property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, 
and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths. (Rorty, 1989, 21) 
But if use and meaning are contingent, how can we possibly talk about justice 
without referring to a clear concept of it? Can we ever be sure that we are talking 
about the same thing as our interlocutor? If we are not…would it possible to fully 
understand what our interlocutor is trying to tell us? Could we reach an agreement? 
What factors could affect the nature of this agreement? These questions prompt the 
next sections of this research. Nevertheless, for the time being, it is important to 
emphasise and take into account that even though the meaning of justice –signified– 
is contingent, and even subjective, the term itself seems to operate as an empty 
signifier: 
An empty signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without a signified. [And it can] only 
emerge if there is a structural impossibility in signification as such, and only if this 
impossibility can signify itself as an interruption (subversion, distortion, etcetera) of the 
structure of the sign. That is, the limits of signification can only announce themselves as 
the impossibility of realizing what is within those limits – if the limits could be signified in 
a direct way, they would be internal to signification and, ergo, would not be limits at all. 
(Laclau, 2007, 37) 
That is, the term “justice” operates, in its contingent use, as the announcement 
of an impossibility of signification: as the impossibility of giving full presence to 
particular struggles and claims for justice within a given legal framework, as the 
mirror image of the power to name – “the originary violence of language which 
consists in inscribing within a difference, in classifying… [i.e.] to think the unique 
within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of arche-writing: arche-
violence” (Derrida, 1976) – and as the mirror image of the attempt of reducing 
difference to identity and generality: of the attempt of reducing life in its radical 
contingency to abstraction.  
The precarious but necessary balance between abstraction, subjectivity, 
universality and contingency reveals the role of justice, and its undecidability, as 
the third and ultimate constituent limit of the law. 
94 
 
The incompatibility between law and justice in their relation with 
subjectivity and contingency 
The previous two sections expanded upon the role of subjectivity and 
contingency as constituent limits of the law, disclosing the role of justice as its third 
and ultimate limit. These sections have helped us reach a point in which we can 
finally see how justice operates as an empty signifier in its relation with the law. In 
other words, they have helped us see the way in which this term announces an 
impossibility of signification: the impossibility of giving full presence to particular 
calls for justice within the law. 
In view of this, it would seem appropriate to address the question of justice and 
its role as ultimate constituent limit of the law. Nevertheless, there is something that 
has been intentionally omitted so far: the relation of justice with contingency and 
subjectivity. And, throughout the last two sections, this chapter has remained 
deliberately silent about this. If the rationale behind this approach –the rationale 
behind this silence– is to be understood, we need to stop for a moment and take a 
step back. Let us recapitulate. The first chapter of this thesis began with the classical 
roots of current academic debates about justice, drawing our attention to the 
problematic character of certain assumptions in these debates. In consequence, it 
was stated that the departure point of this research could not be a literature review 
of current debates on justice, but a study of the conditions that allow the emergence 
of struggles over the meaning of justice; and the first and foremost requirement for 
this emergence is the existence of a normative framework. Thus, the departure point 
of this research had to be an analysis of the normative framework par excellence: 
law. Four different schools of legal thought –Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Legal 
Realism and Critical Legal Studies– were analysed and criticised in that chapter, 
highlighting how the four of them seem to neglect the same thing: how the four of 
them seem to be blind to the living breathing human being.27 This common blind-
spot became manifest throughout the study of contingency and subjectivity as 
                                                          
27 The living breathing individual human being: “[t]he man of flesh and bone; the man who is 
born, suffers and dies –above all, who dies; the man who eats and drinks and plays and sleeps 
and thinks and wills; the man who is seen and heard; the brother, the real brother” (Unamuno, 
[1913] 1972). 
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constituent limits of the law in this chapter. And, finally, we saw how these limits 
permit the emergence of justice as its third and ultimate constituent limit. Given the 
development of this argument it would have not made sense to make clearer the 
relation between justice, contingency and subjectivity before this point. But now, 
and before proceeding to the next stage of this research, it is necessary to clarify 
this question: What is the relation between justice and subjectivity? What is its 
relation with contingency? What is the difference between this relation and the one 
between law, contingency and subjectivity? 
The following diagram illustrates the relation of justice with contingency and 
subjectivity in contrast with the relation of Law with these concepts. 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, law and justice appear in relation to subjectivity and 
contingency in the context of this research; and yet, both approach these “limits” 
from opposite directions. Whereas the law relates to subjectivity in terms of 
generality, justice does so through universality and particularity; and whereas the 
law appears connected to contingency via normativity, justice relates to it through 
    Law 
  Justice 
Subjectivity Contingency 
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decision and action. Thus both law and justice appear asymmetrically –if not 
antagonistically– related to subjectivity and contingency. 
Subjectivity: generality, universality and particularity 
Expanding on the previous paragraph, this section will elaborate upon the extant 
relation between subjectivity, law and justice. And, more precisely, how this 
relation appears under the form of generality in the case of the law, and under the 
form of radical particularity and universality in the case of justice. 
Once again, let us begin with the law –and generality– in order to see how 
justice –along with particularity and universality– emerges from its limits. 
In our previous analysis of subjectivity as constituent limit of the law it was 
stated that society cannot exist without the latter, for the structures of domination 
imposed by it on individual human beings create the very conditions of possibility 
for society as such. This means, in other words, that without the aforementioned 
structures of domination there could be a complexity or aggregate of human beings, 
but not a society. The latter only comes into existence when its members stand as a 
unity (Althusser, [1970] 2001): when they are legally constituted as subjects, as 
citizens. And, therefore, law and society exist as such insofar as (1) they are 
imposed on individuals and (2) they provide these individuals with a sense of 
belonging or unity. In consequence, legal norms must remain abstract if they are to 
be applied to the generality of subjects belonging to that society: a generality of 
subjects which is distinguishable from a particular subject and the whole of 
humanity. 
This need of enforcement reveals law as a normative system. It produces 
subjectivities in the process of being enforced, and yet –as a system– these 
subjectivities only gain relevance in their contrast with others which are excluded 
from that legal framework –e.g. citizens from other states. Hence these 
“subjectivities” only gain legal relevance –and thus, legal identity– in their 
difference from the subjectivities produced by other legal systems. In the process 
of differentiating its citizens from foreigners, the law reduces every difference 
among citizens to identity; and, in turn, any similarity between citizens and 
foreigners to difference. Ultimately, this means that the law always operates in 
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terms of generality, excluding particularity and universality from its domain. And, 
as I will argue, this is the basic difference between law and justice in their relation 
with subjectivity: whereas the former operates in terms of generality, justice always 
functions in terms of universality and particularity. 
The production of these sets of identities and differences reveals, in turn, the 
symbolic character of the law. A symbolic character that has been hinted throughout 
this chapter but becomes manifest at this point. Just as happens with other 
sociocultural productions –such as language, norms, mores, institutions, practices, 
or customs– the law can be framed within the Lacanian register of the Symbolic as 
a trans-subjective milieu that pre-exists individual human beings and constitutes 
them as subjects within a structure. This constitution takes place through the 
introduction of negativities in the register of the Real, in the form of the creation of 
antagonisms, gaps, etc. And, in the law, this introduction of negativities appears 
crystallised in the legal-illegal and citizen-foreigner dichotomies. It is crystallised 
in the exclusion of the particular and the universal. 
This exclusion becomes manifest in the articulation of demands of justice; an 
articulation that generates a surplus: desire. But, in order to get a better grasp of this 
question, it is necessary to turn once more to Lacanian psychoanalysis and make 
clear the difference between need, demand, and desire. 
The concept of need could arguably be defined as the fact of feeling the lack of 
something;28 in this case, the lack of justice in a situation perceived to be unjust. 
The satisfaction of needs normally requires us to interact with other human beings, 
and thus they must be articulated as demands –expressions and behaviours that can 
be interpreted as a signal of the existence of such need. According to Lacan, one 
must accept and speak “the discourse of the Other” if one’s needs are to be 
recognised and addressed by others. But, in the end, speaking the discourse of the 
Other excludes the possibilities of speaking in terms of particularity or universality. 
On the one hand, if the need is expressed as pure particularity in some sort of 
“private language”29 –as the exact conflict W over the particular object X between 
the contingent subjects Y and Z– the law as Other cannot understand the message, 
                                                          
28 Not necessarily at a biological level. 
29 See Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein [1953] 1967, §243-§271). 
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for a particular case becomes legally relevant in so far as it can be subsumed within 
broader legal categories. On the other hand, if the need is expressed in terms of pure 
universality the law as Other cannot know that we are addressing it in order to find 
satisfaction. In consequence, demands must be shaped under the terms imposed by 
a socio-symbolic Other: in the terms prescribed by the law; which are, by definition, 
terms of generality. And yet, it is important to note that this demand has a twofold 
function, for on the one hand it articulates the need; but, on the other, every demand 
also constitutes a demand for love.  
This leads to the third and final concept of this triad: desire. As stated above, 
desire appears as the generation of a surplus in this process of articulation. It 
emerges as that which remains after need is deduced from demand: the outcome of 
a process of symbolisation that charges needs with surpluses –demands for love– 
disclosing the position of the subject in the relation with the Other. In this way, the 
law can satisfy the need that has been articulated as a demand for justice in legal 
terms, but not the desire lurking behind it. Here, the desire for justice of the subject 
appears as a demand for love…and love is “giving something you haven't got to 
someone who doesn't exist” (Philips, 1994, 39). In his desire for justice the subject 
urges the law to provide him with something that it cannot give: full presence. 
Before the law, the subject is only relevant in his role as citizen, as the speaker of 
the language of the law… but nothing else. Name, history, personality, tastes, fears, 
suffering, and joy... none of them are relevant: only the role of the subject as citizen. 
Law cannot love. It cannot give what it does not have to someone who does not 
exist. It cannot give full presence to particularity; and, for the law, the living 
breathing subject, the “man of flesh and bone,” does not exist: only the citizen. 
Here, the desire for justice of the subject reveals itself as constitutive lack. It reveals 
itself as a wish to be universally recognised in one’s own particularity.  
Justice emerges and becomes differentiated from the law in the formulation of 
this desire. It grows out of the struggle between the urge to satisfy this desire and 
the impossibility of finding full satisfaction in the law. It appears in the questioning 
of the law and its functioning. And so does the subject… not just as citizen –subject 
of the enunciated– but also as radical particularity –subject of the enunciation–: as 
that which makes ideology work, and as the point in which it fails. In both cases the 
divide or negativity introduced by the law produces subjectivities; and although the 
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production of subjectivity as such is inherent –and hence necessary– to this process, 
the specific subject that it constitutes is always contingent… as is his desire. 
Every desire for justice appears as the expression of a radical particularity that 
claims universal validity; and thus as the expression of the limits of generality. The 
desire for justice of the subject –along with the impossibility of its fulfilment– puts 
into question the functioning of the law, revealing the limits of its authority and 
normativity: the limits of its might. In turn, the law also conceals its impotence 
through the denial of this desiring-beyond-demand, labelling it as a wish for 
vengeance.30 But, ultimately, the denial of such a desire for justice entails a denial 
of the subject himself, for every subject is a desiring subject, and the subject who 
ceases to desire ceases to live too. It is possible to find an example of this in Don 
Quijote. In Chapter V, during one of his first adventures, The Knight of the Woeful 
Countenance fell off his horse and –in order to regain courage and keep on his 
quest– started reciting epic poems to himself, vowing to perform even greater deeds 
than those of the heroes he admired. Nevertheless, he was seen by his neighbour, 
Pedro Alonso, who started mocking him, saying that he was talking nonsense:  
“Ni vuestra merced es Baldominos, ni Abindarráez, sino el honrado hidalgo del señor 
Quijada.”31 
Don Quijote’s response to such offense was categorical: “¡Yo sé quién soy!”32 
–meaning, according to Unamuno ([1904] 2004) “¡Yo sé quién quiero ser!” 33 
Vowing to perform greater deeds than any other knight before him, Don Quijote is 
telling us that, in the end, he knows who he is because he knows who he wants to 
be: he knows who he is because he knows what he wants to do. Just like Zarathustra, 
Don Quijote strives for his work. And he lived for as long as he strived… and he 
died when he stopped doing so. Don Quijote died when he resigned. Don Quijote 
died when he accepted his role as the person that he was told to be: Don Alonso 
Quijano. And his entire world, full of giants, knights, romance and bravery died 
along with him. 
                                                          
30 The difference between justice and vengeance will be analysed in detail throughout the next 
chapter. 
31 “Your worship is neither Balwin nor Abindarráez, but the worthy gentleman Senor Quijada” 
32 “I know who I am!” (my own translation) 
33 “I know who I want to be!” (my own translation) 
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“Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever 
saves a life, it is as if he saved an entire world.” (Talmud, Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:9) 
 The universality of Don Quijote died along with his most radical particularity, 
buried under the gravestone of generality: of the Symbolic.    
The disavowal of the desire of justice enacted by the law in an attempt to 
conceal its own impotence is tantamount to this sort of death. And yet, the subject 
who finds rejection and denial where he sought recognition cannot resign, not 
completely, for absolute resignation amounts to absolute death. 34  Whether this 
persistence of desire takes a form or another is question that will be further 
explained over the following chapters. But, for the time being, it is important to 
remember, once again, that justice calls for the universal recognition of a 
particularity; and thus requires an immediate relation between the particular and the 
universal. A direct and immediate relation that inaugurates a suspension –if not 
destruction– of the general at the same time that reflects the universal particularity 
of desire. 
Contingency: normativity, decision and action 
Generality loses importance in the relation between law and contingency, but 
another basic feature of the law gains relevance its place: normativity. As seen in 
the previous section on subjectivity, the existence of society as such –and thus, 
generality– depends on the possibility of imposing the law on individuals –
constituting them as legal subjects, citizens– and providing them with a sense of 
belonging or unity. And it is this “imposition” that appears as the quintessence of 
normativity: the very condition of possibility for the existence of a relation between 
law and subjectivity marked by generality. 
                                                          
34 See here what Sancho Panza tells his master, Don Quijote, while the latter is in his deathbed 
(Chapter LXXIV): 
"¡Ay! –Respondió Sancho llorando–. No se muera vuestra merced, señor mío, sino tome mi 
consejo y viva muchos años, porque la mayor locura que puede hacer un hombre en esta vida 
es dejarse morir sin más ni más, sin que nadie le mate ni otras manos le acaben que las de la 
melancolía" 
“Ah! –Said Sancho weeping–. Don’t die, master, but take my advice and live many years, for 
the most foolish thing a man can do in this life is to let himself die without rhyme or reason, 
without anybody killing him, or any hands but melancholy’s making an end of him” 
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In this manner, the relevance of normativity seems clear. References to its 
importance as a fundamental characteristic of the law can be found in the work of 
authors such as Walter Benjamin, Sigmund Freud, Louis Althusser or Jacques 
Derrida. And, according to the latter (1990), this basic feature is reflected in the fact 
that the law imposes itself upon individual human beings, legitimating itself in the 
process of doing so –an act of mythic violence (Benjamin, [1921] 1996). Thus the 
difference between legal violence and illegal violence appears as a difference in a 
quantum of force that legitimises itself in terms of quality –legitimacy. Any act of 
violence beyond the law is deemed as illegitimate and pernicious; and not just 
because of the direct effects of these acts, but also because they challenge, and even 
threaten, the very authority of the law. Under the threat of punishment, the “majority 
more powerful than each of the individuals” (Freud, [1930] 1963) prevents these 
individual human beings from taking justice into their own hands. And, in 
connection with the question of generality, we could arguably say that only when 
such violence becomes monopolised by an elite –being legitimised as law– it 
becomes possible to talk about society: only when the relations between two 
individuals are regulated by a third party which stands more powerful than the other 
two, society exists. 
The connection between normativity and contingency can be derived from this. 
On the one hand, the imposition or prohibition of certain behaviours by law 
unavoidably implies that these behaviours are neither impossible nor necessary, but 
contingent –that is, possible. It reveals that the subject can always act otherwise. 
And, on the other, it also implies that the law always rules future actions on the 
basis of past experiences and already-established prescriptions: the past is 
irreversible –and thus necessary, for the way in which it happened cannot be 
changed– and the rule of law and the generality that it entails prohibit ad hoc 
judgements.35 It may be possible to pass a law on the basis of a case, but not for a 
specific case. Hence the law always rules the future on the basis of the past, creating 
a mediation between them that entails a certain blindness with regard to the 
specificity –the particularity– of the present. 
                                                          
35 The dismissal of the “Parot Doctrine” by the European Court of Human Rights constitutes a 
perfect example. 
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This legal mediation between the future and the past shows that the temporality 
of the law is inherently chronological: sequential, a succession of moments in 
which the present always appears as the future of a past and as the actualisation of 
a near future –as the missed encounter between a “not yet” and a “too late.” And it 
is precisely this “missed encounter” that opens a window of opportunity for justice. 
Unlike the law, justice appears as pure immediacy. It emerges as that which 
reclaims a direct relation between the particular and the universal. Justice “doesn’t 
wait […] a just decision is always required immediately. […] the moment of 
decision, as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation” 
(Derrida, 1990). A desire for justice always calls for the universal recognition of a 
particularity, for equalising it to another particular case or using it as the basis for 
future cases entails a denial of this very particularity. In this manner, the temporality 
of justice appears in stark contrast with that of the law. Whereas the temporality of 
the latter always operates in a sequential manner; that of justice appears as a time-
lapse, as the window of opportunity that emerges from the missed encounter 
between a “not yet” and a “too late.” Or, in other words, whereas the temporality of 
the law presents the character of Chronos, the temporality of justice has the 
character of Kairos.36  
Justice always appeals to the present, to a moment in which decision and action 
are required immediately, right away. And, in this moment, past, present, and future 
collide. Here the subject37 is given the opportunity to realise that everything that 
has happened so far has led him to this point; but also that everything that will 
happen from that moment on will be conditioned, if not determined, by what he 
decides to do at this point. In this missed encounter, in this present, the past can be 
redeemed and the future can be saved: kept open and freed from the yoke of the 
past. The temporality of justice manifests itself as a present of decision and action 
with the potential to suspend the law and create a space of timelessness and 
timefulness, colliding the chronological past and future. 
                                                          
36 In opposition to the sequentiality of “Chronos”, the Greek term “Kairos” appears as the right 
or supreme moment: a time-lapse in which everything happens and an opportunity can be 
seized. In Christian theology it refers to the action of God: “the appointed time in the purpose 
of God.” 
37 As subject of the enunciation and subject of the enunciated.  
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Conclusion 
With the intention of filling the lacuna discovered in our previous study of legal 
theory, this chapter has taken the relation between such a particular subject and the 
law as a departing point for the construction of a theoretical edifice meant for the 
study of the production of subjective understandings of justice. This required 
considering two basic features of the law in its relation with the subject: generality 
and normativity. Our analysis of the first of these features revealed that while the 
law necessarily produces subjectivities, such subjectivities are eminently 
contingent and virtually endless in their particularity –something that leads, in the 
end, to the exclusion of the particularity of the subject from the domain of the law. 
On the other hand, the study of the normative character of the law revealed that it 
must be susceptible to being broken insofar as its very existence depends on its 
enforceability, and it cannot be enforced unless it is broken: unless a subject decides 
to act against it. However, just as the legal production of subjectivities results in the 
emergence of an endless variety of particularities, the application of legal norms 
presents some problems of its own. Namely, that its application can never be 
directly conducted towards the resolution and recognition of the particularity of the 
case it aims to solve. Its resolution may be based on previous cases and may as well 
set a precedent for future ones, but the possibility of passing a legal norm ad hoc 
appears excluded.  
The analysis of these two characteristics, along with the dynamics that they 
seem to generate in the interactions between the law and the subject, revealed in 
turn three constituent limits of the law: contingency –the structural incapability of 
the law to recognise the particularity of the case presented by the subject– 
subjectivity –the clash between the general character of the law and the subject’s 
wish to see his particularity universally recognised– and justice –the cornerstone 
holding together the previous two limits and underpinning the will of the subject to 
find recognition in spite of the shortcomings of the law. 
Finally, the last part of this chapter was dedicated to the study of the relation 
between the abovementioned characteristics of the law and the constituent limits of 
the latter. A relation that opens the door for the consideration of three basic 
dimensions of analysis in the study of the production of subjective understandings 
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of justice: contingency, desire, and temporality. Three dimensions of analysis that 
will centre the attention of the second part of this thesis. In the first place, and 
introducing the cases of two victims of terrorist attacks, Chapter Three will 
investigate the question of contingency and its role in the formation of narratives of 
justice in response to the shortcomings of the law through a meaning-making 
process. Secondly, Chapter Four will focus on the unconscious mechanisms behind 
such narratives and on the way in which the particularities of the law as Other seems 
to pave the way for the emergence of desires for justice. Chapter Five will consider 
the differences between the temporalities of law and justice, along with their effects 
on our understanding of this concept. And last but not least, the Interlude between 
these chapters and the conclusions of this thesis will discuss the relation between 
all three dimensions of analysis in order to demarcate a field of possible 
understandings of justice –also offering an ideal typology á la Weber on the basis 
of it.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Narratives of Justice:  
Contingency between Fate and Character 
 
 
If one considers chance to be unworthy of determining our fate, it is simply a relapse into 
the pious view of the Universe which Leonardo was himself on the way of overcoming 
when he wrote that the sun does not move […] we are all too ready to forget that in fact 
everything to do with our life is chance, from our origin out of the meeting of 
spermatozoon and ovum onwards […] We all still show too little respect for Nature 
which (in the obscure words of Leonardo which recall Hamlet’s lines) “is full of countless 
causes (‘ragioni’) that never enter experience.” 
Every one of us human beings corresponds to one of the countless experiments in which 
these “ragioni” of nature force their way into experience.  
(Sigmund Freud, Leonardo da Vinci: A Memory of His Childhood) 
 
 
Encounters with political violence, subjectivity, and the law 
Enter Irene Villa 
17th of October 1991, at 8:00 am Commander Francisco Caballar dies as a result 
of the explosion of a bomb placed in his car by ETA members. A few minutes later, 
Irene Villa, 12 years old, is having breakfast and watching the news with her 
mother, María Jesús González, before going to school. For the first time in her life, 
she learns about the existence of ETA, and a few moments before getting into the 
car she asks her mother if they could have placed a bomb under their car too. 
González, a civil servant who worked at a police station issuing passports and ID 
cards, answered that there was nothing to worry about, that they were not that 
important. After getting into the car and starting the engine, a bomb explodes: María 
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Jesús suffers the loss of her right arm and leg, and Irene loses both of her legs and 
several fingers on her left hand. 
A first ambulance arrives, and since it seems that Irene is beyond salvation, they 
prefer to take her mother in the first place. Moments later a second ambulance 
makes its appearance, the same one that could not save Commander Caballar, and 
the medics take Irene to a different hospital. After the surgery, María Jesús wakes 
up, and seeing the damage on her right side she asks the nurse about her daughter. 
The answer is devastating: nobody else arrived with her. For three days she feared 
the worst, remaining in complete silence until her father paid her a visit and said: 
“Child, won’t you ask about your daughter?” That day everything changed for her: 
“That was like being born all over again, I felt as if I had grown wings, I no longer 
cared about my situation. My daughter was alive!”38 
In the meantime, Irene was fighting for her life in a different hospital. Her 
father, having learnt about her severe injuries, told the doctors to let her go: he did 
not want a life of suffering for his child. He would rather suffer her loss in silence 
than seeing her lead a crippled life, a tortured life. The surgeons ignored his request 
and saved Irene’s life. Being a teenage girl who enjoyed playing basketball with her 
friends and wanted to become a model, discovering the loss of her legs was an 
incredibly traumatic experience. Nevertheless, few days later she finally managed 
to see her mother for the very first time since the explosion. Both of them were 
physically injured, but emotionally they were in very different situations: on the 
one hand, Irene could not overcome the loss of her legs and fingers; on the other, 
María Jesús ‘no longer cared’ about her own injuries. All that mattered to her was 
that her daughter was alive when she had thought her dead. In this context, their 
first encounter was marked by the first question that Irene asked her mother: “why 
did this happen to us?”  
She was trying to make sense out of a situation that she suffered but could not 
understand. And yet, the answer that she received from María Jesús would change 
her life as much as the loss of her legs: 
                                                          
38 Interview with Un Tiempo Nuevo, Telecinco (03/01/2015): “Eso fue como un renacer, como 
que me salían alas, como que ya no me importaba lo que tenía. Ya, mi hija estaba viva.” 
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My child, we can cry just like you’re doing now. We can curse and blame these people…we 
have every right to do so. But that would make us very unhappy. Hatred only causes pain 
to the person who feels it, and it wouldn’t hurt them…not in the slightest. But we have 
another option: forgiving. We can think that we have been born like this […] and do 
everything we can to be happy.39 
Irene decided that she had been born without legs. And every year since 1991 
Villa and her mother have celebrated their birthdays on the anniversary of the 
attack, as if they had, indeed, been born again that day. After recovering from her 
injuries in a record time, Irene decided to put into practice the advice she had 
received from her mother, becoming a successful journalist, writer, psychologist, 
and para-alpine skier who has travelled the world sharing her experiences with 
others and giving talks about trauma, self-overcoming, forgiveness, etc. 
The brutal images of her attack, along with her fast recovery and later 
professional success made her, almost immediately, one of ETA’s most prominent 
victims since the conflict started in 1958. Along with Admiral Carrero Blanco –
who died in 1973 and was meant to be Franco’s successor– and later on José 
Antonio Ortega Lara –kidnapped by ETA for almost two years between 1996 and 
1997– and Miguel Ángel Blanco –councillor for the small town of Ermua, in the 
Basque Country, kidnapped and executed in July 1997– the history of Irene Villa 
would become a central part of the pantheon created around the victims of ETA by 
the Spanish Government in its struggle against ETA. And yet, in spite of being 
among the highest-profile victims of ETA, and in view of the increasing 
politicisation of the figure of the victims by Spanish media and political parties, 
Villa decided to abandon the Association of Victims of Terrorism in 2007. Refusing 
to be used for electoral and political purposes, Irene Villa has remained almost 
completely silent in this regard ever since, arguing that that part of her life is over, 
and even stating that she wants to get rid of the label of ‘victim of ETA’: 
                                                          
39 Ibid: “Hija mía, podemos llorar como tú estás haciendo ahora, maldecir a esta gente…que 
tenemos todo el derecho del mundo. Pero esto nos trae en consecuencia que seremos muy 
infelices, porque el odio sólo daña al que lo siente, y a ellos no les llega ni un poquito. Así que, 
también tenemos otra opción, que es la de perdonar, pensar que hemos nacido así […] y hacer 
todo lo posible por hacer feliz.” 
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That year [2007] I started competing in para-alpine skiing, and during the Championship 
of Spain they only asked me about the negotiations, and about this or that judge or ETA 
member. I was competing at a national level! It was my career!40 
I’d rather be known as the journalist, the athlete, the speaker, or the psychologist, than as a 
victim of ETA.41 
[I am tired] of having my whole career reduced to that [being a victim of ETA]. The truth 
is that they keep identifying me with a group I do not want to have anything to do with, not 
even being its victim, because I feel responsible for my life and my future. Only me.42 
We can never be victims, not even if we suffer the detonation of a bomb: we are responsible 
for our lives, for our future.43 
The interest of the antagonistic relation between victimhood and responsibility 
established by Villa cannot be easily dismissed, but it cannot be disconnected from 
another element that has become a recurring topic in her interviews and talks: 
forgiveness. Villa and her mother have commonly supported an “egoistic” [Sic.] 
understanding of forgiveness. Namely, that it is the person who forgives who 
receives the greater benefit in doing so. And while Villa admittedly understands the 
situation of those victims who cannot let go of hatred and resentment,44 she claims 
to have forgiven the people responsible for her attack for her own sake, for her own 
well-being: 
If you forgive you can rest, be happy, and go on with your life. If you don’t, you cling to 
the past.45 
                                                          
40 Interview with Diario de Burgos (08/12/2013): “Ese año [2007] empecé a competir en esquí 
alpino asistido y, en pleno campeonato de España, solo me preguntaban por la negociación, por 
el juez no sé quién, por determinados presos o por un etarra. ¡Yo estaba compitiendo a nivel 
nacional! ¡Era mi carrera!” 
41 Interview with Qué! (16/12/2013): “me gustaría que en vez de como la 'víctima de ETA' me 
conocieran como la periodista, la deportista, la conferenciante o la psicóloga.” 
42 Interview with La Opinión A Coruña (27/12/2013): “[Estoy cansada] Sobre todo de que toda 
mi trayectoria se reduzca a eso [ser víctima de ETA], aunque creo que cada vez es menos. Lo 
cierto es que me siguen identificando con una banda con la que nunca he querido tener nada 
que ver, ni siquiera ser su víctima, porque yo me siento responsable de mi vida y de mi futuro. 
Solo yo.” 
43 Interview with El Hormiguero, Antena 3 (12/12/2014): “No somos víctimas jamás, ni aunque 
nos pongan una bomba: somos responsables de nuestra vida, de nuestro futuro.” 
44 Interview with Qué! ((16/12/2013). 
45  Interview with Un Tiempo Nuevo, Telecinco (03/01/2015): “El que perdona es el que 
descansa, el que es feliz, el que puede seguir con su vida. El que no perdona, se ancla.” 
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[To forgive is] to become free from those who hurt you and make a new start. […] Once 
you forgive, you are free…and you don’t look back. If you do, well, that is because you 
never forgave to begin with.46 
One must forgive in order to continue to live, although there are a lot of people who don’t 
forgive. […] It doesn’t matter where you come from, but where you are going to. […] The 
person who benefits the most from not hating is you. So why should I keep hating and 
suffering if they won’t receive any harm from it?47 
The constant emphasis on forgiveness in Villa’s discourse is remarkable, but it 
opens a space for questioning too. For instance, the recurrence of this topic in her 
conferences and public talks may put into question the true extent of her rejection 
of the label of victim. As stated above, Villa has frequently refused to be categorised 
as such, and yet there seems to be a contradiction between this purported rejection 
and the way in which her talks are normally framed. The content of her talks 
revolves around the importance of forgiveness, but the relevance of this topic for 
Villa and the weight of her words can only be understood inasmuch as she is seen 
–first and foremost– as a victim of political violence. Arguably, such statements 
would not have the same value or influence if they were made by someone who 
suffered similar injuries in a car crash after being hit by another person driving 
under the influence of alcohol. And, in the same way, the importance of forgiveness 
in her discourse could not be understood if she presented herself as a journalist or a 
sportswoman rather than as a victim of political violence.  
The purpose of her regular emphasis on the importance of forgiveness may also 
be more complex than meets the eye. Seemingly, most interviewers ask her about 
this topic, and yet one may wonder if this repetition is not about forgiving, but about 
forgetting. In this regard, repeating can be seen as a way of not remembering (Freud, 
[1920] 1955).  But if that is so, what is it that she is trying to forget? Given the 
complexity of her case there are many possible answers to this question. However, 
there are at least two of them that might be worth considering. On the one hand, 
                                                          
46 Interview with La Opinión de A Coruña (27/12/2013): “[Perdonar es] liberarte de quien te ha 
hecho daño y empezar de nuevo. […]Cuando perdonas, te liberas y no vuelves atrás, si lo haces, 
es que nunca perdonaste.” 
47 Conference Lo que de verdad importa (15/11/2011): “Hay que perdonar para poder seguir 
viviendo. Y hay mucha gente que no perdona. […] No importa de dónde vienes, sino a dónde 
vas […] El principal beneficiado de no odiar eres tú. Entonces, yo, para qué voy a estar odiando 
y sufriendo si a ellos no les va a llegar.” 
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Villa might be trying to forget the suffering she experienced after the attack: the 
initial confusion and anger that followed the discovery of her loss. If that were the 
case, the fact that Villa and her mother celebrate their birthday on the anniversary 
of these events would gain significance in her narrative: the bombings that caused 
their loss would have occurred in a time before their lives had even begun, and thus 
they would not have really experienced them. The memory of the attack would be 
but a phantasmatic experience, a nightmare that she wants to forget. The other 
possible interpretation of her discourse to be considered here is that Villa might not 
be trying to forget her suffering, but her inability to forgive. In the same manner 
that a narcissistic person tries to cover and make up for his insecurities and self-
hatred projecting an image of self-love and success –that he hopes others would 
recognise and return to him– it is possible to imagine a situation in which someone 
unable to forgive could display an image of forgiveness before others, hoping to 
become one with that mask. In a way, it would be the enactment of Pascal’s idea: 
act as if you believed, and eventually you will believe. 
Undoubtedly, these interpretations are but pure speculation. It would be 
impossible for us to know whether Villa has forgiven or not, or if she is trying to 
forget rather than to forgive. Nevertheless, the purpose of these two hypotheses is 
not so much to ‘reveal the truth’ beneath her narrative as it is to problematise the 
different ways in which the elements within it could be organised. Forgiveness, 
political violence, loss, justice, moving on, self-overcoming, redemption, suffering, 
hatred…all of them form part of Villa’s discourse. All of them are relevant, but, 
ultimately, the kind of narrative and the subjective understanding of justice 
resulting from this meaning-making process will depend not so much on the 
elements present in the narrative, but on the way in which they appear organised in 
it. The case of Ángeles Pedraza, another victim of political violence who has 
undergone arguably similar experiences, can help us get a better grasp of the 
relevance of this ‘narrative structure.’ As explained below, Pedraza’s narrative of 
justice shares many of the elements present in Villa’s. And yet, it will make it 
possible to see how similar elements and experiences organised in different ways 
can result in entirely different narratives and understandings of justice. 
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Enter Ángeles Pedraza 
The morning of the 11th of March 2004, three days before Spain’s general 
elections and nearly 13 years after the bombings of Irene Villa and María Jesús 
González, ten bombs were detonated almost simultaneously aboard four different 
commuter trains near Atocha Train Station, in Madrid. As a result of the explosions, 
192 people were killed and over 2,000 were wounded. This would be the biggest 
terrorist attack in the history of Spain and Europe. 
Widespread controversy and confusion followed the attacks. The conservative 
People’s Party (PP) –then in office, and led by Prime Minister José María Aznar – 
held that the Basque separatist group ETA was responsible for the bombings. This 
group normally issued warnings before any form of mass bombing, and always 
claimed responsibility for its actions afterwards, so the situation became 
increasingly confusing when ETA released a public statement that day denying all 
involvement with this attack. At that point some people started questioning the 
theory of the Spanish Government, including the Socialist Party (PSOE) –its main 
rival in the upcoming elections. Over the next few days an increasing amount of 
evidence strengthened these doubts, pointing to a different author: an al-Qaeda-
related terrorist cell.48 
The public support of the Government dropped almost immediately. Prime 
Minister José María Aznar had turned the fight against ETA into an electoral 
flagship, and thus the involvement of this group in the attacks would have 
strengthened the position of his party in the face of the forthcoming elections. 
However, if the people responsible for the bombings were not ETA activists but 
members of an extremist Islamist group, the public reaction would be anything but 
supportive. In 2003, with the opposition of all  other political parties and vast sectors 
of Spanish society, the Government led by José María Aznar openly backed and 
offered military support to the invasion of Iraq. The popular unrest caused by this 
decision was silenced by the good economic situation and the absolute majority of 
Aznar’s conservatives in the Congress and the Senate, but the demonstrations that 
                                                          
48  With nearly two hundred casualties, the sheer scale of the attack and its apparent 
disconnection with ETA’s regular targets (e.g. politicians, police officers, members of the 
military) pointed to a very different form of violence. This was confirmed later on by the study 
of the devices used during the bombings, different from those normally used by ETA activists. 
112 
 
had been ignored then would return, with redoubled strength, as a consequence of 
the 2004 bombings. The conservative party was seen as responsible for the attacks 
and, more importantly, accused of lying to the Spanish people for electoral gain. As 
a result, the Socialist Party won the elections three days later. 
Ultimately, the bombings were judicially attributed to an Islamist cell, whose 
surviving members were tried and found guilty. However, the People’s Party and 
conservative media continued to support conspiracy theories involving the National 
Police Corps, Guardia Civil, al-Qaeda, ETA, and the Socialist Party plotting to 
remove them from office. Not unexpectedly, the arguments and accusations 
between both parties grew considerably bitter over the next few years. The Popular 
Party –now led by Mariano Rajoy– encouraged the biggest association of victims 
of terrorist attacks in Spain, the ‘Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo’ (AVT), 
to express its discontent and doubts regarding the authorship of the bombings as 
determined by the Spanish judiciary. In this context, the association grew closer to 
extreme right-wing political stances, becoming the activist-branch of the 
conservative party and accusing the –then– Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero of lying, betraying the dead, and conspiring with terrorist organisations. 
And this is, precisely, where Ángeles Pedraza comes in. The night before the 
attacks, her daughter Myriam (25 years old) and her husband visited Pedraza to ask 
her for a suitcase: they were flying to London in the morning. Pedraza knew that 
they had to take a train to Atocha in order to get to the airport, so when she heard 
about the bombings her first reaction was to call her daughter. No one would answer 
her phone calls. Fearing the worst she decided to visit Atocha Train Station, El Pozo 
del Tío Raimundo Station, Santa Eugenia Station, and Calle Téllez –the places 
where the four trains had exploded. Not being able to find her daughter, she visited 
every hospital between Madrid and Guadalajara –60 km away from the Capital. 
Myriam was not there. Desperate, and now certain that her daughter was not alive, 
Pedraza decided to go to the morgue, where she had to identify the body of her 
daughter. 
In the aftermath of the attacks Pedraza joined the AVT, becoming its leader 
between 2010 and 2016. As stated above, the first term in office of the socialist 
Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004 – 2008) was haunted by the 
113 
 
controversies and bitter arguments that followed the 2004 bombings. The AVT, led 
at that time by Francisco José Alcaraz, played a major role in the conservative 
attempts of delegitimising the Government. And although Pedraza was not the 
president of the association at the time, her mandate was just as militant as that of 
her predecessors, organising countless demonstrations and mass rallies against 
issues such as the repeal of the Parot Doctrine49 by the ECHR, the legalisation of 
the political party ‘Bildu,’50 the release of ETA prisoners for health reasons,51 any 
form of negotiated end to the conflict, and the announcement of a permanent 
ceasefire declared by ETA in October 2011. 
The ceasefire was declared during the last months of the second term in office 
of Prime Minister Zapatero. In different circumstances the Socialist party could 
have capitalised this event for electoral gain, but the breakout of the Great 
Recession in 2008 and the subsequent austerity measures had led to unprecedented 
levels of discontent among the Spanish population, and in the elections they 
suffered one of the biggest debacles in the history of Spanish democracy. Due to 
the ceasefire and the apparent end of the Basque conflict, the conservative 
Government of Mariano Rajoy –elected Prime Minister in November 2011, shortly 
after the aforementioned ceasefire– found an unexpected accuser in Pedraza. This 
new scenario offered the possibility of realistically ensuring an end to a political 
conflict that had ravaged Spain for more than 50 years. However, the AVT had 
grown to be one of the biggest political lobbies in Spain –thanks, among other 
things, to the patronage of Mr Rajoy’s People’s Party– and they were not willing to 
accept the end of the struggle. The new Government chose to ignore the will of its 
former political allies, and as a consequence they faced new accusations of 
weakness and betrayal. The activist branch of the conservative party grew even 
bolder in its demands when two years later, in 2013, the European Court of Human 
Rights repealed the Parot Doctrine and, on the basis of the extant treaties, the 
Government and the Supreme Court accepted to release –and compensate– those 
members of ETA who had been subject to it. In this case, the organisation led by 
Pedraza went as far as to require the Spanish Government to suppress the Supreme 
                                                          
49 See Chapter Two. 
50 Bildu is a Basque nationalist and leftist political party. 
51 Particularly the recently deceased Josu Uribetxeberria Bolinaga. 
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Court and abandon the European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Union.  
Ever since her election as president of the AVT, Ángeles Pedraza became the 
living embodiment of a relentless effort to bring a police-based end to the activity 
of ETA, declaring that she wanted peace, but only if it came along with the defeat 
of ETA. A defeat that she did not see.52  
At this point it should be possible to glimpse how a different narrative 
articulation of similar elements and experiences can result in entirely different 
understandings of justice. But what are the factors that may have led this former 
shop assistant to quit her job and devote herself exclusively to this fight against an 
enemy that is virtually defeated? Why did she become a ‘full-time victim’ unlike 
Irene Villa, who rejects this label? 
In the same manner that every case of political violence has its own prehistory, 
every subject touched by one of these cases has a prehistory of his own. The 
prehistory of ETA can be tracked down due, among other things, to the vast amount 
of media coverage that it received over five decades of conflict. The same applies 
to Irene Villa, whose life has been well-documented thanks to the early age at which 
she suffered the bombings of 1991 and her later professional developments. The 
case of Ángeles Pedraza, however, is different. Her life before the 2004 bombings 
is relatively unknown –just that she was born in Montilla (Córdoba), used to work 
as a shop assistant, and was divorced and had two children at the time of the attacks: 
Myriam, who died during the bombings, and Javier, who is still alive. She did not 
become a public figure until 2008, when she was elected vice-president of the AVT, 
at the age of 51. In consequence, the only elements of her life that we can draw 
upon in order to fathom the factors that may have led her to adopt such a radical 
stance against ETA are her public statements, interviews, and speeches since 2008. 
However limited in scope such analysis might be, there are certain recurring topics 
in Pedraza’s activity that may allow us to get a better grasp of the differences 
between her and Villa, and how two people who have undergone similar 
experiences have ended up in arguably opposite extremes. 
                                                          
52 Interview with El País (09/11/2011): “Quiero la paz, pero también la hubiera querido antes. 
La quiero con la derrota de la banda. Ahora no la veo.” 
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In contrast with Villa and her emphasis on forgiveness, justice appears as the 
key element in Pedraza’s narrative. Over and over again, Pedraza has claimed that 
all she wants is justice, making it the cornerstone, not just of her own narrative, but 
also of several protests –including the demonstration organised in response to the 
repeal of the Parot Doctrine in 2013. And yet, curiously enough, her claims for 
justice tend to be followed by the same postscript in every occasion. Namely, that 
what she wants is justice, not revenge. 
Today we fight for justice. Today we do not want revenge, we never wanted it. All we ask 
for is justice. […] not rancour, but justice. […] We demand one thing, and one thing alone: 
complete and total Justice.53 
At this point, I would like to problematise once again how different ways of 
organising the elements appearing in a narrative can result in diverging 
understandings of justice. In principle, it may seem that what has led Pedraza to 
become the embodiment of a police-based fight against ETA is her unshakeable 
thirst for justice, but there are certain aspects of her speech that suggest caution to 
this approach. For instance, her insistence on denying a wish for retribution could 
also be interpreted as a response to the increasing number of criticisms received by 
her association over the last few years –especially since 2011, when ETA declared 
a permanent ceasefire and the AVT opposed it. But given that in the context of the 
abovementioned demonstrations she was addressing like-minded people from her 
own organisation, it could also appear as a clear case of excusatio non petita, 
accusatio manifesta –he who excuses himself, accuses himself. It could be that, by 
denying a wish for revenge, Pedraza may actually be making it manifest. But if it 
is justice and not vengeance what she wants…what does she mean by ‘complete 
and total justice’? What is necessary for her to feel that she has attained it? 
We insist: in order to achieve justice, the end of terrorism must be an end with victors and 
losers. […] And we will never stop fighting for our most elemental right, no matter what: 
our right to an end of terrorism with justice, memory, and dignity. That is to say, an end of 
                                                          
53  Demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013): “Hoy 
luchamos por la justicia. Hoy no queremos venganza, como no la hemos querido nunca. Sólo 
pedimos justicia. […] No es rencor, es justicia. […] Sólo pedimos una cosa, y sólo una: Justicia 
completa y con mayúsculas.” 
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terrorism that will allow all Spaniards to say: ‘Our immense sacrifice was worth it, we won. 
And they, those murderers, have lost.’54 
In contrast with Villa’s views on justice, which she identifies with social 
reintegration after having undergone the corresponding legal punishment, 55 
Pedraza links her wish for justice with the disappearance of ETA. For her, the 
possibility of attaining ‘complete and total justice’ appears as ultimately dependent 
on the ‘complete and total disappearance of ETA’: not the end of the struggle, but 
a crushing defeat of ETA.  
By making use of this arguably Schmittean friend-enemy distinction, Pedraza 
seems to be not only admitting the political character that she has so often denied 
to this conflict,56 but also excluding ETA from Spain qua political community. And, 
interestingly enough, by means of this exclusion Pedraza seems to be granting and 
reasserting as well a key point in ETA’s nationalist credo –their Basqueness as lack 
of Spanishness– conversely configuring Spanish nationalism in its opposition to 
ETA, simultaneously identifying the Spanish nation with the victims and the fight 
against terrorism in a rather interesting chain of empty signifiers (Laclau, 2007).57 
                                                          
54 Ibid.: “Insistimos en que para que haya justicia el final del terrorismo debe ser un final con 
vencedores y vencidos. […]Y nunca, jamás, cueste lo que nos cueste, dejaremos de defender 
nuestro derecho más elemental: el derecho a un final del terrorismo con justicia, con memoria, 
y con dignidad. Es decir, a un final del terrorismo que nos permita decir a todos los españoles: 
nuestro inmenso sacrificio ha merecido la pena. Hemos ganado, y ellos, los asesinos, han 
perdido.” 
 
55 Interview (04/12/2013): “Nunca es tarde tampoco para arrepentirse, quizá obcecado en una 
idea, […] claro lo que sí que pienso, y eso es que para vivir en una sociedad con un Estado de 
Derecho es normal, es la justicia. Después de haber pasado, de haber pagado por el daño que 
has hecho sí que mereces reinsertarte, y sí que mereces tener otra vida, después de haber expiado 
tu culpa, por supuesto.” 
56 During the demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013) 
she claimed that “there is no war here, no conflict, but murderers and innocent victims.” (“Aquí 
no ha habido guerra, aquí no ha habido conflicto, aquí ha habido asesinos y víctimas 
inocentes.”) 
 
57 In this regard, it is important to take into account two historical factors. On the one hand, 
under Franco’s Dictatorship, Spanish nationalism became essentially reactionary: constructed 
in opposition to communism, Basque and Catalan nationalism. On the other, in the aftermath 
of the dictatorship Spanish nationalism became largely discredited due to its links to Franco’s 
regime. The transition to democracy resulted in “pact of forgetting” that implied that the new 
democratic regime would not delve into the past and bring to the political arena a debate on the 
victims of Francoist repression (50,000 to 200,000 casualties). In spite of their lack of visibility, 
these victims haunted the politics of the Spanish right wing, undermining the democratic 
legitimacy of the People’s Party. However, during the 1990s former Prime Minister José María 
Aznar (PP) was –unsuccessfully– attacked by ETA, and from that moment on his party aimed 
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In consequence, her claims about a ‘complete and total’ end of ETA seem to present 
at least two difficulties. On the one hand, the possibility of a complete and total 
disappearance of ETA and all its members would involve as well –according to her 
own narrative– the possibility of a complete and total disappearance of the victims 
when not of the Spanish nation as such –since they appear to be constituted, in the 
end, in contraposition to the activities of this group. On the other –and this is 
perhaps one of the most shocking aspects of Pedraza’s stance– ETA had nothing to 
do with her loss: her daughter was killed by an al-Qaeda-related Islamist cell that 
was dismantled shortly after the 2004 bombings, and there have been no other 
actions of this kind ever since. ETA plays an important role in the Villa’s 
narrative…but why does it seem to play an even bigger role in Pedraza’s? Why 
ETA and not al-Qaeda? Why ETA only after the 2004 bombings and not before?  
One could argue that Pedraza’s actions may have been driven by a sense of 
solidarity with other people who have undergone experiences of political violence, 
but that would not account, in the end, for the fact that her activism started only 
after the 2004 bombings under the patronage of the conservative party. 
We are all here because we are not willing to move on, to turn the page and forget what has 
happened in this country for more than 50 years.58 
This cannot end, nor be forgotten.59 
ETA might not to be the cause of her loss, but it has become a guilty agent for 
it nonetheless. It has become the embodiment of her pain:  
For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an agent; still 
more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering –in short, some living thing 
upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy: for the 
venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win 
relief, anaesthesia –the narcotic he cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind. This 
                                                          
to turn the fight against this group and the recovery of Spanish nationalism into one of the 
hallmarks of the Spanish right wing. Counting with victims “of their own” became a way of 
gaining democratic legitimacy for the sake of their party and Spanish nationalism. 
58 Demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013): “Todos 
estamos aquí porque no estamos dispuestos a pasar página, a olvidar lo que ha ocurrido durante 
más de 50 años en este país.” 
59 Interview (10/03/2014): “Esto ni puede zanjarse, ni se puede olvidar.” 
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alone, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, 
and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects. (Nietzsche, [1887] 1994) 
Maybe the members of the Islamist cell responsible for the 2004 bombings 
disappeared “too soon” to give Pedraza the opportunity to vent her suffering upon 
them; and thus Pedraza might have had to find a new cause for her pain that would 
not disappear any time soon, a cause capable of sustaining her narrative for an 
indefinite amount of time. ETA and the fight against it for the supremacy of Spain 
could be this cause –both, as origin and goal. 
(Seekers of justice). There are those who, if science ever made it possible, would like to 
extend the lifespan of criminals by up to 1,000 years, so they could serve 1,000 years in 
prison. Wasn’t it God who did that when he founded eternity, so the damned could eternally 
suffer in hell? (Sánchez Ferlosio, 1993, 127, my translation). 
Ángeles Pedraza seems to displace the resentment caused by her suffering from 
al-Qaeda to ETA, and when the latter threatens to disappear she rejects that 
possibility. Her narrative was meant to restore meaning to her life, and the 
disappearance of one of the pillars of such narrative would render her suffering 
meaningless. Suffering appears here as the key element, as the cause and trigger of 
the creation of her entire narrative…but what are the origins of the suffering stirring 
her alleged desire for justice? 
Undoubtedly, the keystone of her pain can be traced back to the dramatic loss 
of her daughter Myriam. And yet, it is not only the biological death of Myriam that 
matters here, but also the disappearance of a person who played a fundamental role 
in Pedraza’s own life. In other words, the origin of her pain is not just the real loss, 
but also the symbolic loss for which Myriam stands.  
Pedraza has repeatedly stated that she cannot accept a negotiated end to the 
conflict with ETA. In her opinion the victims “have already been too generous,”60 
and thus public authorities and tribunals alike should be up to the sacrifices they 
have made.61 The choice of words is very revealing, but if there is a concept that 
                                                          
60 Interview with El País (20/10/2011): “Las víctimas ya hemos sido demasiado generosas.” 
61 Demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013): “Pedimos 
que todos los poderes públicos, los jueces, que estén a la altura de nuestro sacrificio. Y a la 
altura de lo que hemos dado. A la altura de lo que España merece y necesita.” 
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stands out among the rest in Pedraza’s phrasing, that undoubtedly is ‘sacrifice.’ 
That seems to be the way she sees her loss –and, arguably, the losses of the other 
victims– as a sacrifice: as something offered to a deity or higher cause. As a 
meaningful loss which, in spite of all the suffering that it may entail in its own right, 
carries within itself the promise that “it won’t have been all for nothing.”  
In Agamben’s Homo Sacer (1998), sacrifice is described as the act of conferring 
meaning to a loss, but it is also said that it is impossible to sacrifice that which is 
not one’s own to give. Hence, it may seem too far-fetched to state that Myriam 
chose to give her life for a higher cause –either the unity of Spain, the fight against 
ETA, or any other– when that day she was but another citizen headed to the airport 
to catch a flight. But did Pedraza offer Myriam’s life in exchange for something? 
Undoubtedly it was not hers to give, but in one of her statements she seems to 
suggest the opposite: 
I don’t forgive the life they took, nor all the suffering of that day, but even less the fact that 
they prevented me from becoming a grandma for life.62 
Here can be seen the symbolic loss for which Myriam stands: she was not only 
Pedraza’s daughter, but also a way for her to become a grandmother. Consequently, 
this could be understood as a loss of lineage, as a promise of the symbolic that has 
not been fulfilled (Frosh, 2013) due to the intervention of a third party. Pedraza not 
only lost her daughter, but also the possibility of seeing fulfilled some of her 
expectations in life. It is not just Myriam’s life that was lost, but also the role that 
she played in Pedraza’s symbolic universe. 
 However, spectres arise at the end or death of something (Derrida, 2006). The 
life that was lost cannot be recovered, but the role that it played in someone else’s 
life lives on as a remainder: haunting us. Myriam died in 2004, but the unfulfilled 
promises and expectations caused by her absence keep haunting Pedraza’s life, and 
the symbolic role once played by Myriam is now occupied –and played– by her 
loss. The 2004 bombings tore down Pedraza’s symbolic universe: Myriam had been 
replaced by the loss of Myriam, and this change required an equally dramatic shift 
in Pedraza’s life and narrative. She found a renewed sense of purpose in her crusade 
                                                          
62 Interview with La Razón (13/03/2012): “No les perdono la vida sesgada ni el calvario de 
aquel día, pero, mucho menos, que me dejaran para toda la vida sin ser abuela.” 
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against ETA, and her loss came to play a fundamental role in it: becoming, in the 
end, the flagship and cornerstone of her fight.  
Pedraza did not sacrifice Myriam’s life, nor her role: she lost them. 
Undoubtedly there is a need to confer meaning to a loss like this, and for that 
purpose she embraced a new narrative centred on the fight against ETA. The issue 
of her sacrifice may require further consideration, but for the time being we cannot 
rule out the possibility that Pedraza’s sacrifice might have been other than her 
daughter’s. Perhaps, the possibility of having taken justice into her own hands –
instead of relying on the rule of law out of fear of legal punishment. 
Configured as a victim by that renunciation –along with other factors such as 
the historical and political moment, the extant legal definitions, group membership, 
etc. – and unlike Irene Villa and María Jesús González, Ángeles Pedraza fully 
embraced her newly acquired condition. So much so that she even quit her job to 
devote herself exclusively to the activities of the AVT. Pedraza sees herself as a 
victim wholeheartedly:  
There is no war here, no conflict, but murderers and innocent victims.63 
The victims are not responsible for anything. We are absolutely innocent.64 
We will keep showing our disagreement with all initiatives aimed at the recognition of the 
existence of some purported ‘victims of state violence’ and their equalisation with the 
victims of terrorism.65 
“There are only two sides: murderers and victims;” “if you do not support the 
victims, then you support the murderers;” “victims are absolutely innocent and 
murderers are absolutely guilty;” etc. This form of discourse has found wide 
coverage in Spanish media and political parties, resulting in an array of 
prefabricated pseudo-arguments against ETA now shared by most of the population 
of the country. And, in this regard, even if Pedraza sees herself as a victim, to an 
extent she has also been a victim of victimisation: a form of victimisation fostered 
                                                          
63 Demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013): “Aquí no ha 
habido guerra, aquí no ha habido conflicto, aquí ha habido asesinos y víctimas inocentes.” 
64 Ibid.: “Las víctimas no somos responsables de nada. Somos absolutamente inocentes.” 
65 Interview in July 2012: “Seguiremos mostrando nuestro total rechazo a todas las iniciativas 
dirigidas al reconocimiento de unas supuestas ‘víctimas del Estado’ y a su equiparación con las 
víctimas del terrorismo. 
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and nourished by Spanish political parties and institutions, aiming to create a social 
reality that equates any attack on the victims with an attack on society as a whole. 
By doing so the state manages to posit itself –and hence society– as a victim of 
crime and tries to equal the interests of the victims to its own, denying –in turn– the 
category of “victim” to others that may have suffered as much at the hands of the 
same institution for whose sake Pedraza claims to have sacrificed the life of her 
daughter. 
The cases of Villa and Pedraza could not seem more radically opposed, but there 
seems to be a common element to both cases: through the deployment of meaning-
making processes they have managed to create narratives –that have allowed them, 
to some extent, to escape a series of experiences so dramatic that they could even 
be considered as ‘traumatic,’ reshaping their lives and providing them with a 
renewed sense of purpose 
Framing contingency, inventing narratives 
What is the reason for including these cases at the beginning of this chapter? 
Why these two particular cases? What is their function? What is their role in this 
research? How do they contribute to the process of reconceptualising justice in 
relation to subjectivity and law? 
In order to answer these questions I will look at two different dimensions: the 
relation between the cases and this research, and their connection with the following 
two chapters –that will respectively address the topics of desire and temporality in 
relation to justice.   
The experiences lived by Villa and Pedraza shattered their narratives of life –
one wanted to play basketball and become a model, the other expected to have a 
quiet life devoted to her work and family– forcing them to make sense out of 
something that seemed to lack any of it: they had to create new narratives in order 
to regain a sense of purpose and restore meaning to their lives. The study of these 
narratives, which imply subjective notions of justice, will allow me to closely look 
at the process of positioning of the subject in relation to the law.  Hence the main 
goal of this chapter is to study the relation between contingency and the creation of 
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subjective narratives of justice, taking the abovementioned cases as opposite poles 
demarcating a field of possible narratives. 
Secondly, the study of the questions of contingency, desire, and temporality 
conducted in this chapter and the following ones aims to cover three dimensions of 
analysis with the goal of offering a reconceptualisation of justice from the limits of 
the law. Although clearly distinct from one another, these dimensions appear as 
three aspects of the same phenomenon: the emergence of subjective understandings 
of justice. Therefore, these cases will not only hold sway over this chapter, but also 
over the two following ones, providing us with a clearer understanding of the 
importance of desire and temporality in the formation of subjective understandings 
of justice. The “Interlude” included between Chapter Five and the conclusions 
seeks to clarify the relation among all three dimensions while also proposing an 
ideal typology á la Weber of possible understandings of justice: a typology that will 
take the cases of Villa and Pedraza as the two extremes of a spectrum in which other 
intermediate understandings of justice could be located. 
However, and before reaching that point, it is necessary to go back to the topic 
of contingency and the cases opening this chapter in order to grasp a better 
understanding of the role of the histories of Villa and Pedraza in the elaboration of 
the abovementioned typology. 
Between its foundation in 1958 and the permanent ceasefire declared in 2011 
ETA had been active for more than fifty years, and over that lapse of time it killed 
829 people and injured thousands. There are hundreds of different cases that could 
have been chosen for this chapter. And yet, the histories of Villa and Pedraza 
provide us with something that other cases do not share: remarkable similarities, 
and even more astonishing differences. On the one hand, both subjects have 
undergone dramatic encounters with political violence, and both of them have 
created narratives in the aftermath of these encounters that have allowed them to 
carry on with their lives. On the other, and in spite of their arguably similar 
departing points, their narratives have produced extremely divergent 
understandings of justice: Villa’s emphasis on forgiveness resulted in the 
production of a narrative tending to equate justice to legal punishment, whereas 
Pedraza seems to understand justice as the total and complete disappearance of the 
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enemy. Resorting to the same mechanism in their attempts to overcome similar 
dramatic experiences, they have reached opposite extremes. And that is why they 
have been chosen above all others for this chapter: they appear as opposite poles of 
the same spectrum, and the radical opposition between them allows us to demarcate 
a field for other intermediate positions.  
The unbridgeable gap between both entices us to wonder about the reasons that 
may have led Villa and Pedraza to assume such different stances. In order to study 
this question there are, at least, two different dimensions that require further 
consideration: (1) the milieu of elements comprising the background of their 
narratives, and (2) the narrative structure articulating them. Due to the significant 
number of elements that feed into their narratives –ranging from psychological 
factors or family history to political preferences– an in-depth analysis of the first of 
these two dimensions presents us with a level of complexity that exceeds the scope 
of this research and may even call for a project solely focused on it. Consequently, 
in the following sections I will take into account some of these aspects, but under 
two provisos. First, instead of considering all the factors present in each narrative, 
I will focusing my attention on the structure underpinning the most relevant ones in 
each of them. And second, the relation between the factors considered over the next 
few sections and the narratives produced by both subjects should not be taken as an 
attempt to find a direct relation of causality that could explain their diverging 
outcomes. In this regard, and following Weber’s scepticism towards causal analysis 
in social sciences, it is important to remember that “any causal […] explanation in 
comparative sociological analysis is unlikely to be right” (Needham, 1962, 122), 
and, in consequence, any serious study in this field should be “more like interpreting 
a constellation of symptoms [rather] than tracing a chain of causes” (Geertz, [1973] 
1993, 316). Therefore, I will not try to offer a univocal causal explanation for the 
diverging attitudes of Villa and Pedraza towards justice, but to explore the 
organisational structure articulating the constellation of factors that may have 
conditioned their reactions; and, most importantly, the role played by contingency 
in this regard. 
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Encounters with contingency and the event 
Over the last few pages there have been several references to “the unexpected” 
and “the possibility of the unexpected” as key elements in the development of the 
abovementioned narratives: as the factors that destabilise and call into question our 
understanding of the world, jeopardising our plans and expectations in life, forcing 
us to rethink our relation to the symbolic networks we inhabit. Mentions that 
resonate with echoes of one of the most relevant concepts in the work of Alain 
Badiou (1988): the event. And yet, as I will argue, event and contingency are not 
exactly the same. 
It is difficult to find a clear and univocal definition of ‘event’ in the work of 
Badiou, but it is possible to find an approximation to this concept in The Communist 
Hypothesis: 
I call an ‘event’ a rupture in the normal order of bodies and languages as it exists for any 
particular situation […]. What is important to note here is that an event is not the realisation 
of a possibility that resides within the situation or that is dependent on the transcendental 
laws of the world. An event is the creation of new possibilities. It is located not merely at 
the level of objective possibilities, but at the possibility of possibilities. Another way of 
putting this is: with respect to a situation or world, an event paves the way for the possibility 
of what –from the limited perspective of the make-up of this situation or the legality of this 
world– is strictly impossible. […] We might also say that an event is the occurrence of the 
real as its own future possibility (Badiou, 2010, 242-243) 
For Badiou, reality is not something ‘solid’ or stable, but an ‘inconsistent 
multiplicity’ grounded in a void which is, at the same time, void and excess.66 
Phenomena such as law and ideology help to cover up and mask this unstable 
foundation that, nevertheless, remains present: locked within ‘the excluded part.’67 
The event, therefore, appears as that which happens when the excluded part irrupts 
the social scene in a sudden and drastic way. It breaks the appearance of normality, 
creating a space in which reality can be disclosed in its true inconsistent 
                                                          
66 It is possible to see at this point the connection between Badiou’s work, the Lacanian register 
of the Real, and Heidegger’s ‘Abgrund.’ 
67 The constitutive character and importance of this ‘excluded part’ has been highlighted over 
the last few years in the work of Slavoj Žižek –especially in his book Less than Nothing: Hegel 
and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (2013). Prior references to this topic can also be 
found in the work of Hegel himself, and Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra ([1883] 2006):  
“If one takes the hump from the hunchback, then one takes his spirit too.” 
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multiplicity. In this ‘return of the repressed,’ the event tears apart the very fabric of 
law and ideology, dispossessing them of their purported natural character, and 
creating the conditions of possibility for the emergence of new subjects, truths, and 
systems.  
Following this description it seems plausible to establish a connection between 
the concept of the event and the encounters with political violence experienced by 
Villa and Pedraza. In the first place, these encounters were ‘impossible’ –remember 
here the answer that Villa received from her mother right before the bomb exploded: 
“We are not that important.” Also, these experiences could be labelled as ‘real’ 
inasmuch as they completely escaped predictability and immediate meaning. And 
last, but not least, they forced Villa and Pedraza to accept new possibilities, 
producing, in the process, new subjectivities and truths. Badiou’s idea of the event 
is rather mutable and changeable,68 hence these encounters may not meet all the 
requirements necessary to be considered as such. Nevertheless, if we take into 
account the brief explanation of the event provided above along with the description 
on the cases that opened this chapter it might yet be possible to consider the 
experiences of Villa and Pedraza as “eventful.”   
The event as the resurgence of a –necessarily– excluded part that destabilises 
law and ideology reminds us of the structurally necessary –and yet conflictive– 
relation between law and contingency described in Chapter Two. So, what is the 
exact connection between event and contingency? What are their differences? Do 
they play the same role in the production of narratives of justice? What role is that? 
In this regard, it may be possible to draw several similarities and differences 
between contingency and the event: (1) contingency is a property of the event; (2) 
every event is contingent, but not every contingency is an event; (3) contingency is 
disclosed and becomes visible in the event.  
(1) Contingency is a property of the event. Even if Badiou has described the 
event sometimes as the ‘occurrence of the impossible’ it is important to remember 
that ‘the impossible’ refers, in this case, to that which cannot occur within ‘the 
                                                          
68  Although not exhaustive, some of the lists of events provided by Badiou seem rather 
arbitrary, ranging from deeply personal phenomena –such as falling in love– to more socio-
political ones –such as the Haitian Revolution. 
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situation’ –that is, the Imaginary-Symbolic field of reality in contraposition to the 
field of the Real.  Therefore, it would be unwise to declare that contingency and the 
event are incompatible due to the ‘impossible’ character of the latter. Quite the 
opposite, the event is ultimate and radical contingency: that which may happen 
beyond our wildest dreams, nightmares, and expectations. It is, in other words, but 
the actualisation of a raw, unlikely, and unforeseeable possibility. 
In consequence, (2) every event is also contingent –it may or may not happen– 
but contingency exceeds the event itself. The latter always comes from beyond the 
wall of reality; contingency, on the other hand, operates on both sides of the wall: 
it includes the possibility of the return of the excluded part, but also all the different 
combinations and permutations of small and apparently irrelevant particularities 
that may take place within the situation. 
And last, but not least, (3) the event discloses the radical contingency of our 
existence, making it visible. The event is ‘the unexpected’ knocking down the doors 
of our everydayness. It challenges our views, demanding a movement of distancing 
and de-distancing (Heidegger, [1927] 2010, 97) from our immediate reality. 
However, the effects of the event transcend the event itself: yes, the impossible has 
occurred…but that also means that other ‘impossibles’ may occur too! Hence the 
reason why I chose to use the expression ‘knocking down’ instead of saying that 
the event ‘opens the doors’ of our everydayness. After the event, these doors are 
simply gone, they no longer exist, and through that opening in the wall of reality it 
becomes possible to see a whole new world of possibilities: the event discloses, as 
Badiou notices, the possibility of the possibility. That is, contingency. 
Ultimately, the event is but a contingent actualisation of contingency itself. The 
latter, nevertheless, remains as pure potentiality: where the event is “the 
unexpected,” contingency appears as “the possibility of the unexpected.” But even 
if the importance of contingency is revealed dramatically in the wake of the event, 
it does not necessarily require of the event itself for this. 
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From encounters to narratives 
In relation to the production of narratives of justice, contingency enters the 
scene in two steps. First, it becomes visible in the emergence of unexpected 
circumstances that lead us to seek justice in the law, hoping to restore ‘normality’ 
to our lives. And second, it can also manifest itself in a “dissatisfaction of normative 
expectations” (Renault, 2004, 107-108). This dissatisfaction can be restricted to the 
rupture of the normative expectations caused by the circumstances that led us to 
seek justice in the first place –thus reinforcing our positive appreciation of the law. 
But it can also go beyond these original circumstances –and encompass law itself– 
if we understand that ‘normality’ has not been restored: 
While our routines are accompanied by implicit positive valuations of our social 
environments, the emergence of a feeling of injustice entails a shift to critical appreciation. 
[…] If the inquiry on the nature of the injustice concludes that it is produced by, or 
compatible with these [normative] principles, their positive appreciation turns into a critical 
one. (ibid, 111) 
As stated above, law needs contingency in order to be enforced (back) into 
existence: it is its very condition of possibility. Without a rupture in normative 
expectations normality cannot be restored, and thus norms cannot be enforced. 
Without law-breaking and justice-seeking subjects law cannot act. But this 
necessity also entails a danger: if the law fails to meet the expectations that it has 
created, this situation could lead to a questioning of its very authority. It could 
become dispossessed of the ‘natural character’ with which it clothes itself, revealing 
its historic, political, and ultimately contingent character. 
Therefore the role of contingency in the production of subjective understandings 
of justice is threefold. In the first place, contingency creates the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of circumstances that entail a rupture in normality, 
leading to a direct contact between the subject and the law –along with a greater 
awareness of the impact of the latter on the life of the former. Secondly, this 
scenario allows the law to assert its authority. And, finally, the outcome of this legal 
and judicial process –in which law enforces its authority– will determine whether 
such authority is accepted or questioned depending on the satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction of the subject and his expectations with the decision made. The reach 
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and limitations of the law become apparent to the subject throughout this process. 
The possibility of the unexpected is disclosed, holding sway over the subject. And 
if, for whatever reasons, the expectations of the subject are not met, this process can 
also lead to a repositioning in his relation with the law and to the production of a 
new subjective understanding of justice. 
This, of course, is intimately connected with the differences between demands 
and desires for justice already introduced in Chapter Two, and it might be 
interesting to see to what extent it would be possible to make a move in desire from 
expectation –Erwarten– to anticipation –Vorlaufen– (Heidegger, [1927] 2010).69 
For the time being, however, it is necessary to set this topic aside if we are to get a 
better grasp of the role and importance of contingency in the production of 
subjective narratives of justice. 
The irruption of contingency in our everydayness requires us to take a step back, 
look, and reassess –or even change– our position in the symbolic milieu we 
normally inhabit. A possible but very unlikely explosion forced Irene Villa to 
rethink her own life, making relevant, overnight, topics such as justice and 
forgiveness that were completely irrelevant to her before. A similar incident turned 
a former shop assistant, Ángeles Pedraza, into the leader of one of the biggest 
political lobbies in Spain, championing the fight against a separatist group that had 
no relevance in her life before 2004. And, in the same way, the possible and yet 
unexpected irruption of the histories of these two women in this research requires 
us to reconsider the true role of contingency in the formation of subjective 
understandings of justice. 
Ultimately, contingency produces an immediate feeling of alienation towards 
the law: in the process of becoming aware of its importance it also becomes alien 
to us. We start wondering if these legal norms are part of the solution or part of the 
problem. The possibility of the unexpected becomes problematic too. The recently 
disclosed strangeness of the law and our very lives causes an unbearable feeling of 
uneasiness. And, in this situation, re-integrating that breach into our symbolic 
network becomes a pressing necessity. That is, we must produce a narrative of 
                                                          
69 This topic appears studied in further detail in Chapter Five. 
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justice in order to abandon the apparently meaningless situation of discomfort we 
currently inhabit and regain a sense of purpose in life. 
Function of the creation of narratives 
Contingency, as a destabilising factor, appears as the problematic element 
demanding articulation in any narrative of justice. The increased awareness of its 
importance provoked by the unexpected circumstances in which our normative 
expectations are thwarted leads to a critical questioning. A critical questioning not 
just of the law, but also of all the symbolic constructions that rendered our lives 
safe, predictable, and stable. In other words, contingency challenges –and even 
dismantles– whatever narratives of life we may have had, and if the institutions 
meant to restore normality to our lives fail to fulfil their function, the production of 
a new narrative is required. A narrative meant to provide us with a renewed sense 
of purpose. 
Expectations, plans, norms, systems, goals, laws…all of them are called into 
question by the experience of contingency. And it is this very experience that acts 
as the basic requirement for the production of new discourses or narratives of 
justice: “A universe of experience is the precondition for a universe of discourse” 
(Dewey, 1938, 68). In principle, any experience of contingency is “perceived as 
part of the environing world, not in and by itself” (ibid.), but the relation between 
such experience and the symbolic matrix that it enters –and, in which it is also 
perceived– is problematic. On the one hand, we try to make sense out of it by 
drawing connections between this new element and the pre-existing ones; but, on 
the other, this new element simply does not “fit in.” In the same manner that 
definitions emerge from “forms of life” and words result unintelligible without a 
grasp of the social background in which they are used (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1967), 
an isolated experience cannot be understood without the symbolic matrix in which 
it takes place.70 Expanding on this linguistic metaphor, the problematic entailed by 
the irruption of contingency in our lives would be similar to that of being forced to 
use, in our everyday life, a foreign word that we have never heard of before. It 
would be the equivalent of forcing a Chinese peasant from the 13th century to use 
                                                          
70 See Wittgenstein’s famous example: “if a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” 
(ibid.) 
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words like “drone,” “psychoanalysis,” or “microprocessor” in his daily life. It 
would be virtually impossible for us to know how to use words like that in such a 
situation: we would have never heard them before; we would not know the context 
in which they are meant to be used; we would not know how to use them even if 
we had a basic understanding of such a context; and, ultimately, we would not know 
their meaning, what they stand for. Undoubtedly it would be possible for us to speak 
or utter those words, but we would not know how to use them –what to make out 
of them. They would simply not make sense in the symbolic matrix we had hitherto 
inhabited. In similar circumstances it might be possible to ask ‘a knowledgeable 
someone’ for the meaning and use of these new words, but that ‘authority’ could 
also be missing or simply fail to explain –and thus render understandable and 
normal– these questions. 
A similar situation occurs when we have an encounter with contingency: it does 
not fit in with the symbolic structures that we have inhabited so far. New 
experiences, new events, new discoveries, new inventions…they require us to 
reshape our language and make room for them in our lives. When contingency 
becomes manifest in experiences such as those of Irene Villa and Ángeles Pedraza, 
the immediate reaction of the subject could be to appeal to ‘the competent 
authorities’ –that is, law– to confer meaning, explain, and adjust these newly 
apparent circumstances. The subject may seek answers and recognition in the 
authority of the law, but if the latter fails to meet such expectations, these 
circumstances would still require integration in the symbolic matrix regulating our 
everyday life. If this happened, there could either be a withdrawal of the subject –
becoming overwhelmed by the apparent meaninglessness that an unexpected 
contingency has brought upon his life–71 or a production of a new symbolic matrix 
capable of articulating the problematic element –contingency– in a narrative of 
justice in response to the inoperability of the law. 
In relation to the main topic of this chapter, the most interesting aspect of these 
subjective narratives of justice is that they do not erase contingency. Quite the 
opposite, they are built on and around it: “The universe of experience surrounds and 
regulates the universe of discourse but never appears as such within the latter” 
                                                          
71 Discussed in the Interlude. 
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(Dewey, 1938, 68). Contingency appears as the symbolic void that originates these 
narratives, but also as the force keeping them together: as if it were a black hole 
whose gravitational pulse prevents any particle or electromagnetic radiation from 
escaping its event horizon. For that reason all the conferences given by Irene Villa 
and all the speeches made by Ángeles Pedraza over the last few years refer, in the 
end, to the encounters with political violence that changed their lives. 
The production of subjective narratives of justice not only permits the analysis 
and interpretation of a situation previously unintelligible, but also –and this is the 
most important part for this research– the articulation of hitherto unthinkable claims 
for justice. The histories of Pedraza and Villa are good examples of this, but they 
also illustrate how this process is never completely finished:  the goals and claims 
fostered by Pedraza in her narrative are either too distant in the future or simply 
unattainable; and, in the case of Villa, the constant return to the explosion that 
caused the loss of her legs seems to indicate that her discourse of forgiveness 
requires a permanent re-enactment and working-through without ever being fully 
completed. As Rorty well notices, in the end, every human life seems to be but “the 
working out of a sophisticated idiosyncratic fantasy, and […] no such working out 
gets completed before death interrupts. It cannot get completed because there is 
nothing to complete, there is only a web of relations to be rewoven, a web which 
time lengthens every day” (1989, 42-43).  
Narratives of justice: contingency between fate and character 
Articulating contingency in the cases of Irene Villa and Ángeles Pedraza 
Forgiveness, punishment, reparation, suffering, redemption, peace, balance, 
sacrifice, victory…as seen in the cases of Villa and Pedraza, different narratives of 
justice present and articulate different elements. Narratives, that are also affected 
and conditioned by a variety of political, historical, economic, social, 
psychological, and cultural factors that determine the subjective position from 
which these narratives are produced. And yet, in spite of the many possible 
combinations of factors and discursive elements, all narratives of justice have 
something in common: they appear in response to the irruption of contingency in 
our lives and the failure of the law to restore normality and meaningfulness to it. In 
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other words, these narratives emerge as an attempt to repair the breach in the 
Symbolic and integrate contingency into it.  
Irene Villa tried to make sense out of the loss of her legs, and Ángeles Pedraza 
tried to confer meaning on the loss of her daughter. They were trying to integrate 
the unexpected events that caused their suffering, but also the possibilities disclosed 
by such events. The irruption of contingency is not just a one-time thing: it also 
reveals the possibility of other unexpected things happening. It can shatter our plans 
of life and dismantle our normative expectations, opening a future of uncertainty 
sometimes difficult to bear. And, in response to this situation, if law fails to restore 
normality, the subject might create a narrative of justice capable of conferring 
meaning on contingency, on the unexpected and the possibility of the unexpected. 
Creating a narrative is, in a way, like creating a story. A story we tell ourselves 
about ourselves, about our lives. And, ultimately, a story in which each of us is the 
main character of our own narrative. Before the explosion that caused the loss of 
her legs, Irene Villa was a girl who attended school and dreamed of playing 
basketball and becoming a model someday. In the same way, prior to the 2004 
bombings Ángeles Pedraza had a stable job, and having two grown-up children she 
dreamed of becoming a grandmother soon. Both subjects had their own stories, their 
own narratives of life. Knowing where they came from, and, supposing that their 
circumstances remained relatively stable and unchanged, they also knew where they 
could and would like to see themselves in the future. The knowledge of their past 
and present circumstances allowed them to navigate through a process of becoming, 
towards the situation in which they would like to find themselves someday. This 
relation between past experiences, present circumstances, and expectations about 
the future allowed them to make sense out of the world surrounding them, making 
it part of their story. 
Ceteris paribus, if nothing extraordinary or unexpected happens, we might be 
able to see these kinds of narratives of life become true. The problem is that, as seen 
in the cases of Villa and Pedraza, the unexpected is always possible. And, as it 
happened to them, it can tear to pieces whatever narrative we might have had. The 
symbolic puzzle of our life, once considered stable and maybe even natural, is 
undone by the irruption of contingency: its pieces now scattered, disperse, 
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unconnected, meaningless in and by themselves. In such circumstances it might yet 
be possible to go to law, to its authority, hoping that the legal norms meant to 
provide us with stability and certainty might also be able to restore normality to our 
lives. Hoping that the law might be capable of putting the pieces back together. 
Hoping, in the end, that it might be able to help us confer meaning on an apparently 
meaningless situation. And, if possible, assure us that our expectations in life will 
not be dismantled again. That is, that no such contingencies will disturb our plans 
ever again. 
If the subject perceives law as incapable of doing this –or maybe even as part 
of the problem, and not just as an unsatisfactory solution– the need to restore 
meaning to our lives and articulate contingency remains. And in these cases, in the 
wake of the failure of the law, the subject will produce a narrative of justice.  Just 
like the angel of history (Benjamin, ([1940] 1970), the subject sees the wreckage 
left behind by the irruption of the unexpected in his life. What used to be a chain of 
events is now a single catastrophe. We might like to “stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed” (ibid.), but all that is left for us to do is to 
move on, collect whatever pieces of the wreckage we can, and try to put them 
together…not in the way things really were, but reappropriating them in a new light: 
interpreting our lives in a new way. 
It was said before that knowing our past and our present circumstances allows 
us to navigate towards our expectations in a process of becoming. The need to create 
a new narrative forces us to reconfigure these elements, allowing us to locate and 
know again “the causes of being what we are” (Rorty, 1989, 27). We start a process 
meant to retrieve the coordinates of our lives, and thus regain self-knowledge. But 
this process becomes, in the end, a process of self-creation. Recovering and re-
articulating our past experiences, “the causes of our being what we are,” is not to 
recognise things “as they really were,” but to reappropriate them: to transform and 
see them in a new light.  
In the narrative of justice produced by Pedraza, the loss of Myriam is no longer 
–just– the loss of her daughter and the mother of her future grandchildren, but –
also– the cause, the driving force, in her struggle against ETA. She became a 
sacrifice in the struggle for a greater good. And, in the narrative produced by Villa, 
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the loss of her legs is no longer –just– the incident that thwarted her youthful 
dreams, but –also– the event that made her be born again. And just like being born, 
the loss of her legs became in her narrative an irrational and contingent originary 
moment that, rather than dismantling plans and expectations in life, allows the 
emergence of new ones. 
The creation of these new narratives not only entailed the production and 
appearance of new stories of life for Villa and Pedraza, but also transformed the 
main character in each of these stories. On the one hand, Pedraza ceased being a 
regular shop-assistant who hoped to be a grandmother someday, becoming the 
embodiment of a relentless police-based struggle against ETA, and the leader of 
one of the most important lobbies in Spanish politics. On the other, Villa stopped 
being an anonymous child, and was transformed into the living testimony of the 
overcoming of physical and psychological difficulties, sharing her experiences with 
others. 
Narrative and subject are transformed in both cases, and the need to articulate 
and confer meaning to contingency acts as the driving force operating these 
changes. But how exactly do they articulate contingency? How does this new 
articulation transform their relation with the law? Do they just replace one –legal– 
justice for another? Do they try to rule contingency out of their lives once again, or 
do they accommodate it within their narratives in some other way? 
Law-making narratives 
Even if contingency appears as the problematic element requiring articulation 
in any narrative of justice, not all narratives articulate it in the same way. In some 
cases, like Villa’s, it might appear as a meaningless and unfathomable 
‘impossibility’72  that allows the emergence of all other possibilities in life. In 
others, like Pedraza’s, it might be seen as a meaningful event, as a sacrifice for a 
greater good. As said above, the configuration of the narrative produced by the 
subject is dependent on the constellation of factors surrounding it, and the way in 
which it is articulated: its structure. But even if factors such as political and 
historical context or the economic and social background of the subject have an 
                                                          
72 The event, in Badiou’s terms. 
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effect on the overall process, what matters the most here is understanding the role 
played by contingency in the structure of the new narrative, and how that affects 
and transforms, in turn, the subject’s understanding of justice in relation to the law. 
Making use of the concepts of “fate” and “character” in the work of Walter 
Benjamin ([1919] 1978) and Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio (2011), in this section I will 
analyse the articulation of contingency in the narratives produced by Ángeles 
Pedraza and Irene Villa, considering three different –although interconnected– 
dimensions in each of them: the role played by contingency and the way in which 
they articulate it, the similarities between this articulation and that of law, and the 
way in which their articulation of contingency results in the production of a new 
understanding of justice that transforms their relation with the law. 
The key concept to understand the articulation of contingency in Pedraza’s 
narrative is sacrifice. As seen at the beginning of this chapter, it is easy to find direct 
and indirect references to this idea in most of her public statements: “our immense 
sacrifice was worth it, we won. And they, those murderers have lost;”73 “the victims 
have already been too generous;”74 “public authorities and tribunals alike should be 
up to the sacrifices that they [the victims] have made,”75 etc. The presence of this 
discursive element along with others such as memory, victory, defeat, or cause is 
indicative of the way in which Pedraza frames the irruption of contingency in her 
life. The real and symbolic loss of her daughter, along with the losses of other 
victims, is presented in her narrative as a form of “sacrifice.” Or, in other words, as 
a “meaningful loss” (Agamben, 1998). A loss that appears meaningful inasmuch as 
it has a cause and a goal: insofar as it belongs to the sphere of fate. 
Sánchez Ferlosio76  clarifies this connection between contingency, sacrifice, 
meaning, and fate using the following Spanish saying: 
El potro que ha de ir a la guerra, ni lo come el lobo ni lo aborta la yegua (2011, 57). 
                                                          
73 See page 116. 
74 See page 118. 
75 See page 118. 
76 Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio (1927) is a Spanish writer whose philosophical work, with the 
exception of Carácter y Destino is marked by the use of aphorisms or ‘pecios’ (shipwrecks), as 
he likes to call them. 
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 An approximate translation of this saying into English would be “the foal meant 
to go to war, is not eaten by the wolf nor miscarried by the mare.” Surviving the 
attacks of the wolves, not being miscarried…in a narrative structure of fate, when 
the foal is meant to go to war, when it is fated to go to war, these facts are not just 
felicitous coincidences nor contingencies. They appear as necessary inasmuch as 
they have a higher cause that makes them meaningful, a purpose that is their raison 
d’être. According to Sánchez Ferlosio, this is but “the perverse voice of fate, […] 
the twisted irrationality that attempts to rationalise contingency, imposing meaning, 
cause, or argument on it” (ibid.)77  
In the sphere of fate, contingency is subdued to necessity: rationalised and 
rendered meaningful. And, at this point, the connection between contingency, fate, 
meaning, and sacrifice becomes clear. A foal meant to go to war is fated to go to 
war. The meaning of its life lies in its fate, and everything else that may or may not 
happen to it in the process is read and becomes meaningful in the light of such fate. 
There is no space for contingency or coincidence in this sphere. Everything that 
happens is but an excuse for the unravelling of fate: for the development of the 
story, the argument, and the cause that it represents. In fate, contingency is always 
overwritten by meaning, and life, sacrificed for the sake of history.78 
Pedraza’s opposition to the permanent ceasefire declared by ETA in 2011 and 
the repeal of the Parot Doctrine by the ECHR in 2013 responds to this logic. She 
wants her sacrifice to be “worth it”, not to be in vain. In the same manner that the 
foal survived the attacks of the wolves and was not miscarried because it had to go 
to war, ETA must be defeated because Myriam had to die. It is the fight against 
ETA, the struggle to defeat it, which confers meaning on the loss of Myriam in 
Pedraza’s narrative of justice. If there is no war to go to, there is no reason for the 
foal to have survived; and, if there is no ETA no be defeated, there was no reason 
for Myriam to die. The production of a narrative meant to restore meaning to 
Pedraza’s life articulated the coincidental death of Myriam in March 2004 as a 
painful necessity, as something that was required for, and in turn required, the total 
                                                          
77 His work has not been translated into English yet. All the references to his work here are my 
translation. 
78 The implications of fate in terms of temporality will be discussed in further detail in the 
Interlude. 
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and complete defeat of ETA. Without a higher cause –without a fate– capable of 
rendering meaningful the loss of her daughter, the irruption of contingency that 
once destabilised Pedraza’s symbolic universe threatens to enter her life and destroy 
her narrative once again.79 
Along with other factors, the political and historical context surrounding the 
2004 bombings can be seen as one of the causes for Pedraza’s creation of a narrative 
structure of fate. Between 1991 –when Villa loss her legs– and 2004 there were at 
least three events that marked a turning point in the social perception of ETA, its 
actions, and its victims: the failed attack on the conservative leader José María 
Aznar, the kidnapping of José Antonio Ortega Lara, and the kidnapping and 
execution of Miguel Ángel Blanco. 
The first of these events is the attempted murder of the conservative leader José 
María Aznar in 1995, and the subsequent victory of his party in the 1996 elections. 
An event whose importance cannot be understood without a basic knowledge of the 
historical background of Aznar’s People’s Party (PP). Created at first as ‘Alianza 
Popular’ (AP), this party is heir to Francoist politics, and in consequence its 
ideology is largely characterised by Spanish nationalism, an inherited inclination 
towards greater levels of political centralisation, and a considerable dislike for 
‘peripheral nationalisms.’ The transition to democracy did not entail a rupture with 
the previous political system, but an internally driven mutation. So even if this party 
departed from a relatively solid institutional position, their links to the previous 
regime came at a price in terms of legitimacy. Spanish nationalism had become 
essentially reactionary under Franco’s Dictatorship, constructed in clear opposition 
to Basque and Catalan nationalism, and communism. And, as a consequence of the 
repression (50,000 to 200,000 casualties) during and after the Civil War (1936-
1939), Spanish nationalism became largely discredited due to its links to Franco’s 
Regime. In many aspects the transition to democracy represented a “pact of 
forgetting” that implied that the new democratic regime would not point fingers at 
former members of the dictatorship or delve into the past in order to bring to the 
political arena a debate on the victims of the repression. However, and in spite of 
their lack of visibility, these victims and the links of the People’s Party to Spanish 
                                                          
79 Whether such attachment is completely conscious or not is open to debate. However, its 
unconscious component, discussed at length in Chapter Four, cannot be easily dismissed. 
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nationalism kept haunting the politics of the Spanish right wing for years, 
undermining its democratic legitimacy. 
This situation changed in 1995, when Aznar survived the detonation of a bomb 
placed by ETA under his armoured car. For two decades, the “pact of forgetting” 
had prevented political parties from the using the victims for electoral gain, but this 
attack on Aznar offered the conservatives a new opportunity. The socialist 
government of Felipe González (1982-1996) was already severely weakened by the 
dirty war against ETA, economic turmoil, high levels of unemployment, and the 
emergence of several cases of political corruption. The attack on Aznar allowed the 
conservatives to strengthen their discourse against ETA. But, most importantly, it 
allowed them to create an emotional tie between them and the victims. From that 
moment on they were able to identify any attack on the victims as an attack on the 
state, and any attack on the state as an attack on the victims. Having suffered an 
attack himself, Aznar and his party managed to become the champions of the 
victims in the conflict against ETA. They had found victims “of their own” that 
provided them with the democratic legitimacy that they lacked as political heirs of 
Francoist politics. The victims of ETA became a relevant political actor thereby, 
attaining levels of visibility that they previously lacked. 
The second turning point in the evolution of the social perception of ETA 
between 1991 and 2004 was the kidnapping of José Antonio Ortega Lara in 1996. 
Prison officer and member of the People’s Party since 1987, Ortega Lara was 
abducted by ETA and kept in a dungeon 3 meters long by 2.5 wide and 1.8 high 
with no windows for 532 days. In exchange for his release, ETA demanded the 
transfer of prisoners to Basque prisons –something that first González and then 
Aznar refused to accept. Eventually Ortega Lara was found and rescued by the 
police, but in the meantime his kidnapping had become a symbol for the PP’s 
struggle against ETA, making him, de facto, a political martyr. 
Ortega Lara’s kidnapping accelerated the process started by Aznar two years 
before. However, it was a different event that helped the conservatives change the 
social views on ETA and its victims for good. 
The third and last event was the kidnapping and execution of Miguel Ángel 
Blanco on the 10th of July 1997. Recently elected as councilman for the small town 
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of Ermua –in the Basque Country– Blanco had been a member of the People’s Party 
since 1995. In view of the poor results rendered by the kidnapping of Ortega Lara, 
ETA decided to force the Spanish Government to negotiate the transfer of prisoners 
threating to kill Blanco within 48 hours if they did not agree to do so. There were 
mass demonstrations in all major cities of Spain hours before the ultimatum. And 
fifty minutes after the deadline, and in view of the reluctance of the Spanish 
Government to accept its terms, ETA decided to execute Blanco. He was shot on 
the back of the head and found on the brink of death on the outskirts of San 
Sebastián. He died in the hospital overnight. 
The action against Miguel Ángel Blanco was meant to send a clear and strong 
message. Namely, that they were serious about their demands and threats, and that 
they would not hesitate to carry them out. However, the results of their actions were 
not the ones they expected. The process started by Aznar in 1995 had polarised the 
public opinion against ETA, and a clear sense of open rejection to its actions had 
become widespread. Blanco was a politically irrelevant target, and, in the end, his 
execution was perceived as an act of unnecessary cruelty. Public opinion rallied 
against ETA, and the victims gained visibility, mass support (the demonstrations 
that took place all over Spain hours before the execution), a champion of their cause 
as Prime Minister (Aznar), survivors that could narrate the cruelty of their enemy 
(Ortega Lara), and a true martyr (Blanco) who was targeted simply because he was 
a member of a non-separatist party. 
From that moment on, the associations of victims of ETA –especially the AVT– 
became true political lobbies with a greater saying in criminal law and criminal 
policy, capable of shaping the approach of different governments to the Basque 
conflict. Since the execution of Blanco, the victims of ETA were politically 
enshrined as martyrs of freedom and democracy in the struggle of the state against 
this group. Whoever did not offer them their total and complete support or did not 
agree with their claims became suspected of supporting ETA, and the two major 
parties in Spanish politics competed against one another to see who had greater 
support from the victims, something that became even more evident in the wake of 
the 2004 bombings. 
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The political context surrounding the death of Myriam was one of the factors 
that allowed Pedraza to embrace –and reshape– a narrative capable of conferring 
meaning on the loss of her daughter. A narrative in which her death would not be a 
simple and plain contingency, a tragic coincidence, but a meaningful loss: a 
sacrifice for a higher cause. A higher cause, the defeat of ETA, in which the Popular 
Party successfully equated the interests of the state with the interests of the victims. 
Ultimately, Pedraza was able to embrace a narrative structure in which the promise 
of the future defeat of ETA would make her suffering meaningful. A narrative in 
which: 
 moments, instants, they do not belong to themselves anymore, they are imbedded in a 
vector of sense; it is a tense moment, violently stretched, in which every instant is out of 
itself, a function of the following and preceding ones (Sánchez Ferlosio, 2011, 56). 
Just like in the case of Hamlet, in Pedraza’s narrative ‘time is out of joint,’ her 
present life torn apart between the past and the future: between a sacrifice that 
demands to be “worth it,” and a fate that carries within itself the promise of doing 
so. Time is out of joint, and she lives ‘to set it right.’ Her narrative is imbedded in 
a sphere of fate, in which: 
[Time] is not an autonomous time, but is parasitically dependent on the time of a higher, 
less natural life. It has no present, for fateful moments exist only in bad novels, and past 
and future it knows only in curious variations (Benjamin, [1919] 1978, 308). 
This fateful and sacrificial approach to contingency in Pedraza’s narrative also 
produces a subjective understanding of justice deeply marked by the temporality of 
fate. Her dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of legal justice, along with her view 
of Myriam’s death as a sacrifice, results in the production of a fateful and nearly-
messianic understanding of justice: attaining it requires the complete and total 
disappearance of ETA. A disappearance that is eternally postponed, always 
displaced onto the future, but at the same time required by the past, by the sacrifice 
of her daughter. And it is in this particular respect, in a temporality in permanent 
tension between past and future but blind to the present, that the articulation of 
contingency in Pedraza’s narrative of justice mirrors that of the law. 
The temporality of law, according to the preliminary explanation already 
provided in Chapter Two and studied in more detail in Chapter Five, is primordially 
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chronological. It is marked by sequentiality. Laws are passed on the basis of past 
experiences, meant to rule future behaviours, but blind to the present. In its 
temporality, time is reduced to a succession of moments in which the present always 
appears as the future of a past, and as the actualisation of a near future: a missed 
encounter between a “not yet” and a “too late” in which each moment does not 
belong to itself anymore. In the law, the present is always a function of the past and 
the future, out of joint. But what is even more interesting, and also points towards 
the similarities between the articulation of contingency in both law and Pedraza’s 
narrative of justice, is that, according to Benjamin, the order of fate belongs to the 
sphere of law (ibid., 307): to the sphere of guilt, judgement, punishment and reward. 
Elements that are also present in Pedraza’s narrative.80 
Law condemns, not to punishment but to guilt. Fate is the guilt context of the living. […] 
Therefore it is not really man who has a fate; rather, the subject of fate is indeterminable. 
The judge can perceive fate wherever he pleases; with every judgement he must blindly 
dictate fate. It is never man but only the life in him that it strikes –the part involved in 
natural guilt and misfortune by virtue of illusion (ibid., 308).  
In the same manner that law imposes meaning on contingency, and in the same 
way in which every case becomes an excuse to enforce law back into existence, in 
a narrative of justice underpinned by fate every contingency is reduced to a function 
of the higher cause: including the death of Myriam, whose loss becomes sacrifice. 
Ultimately, even if Pedraza’s understanding of justice seems to confront and 
contradict the current state of legal justice, challenging the decisions made by 
institutions such as the Spanish Supreme Court or the ECHR, it does not differ so 
much from it. Instead of presenting an understanding of justice opposed to the rule 
of law, she seems to want to inscribe her own pain and her own view of justice in 
the law (Brown, 1995, 66). In other words, hers is a law-making narrative of justice. 
Pedraza’s opposition to a negotiated end of ETA can be seen as a dissatisfaction 
with the shortcomings of law and politics, and also as an attempt to inscribe her 
own narrative, her own fate, in the law. With the declaration of the permanent 
ceasefire in 2011 the process of identification between the interests of the victims 
and the interests of the state is revealed as something ideologically constructed for 
                                                          
80 See pages 116 and 118. 
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political and electoral gain, giving birth to a new political context. In this new 
scenario, the state and the different political parties lose their guise of universality 
(ibid.,57) and legal justice is revealed as flawed, unable to restore, repair, and satisfy 
the normative expectations of the victims (Renault, 2004, 104): a situation that 
Pedraza hopes to remedy by changing the law, by making a new law that would 
mirror her narrative and her pain, hence ensuring the survival of the fate that has 
conferred meaning to her loss, making it, in the end, a sacrifice. 
Law-destroying narratives? 
In contrast with this view, the narrative produced by Irene Villa provides us 
with an entirely different approach to contingency, in which fate loses importance. 
The concept of sacrifice becomes irrelevant, and instead we find others such as 
forgiveness, opportunity, self-overcoming, responsibility, or happiness. Finding 
meaning in life is also a pressing necessity for her, probably even more clearly than 
in the case of Pedraza –as exemplified by the first question that she asked her 
mother after the explosion: “why did this happen to us?” And yet, in spite of the 
importance of the aforementioned concepts, none of them seem to occupy the 
central role played by sacrifice in Pedraza’s narrative. 
Instead of formulating clear demands for justice or requiring the authorities to 
be up to the sacrifices made by the victims, what we find in Villa’s narrative is a 
constant return to the irruption of contingency in her life. A constant return to a 
moment that, ultimately, appears as a true point of departure for her. When the case 
of Villa was introduced at the beginning of this chapter, there were two aspects of 
her narrative that seemed to contradict one another: her rejection of the label of 
‘victim,’ and the constant return to the loss of her legs in her conferences and 
interviews. On the one hand, she has repeatedly refused to be considered a victim.81 
On the other, the value of her defence of forgiveness can only be understood insofar 
as she is seen as a victim of political violence. And yet, as I will argue, this 
contradiction becomes merely superficial once we take into account what is at stake 
here: the articulation of contingency. Or, in other words, the articulation of the 
explosion in which Villa lost her legs. 
                                                          
81 See pages 107 and 108. 
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When Pedraza lost her daughter in 2004 there was a whole public narrative that 
allowed the victims to identify their interests with those of the state. But even if the 
attack suffered by Villa and her mother received widespread media coverage, the 
situation in 1991 was entirely different. At that time, before the attack on José María 
Aznar and the kidnappings of José Antonio Ortega Lara and Miguel Ángel Blanco, 
the victims of ETA were merely seen, we could say, as people who had been struck 
by lightning. Something awful had happened to them, but there was no wider social 
narrative capable of conferring meaning to their suffering. The “pact of forgetting” 
was still very much in force, and they were not politically constituted as victims 
yet. And in this context, in the wake of the destruction of her normative expectations 
in life, Villa asked for advice from the only person that she thought was able to 
understand her, to the only person who had been co-witness to her suffering: her 
mother.  
My child, we can cry just like you’re doing now. We can curse and blame these people…we 
have every right to do so. But that would make us very unhappy. Hatred only causes pain 
to the person who feels it, and it wouldn’t hurt them…not in the slightest. But we have 
another option: forgiving. We can think that we have been born like this […] and do 
everything we can to be happy. 
That shared experience with another is something missing in Pedraza’s 
production,82 and as a result she had to go to law, as the only lasting authority 
capable of making her suffering meaningful. In the absence of a political narrative 
capable of restoring meaning to their lives, Villa and her mother had to create their 
own. A narrative that, instead of inscribing contingency in the order of fate, could 
inscribe it in the order of character. Villa took her mother’s advice literally and 
decided that they had been born again that day. For her, the day of the explosion is 
not the day in which her previous narrative of life was destroyed, hence constituting 
her as a victim in a new narrative that could supplement a purportedly flawed legal 
justice. For her, that is the day when her life truly began. And, therefore, the 
constant return to that moment in her public talks is not in contradiction with her 
                                                          
82 Nearly 200 people died in the 2004 bombings, and thousands were injured. But, in contrast 
with Villa and her mother, Pedraza was not there. For her, the irruption of contingency was not 
marked by the explosion itself but by the loss of Myriam. Something that she had to deal with 
in solitude, without witnesses that could understand her suffering until she became a member 
of the AVT. 
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rejection of the label of victim. Quite the opposite, it can be seen as a way of 
publicly saying that she never was a victim to begin with: she had simply been born 
like this. 
Completely dissociating herself from her previous life –reaching the point of 
celebrating her birthday on the anniversary of the explosion, and admitting that she 
does not recognise herself in the pictures of that day– for Villa, the loss of her legs 
has become something similar to being born: a purely contingent event with no 
cause or reason, the ‘impossibility’ that allows the emergence of all other 
possibilities.  
Hence, returning to that particular moment in her public talks is not a way of 
presenting herself as a victim, but a way of presenting her-self as she has been since 
she was born again in 1991. The constant return to the experience of losing her legs 
is, in the end, the recurrence of Irene Villa qua subject. Or, using Walter Benjamin’s 
terminology, the recurrence of her character: 
When Nietzsche says, “If a man has character, he has an experience that constantly recurs.” 
That means: if a man has character his fate is essentially constant. Admittedly, it also 
means: he has no fate –a conclusion drawn by the Stoics ([1919] 1978, 306). 
As happens in A Critique of Violence ([1921] 1996), where Benjamin opposes 
religion to myth, and divine violence to mythic violence, in Fate and Character he 
opposes these two terms. Fate is seen in tragedy, where the different parts are 
overdetermined by the overarching story that they are meant to enact and tell, as is 
the case with Hamlet; it imposes meaning on contingency, sacrificing it for the sake 
of purpose and history; and, in the end, belongs to the sphere of law and guilt. 
Character, on the other hand, is most clearly seen in comedy, like Don Quijote,83 
where the story itself is but an excuse for the different personas to display their own 
unique traits. It does not superimpose meaning on contingency. Quite the contrary, 
the irruption of each new contingency becomes the perfect scenario for the 
                                                          
83 Benjamin refers in his work to Moliere’s characters, but as Sánchez Ferlosio states in his 
study of these concepts, Don Quijote might well be the most paradoxical and yet clearest 
example of character in literature. As he says, “the essence of Don Quijote is being a protagonist 
whose character precisely consists in wanting to be a character of fate. […] It is not, in any way, 
a hybridisation of both orders. Being a character of fate is the product of his own character; and 
that is why, instead of diminishing his condition of protagonist of character, this asserts and 
reinforces it.” (2011, 62-63) 
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unfolding of character. And, unlike fate –which belongs to the sphere of law, guilt 
and history– the order of character is inscribed in the sphere of life and innocence: 
in it, there is nothing to ‘set right.’ 
Villa’s narrative articulates contingency in the order of character. The loss of 
her legs along with any chance of speaking in public have become opportunities for 
the display of her character, for the display of the discourse of forgiveness and self-
overcoming with which she has come to identify herself: 
Character is unfolded in them like a sun, in the brilliance of its single trait, which allows 
no other to remain visible in its proximity. […] While fate unfolds the immense complexity 
of the guilty person, the complications and bonds of his guilt, character gives this mystical 
enslavement of the person to the guilt context the answer of the genius. Complication 
becomes simplicity, fate freedom. […] The character trait is therefore not the knot in the 
net. It is the sun of individuality in the colourless (anonymous) sky of man, which casts the 
shadow of the comic action (Benjamin, [1919] 1978, 310-311). 
As discussed above, when Villa and her mother had to create a narrative capable 
of restoring meaning to their lives there was not such a thing as an overarching 
political discourse capable of doing that. Eventually Villa would become a visible 
member of the AVT, but she abandoned it in 2007, precisely when the ideological 
identification between the interests of the state and the interests of the victims in 
the fight against ETA was at its peak. What is most remarkable about this fact is its 
connection with Benjamin’s description of character as being unfolded like a sun 
that, in the brilliance of its unique trait, allows no other to remain visible in its 
proximity. It was precisely when a political narrative of fate tried to superimpose 
meaning on Villa’s story that she decided to reject the label of victim and terminate 
her association with the AVT. Her character would not allow any other trait, any 
other meaning, to be visible in its proximity.  
The relation between tragedy and comedy also forms part of Benjamin’s 
distinction between the orders of fate and character, but even if it does not appear 
as a key element in this study of the articulation of contingency, it still allows us to 
perceive the form in which the narratives of Pedraza and Villa are respectively 
marked by fate and character. The constant recourse to the reductio ad ETA by 
Spanish politicians to mock and even criminalise their critics has generated a 
trivialisation of this topic. A trivialisation that eventually has turned ETA and its 
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victims into objects of amusement and even jokes. As leader of the AVT, Pedraza 
has criminalised this kind of behaviour from her twitter account. But what is truly 
significant in this respect is that Villa has adopted a completely opposite approach 
to this issue. Ángeles Pedraza has not been an object of jokes herself, but the “Irene 
Villa jokes” have become genuine genre in Spanish humour: the equivalent to the 
“Helen Keller jokes” in English. And yet, instead of criminalising and censoring 
this sort of behaviour as morally wrong, Villa has admitted to be surprised by the 
ingenuity and wit of people, even saying that her favourite joke is the one about her 
as “the explosive woman.” 
Fate, as Benjamin puts it, belongs to the sphere of law, guilt, and tragedy; and 
character to the sphere of innocence, life, and comedy. The fact that Villa’s 
narrative is inscribed in the order of comedy would, therefore, dissuade us from 
trying to find any similarities between her articulation of contingency and that of 
law. But it still plays a major role in both of them. In the case of fate, in the case of 
law’s articulation of contingency, the subject –the character– is but an excuse for 
history: an excuse for the unfolding of meaning, argument, and causality. In the 
case of character, on the other hand, it is exactly the opposite: history itself becomes 
an excuse for the display of the individuality of the subject and his unique traits. 
There is a need for repetition in both of them, and yet this repetition changes from 
one to the other. On the one hand, law needs to be enforced back into existence 
periodically, and for that purpose it still has to be challenged by intermittent 
irruptions of contingency. But in the case of Villa it is her character that demands 
“an experience that constantly recurs.” The role of contingency in both 
articulations, even if necessary, is completely different in each of them. The goal of 
law is to reassert its authority, and in consequence it superimposes that meaning –
fate, guilt– on any contingency. Character, on the contrary, always requires the 
recurrence of the same experience: the return of contingency itself over and over 
again in order to unfold its unique trait. 
Unlike Pedraza, who aims to inscribe her own suffering and understanding of 
justice in the law, Villa develops an entirely different relation to it through her 
narrative. For her, justice is not a fateful and quasi-messianic ideal whose 
attainment is awaiting for us in the future. In her narrative, the present is not a space 
of suffering that we must forcibly transit in the journey between a necessarily 
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painful past and a future in which the wicked will be punished and the just will 
prevail. Quite the contrary, her narrative of character challenges that kind of 
temporality. As if a messianic time had actually befallen her, Villa’s articulation of 
contingency in the order of character is translated into a permanent and recurring 
experience of the same in every moment, in every instant, in every contingency. 
Unlike law and fate, which are constantly torn apart between the past and the future, 
and in turn remain blind to the present, a narrative underpinned by character 
produces a kind of temporality in which every past, present, and future are constant, 
and every ‘it was’ is recreated into a ‘thus I willed it’ (Brown, 1995, 72-75). 
Ultimately Villa’s relation with the law is transformed by her narrative into a 
case of extreme sublimation, and redemption. Extreme sublimation insofar as the 
references to justice in her narrative tend to reduce it to legal justice, with no further 
desires for it after the demand has been satisfied and the corresponding legal 
punishment has been inflicted. And redemption insofar as, for her, justice is not 
something to be attained in the future: it is something that has already befallen her. 
The fact that she could still be after the explosion, the fact that that day she was 
born again, the fact that she just-is, is justice. Her narrative does not seek to be 
inscribed in the law or to transform it. Nor does it destroy law. But, in a certain way, 
the understanding of justice resulting from this narrative manages to suspend the 
law through its plain acceptance of it. 
Conclusion 
Introducing the cases of Ángeles Pedraza and Irene Villa, this chapter has 
sought to illustrate and study the kind of circumstances that may prompt the subject 
to start talking about justice. For that purpose, it centred its attention on the role of 
contingency in the functioning of the law as well as on its destabilising role in the 
life of the subject. In the first place, it argued that contingency appears as the basic 
condition of possibility for the enforcement of legal norms, and hence as that which 
can guarantee the continued existence of law itself. However, the application of 
legal norms permitted by contingency presents some problems due to the reasons 
that may move a subject to seek help from the law: to seek justice in it.  The 
occurrence of unexpected and potentially disturbing events in the life of the subject 
–the irruption of contingency in his life– has the potential to dismantle the symbolic 
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universe that had hitherto allowed him to navigate and make sense of the world 
surrounding him. Not only due to the direct effects such events may have on the life 
of the subject, but also because their occurrence implies that other equally 
unexpected and dangerous events may follow. 
As a result of the uncertainty engendered by such contingencies the subject may 
find himself in the need of restoring a minimum degree of stability and normality 
to his life. For that reason, he may feel tempted to turn to the norms that so far had 
regulated his life. Hoping to make sense of his current situation and willing to put 
together the pieces of his symbolic universe, the subject may turn to the authority 
of the law. He may ask the law to articulate the contingency that changed his life in 
the first place: he may ask it to recognise his particularity of experience and fix the 
wreckage left behind by contingency.  
However, the articulation of contingency that the law may provide in this regard 
is far from satisfactory from the point of view of the subject. As stated above, 
contingency itself is but an excuse for the law to reinforce its authority and, in 
consequence, all contingencies are treated indistinctly. The particularity of 
experience and the suffering undergone by the subject are left largely unrecognised. 
Due to the incapability of the law to provide the subject with that which he seeks 
and the sense of disappointment that may follow it, the subject may start developing 
a narrative meant to overcome this obstacle: a narrative capable of articulating 
contingency and restoring meaning to his life. 
The study of such narratives conducted in the last part of this chapter discussed 
the way in which the use of different narrative structures may result in the 
emergence of radically different understandings of justice. Considering the 
similarities and differences between the cases of Pedraza and Villa, this discussion 
argued that the abovementioned narrative structures may oscillate between the 
Benjaminian notions of fate and character: between a quasi-messianic 
understanding of justice that subdues contingency to the unfolding of history and 
the attainment of a higher goal –as in the case of Pedraza– and a more subject-
oriented understanding of justice in which history itself and the succession of 
contingencies in the life of the subject become but an excuse for the display of the 
unique traits of his character –as in the case of Villa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Desires for Justice, Just Enjoyment 
 
 
May not the absolute and perfect eternal happiness be an eternal hope, which would die if it 
were realized? Is it possible to be happy without hope? And there is no place for hope once 
possession has been realized, for hope, desire, is killed by possession. 
(Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations) 
 
 
Contingency and the dual role of the law 
Not all contingencies are the same. Some of them may appear as unexpected 
obstacles or nuisances requiring us to readjust our daily routines. And yet, this is all 
that these contingencies may require: a small effort, a slight change, or a minor 
adjustment. Other contingencies, however, are not so easily overcome and may 
have deeper effects on our lives. Contingencies such as those experienced by Irene 
Villa and Ángeles Pedraza have the potential to completely disrupt, call into 
question, and even dismantle our entire symbolic universe. 
Not unexpectedly, this research project centres its attention on the second of 
these two types; the main reason being the state of helplessness and disorientation 
that follows them. In the event of a contingency belonging to the first kind –e.g. 
missing a train– and in spite of the troubles that it may cause, the symbolic 
structures underpinning our lives and rendering them meaningful remain largely 
untouched. Such symbolic structures may have ‘failed to foresee’ the possibility 
that something like that may actually happen…but they still allow us to navigate 
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the new situation we find ourselves in. The second type considered here also shares 
this ‘unexpected’ character; however, what makes it truly relevant in the context of 
this research is that, to a certain degree, this type of contingency forces the subject 
to seek help. When the organising principle underpinning the narrative of a subject 
is shattered by the irruption of this type of contingency, when that which conferred 
meaning to life disappears, the structures that allowed the subject to overcome other 
obstacles simply stop functioning: the symbolic universe is put ‘out of joint,’ 
leaving the subject unable to manage –or even understand– the new situation. They 
leave the subject in a state of helplessness that is perfectly crystallised in the first 
question asked by Irene Villa to her mother after the explosion: “Why did this 
happen to us?”  
With the abovementioned symbolic structures in tatters, the subject may find 
himself unable to comprehend the obstacles that he now faces. Built upon the 
premises of a symbolic universe that no longer exists, even his identity and sense 
of self may have been blurred by the irruption of contingency in his life. The gap 
between his previous life and his new circumstances may throw the subject out of 
joint. Under such conditions it is understandable that the subject may seek to restore 
normality to his life: to preserve and rebuild the structures that had hitherto helped 
him make sense of it. He may turn, then, to the authorities that had so far held such 
structures together: to the guardians of a normality that threatens to slip away if 
nothing is done to preserve it. In other words, and in view of his own inability to 
make sense of the circumstances derived from the irruption of contingency in his 
life, the subject may ask an external authority to provide him with the meaning and 
recognition that he needs in order to carry on with his life as it used to be. In the 
case of Irene Villa, the first and most visible embodiment of such authority was her 
mother: not only a primordial figure of authority –being 12, as she was when she 
woke up in the hospital– but also someone that, given their shared experiences, 
could understand what she was going through.  
In other cases –cases in which no one has gone through the exact same 
experience as the subject or the latter is already an adult– it might be difficult to 
find such an immediate figure of authority, but the subject’s need for recognition 
still presses him to find it. And, under such circumstances the subject may turn, 
instead, to the law.  
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The reasons why the law may appear as the ultimate safeguard of normality, as 
the authority capable of providing the subject with the kind of meaning and 
recognition he seeks is something that will be discussed at length in this chapter. 
For the time being, however, it is important to note that law plays a twofold role in 
this regard. On the one hand, it stands as a space in which the subject may be 
recognised as a valid interlocutor capable of “acting out” the experiences lived as a 
result of the abovementioned contingencies. On the other, it also acts as an external 
authority –supposedly– capable of recognising the particularity of experience of the 
subject –along with the demands for justice around which his symbolic universe 
could be rebuilt. And it is precisely this gap between both aspects of the law –as 
space and authority of recognition– that will act as a point of departure for the study 
of the emergence of desires for justice. Desires that stem, as I will argue, from the 
unbridgeable gap between the ideological functioning of the law and its actual 
enforcement. 
Space of recognition, authority of recognition: enforcement and ideology 
The first two chapters of this thesis presented some traces of this distinction, 
discussing at length the views of four different schools of legal thought. Each of 
them gave primacy to a different kind of judgement in the study of the relation 
between law, justice, and subjectivity. Natural Law promoted an external 
judgement of morality based on the accordance between positive law and 
morality/religion. Legal Positivism, on the other hand, favoured an internal 
judgement of validity based on the accordance to other legal norms. The school of 
Legal Realism gave primacy to an external judgement of efficacy dependent on the 
enforceability of legal rules. And finally, for those scholars ascribed to the field of 
Critical Legal Studies, it was not so much the morality, validity or efficacy of the 
law that mattered, but its ideological dimension: the role played by the law in the 
maintenance and reproduction of existing relations of power.  
Whether a jurist favours one or another of these four schools, or a combination 
of several of them, there are at least two characteristics that they all share –as I 
argued in Chapter One. First, all these schools share a certain disregard for the “man 
of flesh and bone” (Unamuno, [1913] 1972) that goes before the law hoping to 
attain justice. And, second, we could also add that every person with a minimum of 
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training in law is taught from the very beginning that law and justice are two 
separate things –and that regardless of any personal opinions on the latter, from a 
professional perspective the only thing that matters is law as such, not justice. This 
research is meant to shed some light on the first of these two aspects, the “man of 
flesh and bone” that goes before the law expecting to obtain justice, but if it is to do 
so…How is it that a subject may still hope to attain justice from the law when most 
–if not all– of the people working in that field know that law and justice are two 
separate things? Why is it that we still have ministries of justice, courts of justice, 
and even justices as synonym for judges, when what they actually do is to apply the 
law and not necessarily give justice? 
  Understandably, if we are to analyse the divergence between the way in which 
legal institutions portray themselves as the hallmark of justice and their actual 
functioning as legal enforcement mechanisms we need to consider some of the 
insights provided by two of the schools mentioned in the previous paragraphs: 
Critical Legal Studies and Legal Realism. That is, we need to consider (1) the 
ideological use of the concept of justice displayed by different legal and political 
institutions, and (2) the materiality of such ideological practices: the effects of the 
association between law and justice on the actual enforcement of legal norms.  
The ideological dimension of law and its ‘predatory use’ of the term ‘justice’ is 
marked by two distinctive, although closely interrelated, features: on the one hand, 
the way in which its self-depiction as an unavoidable, necessary, and even quasi-
natural phenomenon aims to preserve its own authority (Derrida, 1990); and, on the 
other, how its use of the term justice seems to indicate its power to satisfy any claim 
made in such terms.   
In both cases the effect on the particular subject interacting with the law –either 
by choice or necessity– is the same: a sense of powerlessness derived from the 
humbling inescapability and omnipotence of the law in the age of biopower. Birth, 
fingerprints, blood type, ID cards, passports, medical history, work history, 
education, friends, webcam, CCTV cameras, email, phone number, browsing 
history…having every single aspect of our lives thoroughly collected, monitored, 
measured, scrutinised, and evaluated by public –and also private– institutions, only 
one thing is certain: the sanctions outlined in different legal texts may be more or 
153 
 
less severe, we may agree or disagree with the functioning of the law, we may or 
may not like it, but there is no escaping it. If these institutions set their minds to it, 
they can know nearly everything about anyone. Thus, and considering its constant 
and ubiquitous references to justice, should we have any grievances or any 
particularly disturbing circumstances in our lives, law tends to appear as the 
institution with adequate and sufficiently powerful instruments to satisfy our claims 
for justice. Both aspects of the ideological dimension of the law –its inescapability 
in the event that we may break it, and its purportedly overwhelming power to 
provide us with the justice that we may hope to attain from it– have at least one 
distinctive material effect closely related to the production of subjectivities and the 
actual enforcement of legal norms: the production of normalised and law-abiding 
individuals under constant and subtle surveillance, the production of “docile 
bodies” (Foucault, [1975] 1995, 135-139).  
In the first place, the cloak of omnipotence with which the law clothes itself in 
this type of context has the potential to strengthen the subject’s sense of 
helplessness, augmenting his or her dependency on the law. And secondly, the 
purported inescapability of the law also dissuades the subject from breaking it or 
attempting to bypass its mediation. From the point of view of the production of 
subjectivities, the ideological dimension of the law results in a de facto reduction 
of the particular subject, “the man of flesh and bone,” to his role as citizen: his 
reduction to a set of measureable parameters with different degrees of legal, 
regardless of the true value of such “parameters” for the subject himself. And, from 
the standpoint of the actual enforcement of legal norms, the mass-production of 
docile bodies –subdued by the unavoidability of the law– results in a more efficient 
use of its instruments, reducing the necessity of its enforcement to a minimum. 
 It is at this point, between the expectations of justice promoted by the law and 
the sheer application of the latter, that contingency can be located as one of the 
constituent limits of the law as well as a departure point for the emergence of new 
subjectivities: as that which triggers the emergence of desires for justice, entices the 
production of narratives, and makes visible the abyss between law and justice. And, 
although the previous chapter delved into the appearance of narratives of justice in 
response to contingency and the failure of the law to offer a satisfying articulation 
154 
 
of it,84  such meaning-making processes cannot be fully disconnected from the 
emergence of new subjectivities. Something that could be seen already in the cases 
of Irene Villa and Ángeles Pedraza. 
Of narratives and new subjectivities 
The harm suffered along with the disappointment resulting from the 
shortcomings of the law had an unbinding effect on both subjects: the meaning of 
their lives was questioned, their expectations were challenged, and their sense of 
continuity in life was broken. Even their identity and sense of self were put into 
doubt by the emergence of questions such as “Who am I now?” or “Why did this 
happen to me?” And yet, they were able to bring forth two divergent narratives of 
justice that allowed them, in one way or another, to put back together the pieces of 
their lives. These narratives acted as meaning-making processes and provided them 
with answers to these questions, allowing them to regain a sense of purpose in life. 
In view of the incapability of the law to provide them with the meaning that they 
sought, Villa and Pedraza collected the pieces of the wreckage left behind by the 
irruption of contingency in their lives, rearranged them in a new way, and moved 
on. They were able to reappropriate them in a new light (Benjamin, [1940] 1970). 
That is to say, they started a process meant in which they were retrieve the 
coordinates of their lives and gain new knowledge of “the causes of being what 
[they] are” (Rorty, 1989, 27). A process aimed to regain self-knowledge that turned 
out to be, at the same time, a process of self-creation: in the case of Pedraza, the 
loss of Myriam would no longer be –just– the loss of her daughter and the mother 
of her future grandchildren, but –also– the cause and driving force in her relentless 
struggle against ETA; in the case of Villa, on the other hand, the loss of her legs 
would no longer be –just– the incident that thwarted her childhood dreams, but –
also– the event that made her be born again. 
Villa and Pedraza were transformed by their experiences, by the irruption of 
contingency in their lives, but also by the narratives that they produced in order to 
make sense of their new situation: they were changed by and became identified with 
                                                          
84 The enforcement of legal norms necessarily confers meaning to the events that called for their 
application –even if only as a proof of its efficacy. And yet, however valuable that meaning 
could be from a legal perspective, it may not be the ‘kind of meaning’ pursued by the particular 
subject who goes before the law hoping to attain justice and see his symbolic universe restored.  
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the process of symbolisation resulting in the production of their own narratives of 
justice. But what triggered this transformation? What moved them into action in the 
first place? What is their driving force? What animates their narratives? What is the 
structuring element in the subjectivities emerging from them? How does that relate 
to the subjective understandings of justice stemming from their narratives? 
Building on the study of contingency developed in Chapter Three, and before 
moving on to the analysis of the temporality of justice, here I will investigate (1) 
the form in which the irruption of contingency in the life of “the man of flesh and 
bone” leads to the disclosure of the gap between the sheer enforcement of legal 
norms and the kind of justice that a subject may expect to attain from the law; and 
(2) how, in turn, the emergence of desires for justice derives from such a gap, 
allowing the construction of new subjectivities around them. Desires that appear, 
as I will explain over the following pages, as the “condition that plays a structuring 
role in the Subject” (Bailly, 2009, 110). In other words, this chapter will centre its 
attention on the study of the emergence of desires for justice resulting from the –
necessary– ideological failure of the law to adequately satisfy the demands of the 
subject, and how such desires may act as a driving force in the production of new 
narratives of justice.  
This entails a twofold task: on the one hand, it requires explaining the 
emergence of desires for justice as a consequence of and in response to the limits 
of the law; and, on the other, it also calls for an explanation of the ways in which 
such desires can structure, shape, and give origin to new subjectivities and 
particular understandings of justice. For that purpose, over the following pages I 
will make extensive use of psychoanalytic theory and the work of Jacques Lacan85 
on the question of desire while also using the cases of Irene Villa and Ángeles 
Pedraza as an overarching guiding theme. Nevertheless, it should be clear that it is 
not my intention to psychologise a problem that, in spite of being most clearly 
visible in the emergence of particular claims for justice, is first and foremost of a 
political nature. Quite the contrary, the use of psychoanalytic knowledge in this 
                                                          
85 It would have been possible to choose a different path in this regard. The work of other 
authors such Freud, Ferenczi, Klein, Adler or Winnicott may also have offered valuable insights 
in the study of this topic. However, the centrality of desire in Lacanian psychoanalysis, along 
with its emphasis on language, seems particularly suitable for the study of this phenomenon 
and its relation with the production of narratives of justice. 
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chapter is meant to complement the insights provided by legal theory, political 
philosophy, and sociology throughout this thesis in an attempt to offer a 
psychosocial approach to the study of justice. Hence psychoanalysis’ emphasis on 
the unconscious, its capability to outline “patterns of desire in which subjects 
become stuck” (Frosh, 2010, 186), along with its capacity to question and unravel 
meaning (ibid. 185) appear significantly valuable in this regard and cannot be easily 
dismissed. 
The goal of this chapter is, in the end, to analyse the appearance of desires for 
justice in relation to law, the effects of the logics of desire and jouissance on the 
emergence of new subjectivities and subjective understandings of justice, and also 
the interconnection between both logics and the possibility of attaining justice 
within each of them. For that purpose, the first section of the chapter will review 
the relation between need, demand, and desire, along with the role of law in the 
formation of desires for justice. The second one will deal with the importance of 
the process of symbolic castration and the hypothesis of the phallus in the 
development of the troublesome relation between law and the justice-seeking 
subject. The third section, building on the previous ones, will discuss the 
psychosocial effects of conceiving justice either as an object cause of desire or as a 
partial object of jouissance. And finally, the fourth section of the chapter will deal 
with the interconnection between both logics and the possibility of moving from an 
understanding of justice based on desire to another one anchored in jouissance. 
The formation of desire 
If we are to understand what we mean by “justice,” if we are to comprehend 
how we use and understand this particular term in our interactions with the law, it 
is necessary to get a better grasp of the differences between what we are asking for 
and the kind of justice that we truly want. We need a better understanding of the 
differences between what we say and what we mean. Or, to put it differently, we 
must understand the difference between demands for justice and desires for justice: 
the reasons for the appearance of such desires, their origin, their functioning, and 
their goal.   
Putting the cart before the horse, we could arguably say that the hypothesis 
linking this chapter to the previous one is that desire seems to underpin the 
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production of narratives of justice –including their final configuration in terms of 
fate and character– and the subjectivities emerging from such meaning-making 
processes. That is to say, that an object of desire or a goal seems capable of restoring 
meaning to the life of a subject who, not only acts as the artificer of a new symbolic 
universe built upon the ruins of another, but also becomes identified with it.86 As 
with Zarathustra, in this process the subject comes to strive for his work but also 
becomes, in the words of Don Quijote, “the child of his deeds”: the subject is not 
only the artificer of a meaning-making process, but its result as well.  
If we are to investigate this hypothesis, we need to ask ourselves why and how 
the emergence of desire for justice comes to underpin the production of alternative 
narratives and subjectivities. In order to do this, we have to take as a departing point 
the relation between subjectivity, law, and justice outlined in Chapter Two. In it, 
the study of subjectivity as a constituent limit of the law aimed to clarify the way 
in which the latter produces subjectivities –by being imposed on individuals and 
providing them with a sense of belonging or unity– while also remaining abstract 
for the sake of being applicable to the entire political community: a generality of 
subjects distinguishable from a particular subject and the whole of humanity. A 
contrast that creates the conditions of possibility for the emergence of claims for 
justice with the potential to reveal and challenge the limits of the law. And it is 
precisely in this chasm between a legally-produced identity and its subsequent 
exclusion of particularity and universality that the symbolic character of the law 
becomes visible at last.  
As with other sociocultural productions belonging to the register of the 
Symbolic –including language, religion, political community, institutions, practices 
and morals– law appears as a trans-subjective milieu that pre-exists individual 
human beings and constitutes them as subjects within a structure: as citizens or 
foreigners, as particular subjects or as members of a larger political community, as 
justice-seeking or justice-providing subjects. A succession of dichotomies, 
correlative to one another, that crystallises how the law –as part of the register of 
                                                          
86 The importance of these “goals” could be seen already in Chapter Three. They appear as a 
key-stone to the narrative of the subject, holding it together whether we are talking about a 
desire to bring a police-based end to the activity of ETA –as in the case of Pedraza– or a wish 
to share with others the importance of moving on and overcoming obstacles in life –as in the 
case of Villa.  
158 
 
the Symbolic– introduces a series of negativities and antagonisms in the register of 
the Real that results in the constitution of the abovementioned subjectivities and the 
exclusion of the particular and the universal from its domain. And yet, it is precisely 
this exclusion that provides us with the necessary tools to understand the emergence 
of desires for justice and their role in the appearance of new subjectivities. It is this 
exclusion that allows us to perceive the difference between “the man of flesh and 
bone” and the citizen as “speaker of the language of the law”… and how the 
formation of desires for justice in the former comes to question the prominence of 
the latter in our interactions with the law. An interaction that creates the conditions 
of possibility for the emergence of new subjective understandings of justice. 
Need, demand, and desire 
At the beginning of this chapter, while discussing the differences between two 
types of contingencies, it was stated those that are of true interest to this thesis are 
those with the potential to dismantle our symbolic universe and shatter whatever 
narrative we may have constructed prior to that point. Contingencies that may 
require us to go before the law in the hope that the legal norms meant to provide us 
with stability and security may also be able to restore normality to our lives. And, 
in this quest, we may very well seek to give testimony –to share our experiences 
and present our grievances– in a place of recognition –law– as valid interlocutors, 
but also to see an external authority satisfy our claims and recognise the particular 
value of our testimony.  
It is at this point, in the difference between being admitted as valid interlocutors 
and seeing our demands satisfied, that it finally becomes possible to establish a 
connection between contingency, law, and the Lacanian theory of desire. Spurred 
by a psychological need to articulate contingency in a meaningful way and 
reconstruct a symbolic universe in tatters, the subject may seek help –under the 
name of justice– from an Other: from the law. But in order to do so, in order to be 
understood and express an unequivocal signal of the existence of such need –so it 
can be properly addressed and satisfied– the subject must also accept and speak “the 
discourse of the Other.” That is, he must articulate a demand capable of expressing 
his neediness, presenting himself before the law not as a particular subject X who 
enjoys A, fears B, regrets C, and loves D, but as a citizen: as just another member 
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of that political community, with such and such legally relevant features. In other 
words, in order to see his needs satisfied by the law, the “man of flesh and bone” 
must wear the mask of the citizen: the mask of generality.  
This excludes the possibility of making demands in terms of pure particularity 
or universality87: it excludes the possibility of recognising the value of particular 
bodily experiences that escape the disciplinarity of law and the state. On the one 
hand, if the subject’s need for meaning was expressed as pure particularity88 in 
some sort of “private language” (Wittgenstein [1953] 1967, §243-§271) the law as 
Other would not be able to understand the message insofar as a particular case only 
becomes legally relevant inasmuch as it can be comprehended within broader legal 
categories. And, on the other, if such need was expressed in terms of pure 
universality,89 the law as Other would be unable to know whether the subject is 
addressing it or not. Therefore the subject cannot present himself as John Smith, 
who loves meeting with his friends to eat pizza and drink beer every other Friday. 
Nor can he present himself as John Smith “the human being.” In order to see his 
needs addressed and potentially satisfied, the subject must relinquish these two 
dimensions and present himself as John Smith “the citizen” –with NIN 
SR123456A, born in 1985, son to John and Jane, etc. Hence whatever needs the 
subject may have, they must be presented as demands articulated in the terms 
established by the law as socio-symbolic Other. That is, in terms of generality. 
Trivial as it is, the example above gains some relevance once we put it into 
perspective and start considering the tension between particularity and the 
generality imposed by the law in the cases of Irene Villa and Ángeles Pedraza: How 
can a legal norm account for the suffering of a 12 year old girl who has lost her 
legs? How can it determine the value of and give proper recognition to the 
experience of losing your daughter, someone who is, in a certain way, part of you? 
The necessity to present oneself just as a citizen and speak the discourse of the 
Other entails, in this manner, that the subject may very well need help from the law 
in order to restore meaning to his life, but he has to ask for it: he must make a 
                                                          
87 The relation between these two concepts was discussed in Chapter Two. 
88 E.g. as the exact conflict W over the particular object X between the two contingent subjects 
Y and Z. 
89 E.g. “this kind of conflict should be solved!” 
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demand. And, in the end, it is this very gap between what we need and what we ask 
for, the gap between need and demand, which allows us to witness the emergence 
of the third element in this conceptual triad: the emergence of desire. It is the 
difference between what we need and what we ask for that permits us to distinguish 
them both from what we want: what we desire. 
Desire appears as the surplus generated by the articulation of need in demand, 
beginning to take shape “in the margin in which demand rips away from need” 
(Lacan, 2005, 689). It emerges as the result of a process of symbolisation that 
charges needs with surpluses aiming to disclose the position of the subject in 
relation to the Other: as the wish of “the man of flesh and bone” not just to see his 
need satisfied, but also to see his most radical particularity recognised by the law. 
Hence the articulation of a demand always plays a twofold function: on the one 
hand, it aims to satisfy a need; but on the other, it also constitutes a demand for 
love. It is the wish to see recognised the bodily experience of that which cannot be 
reduced to measurable parameters and necessarily escapes the disciplinary power 
of law. It entails a questioning in which the subject urges the Other to answer the 
question ‘Who am I for you?’ Propelled by a sense of meaninglessness stemming 
from the irruption of contingency in his life and the need to reconstruct a wrecked 
symbolic universe, the subject makes a demand in legal terms requesting the 
application of the law, of the norms meant to restore normality to his life. But the 
sheer application of legal norms does not suffice: the subject wants that application 
to provide him with meaning and a sense of purpose in life, with full presence. In 
his demand for justice, the subject requests the enforcement of the law, but he also 
wants to have his particularity recognised by the law in the effort put into that very 
enforcement –an “inessential part of the demand” (Bailly, 2009, 115) that, in the 
end, can only be demanded obliquely: justified and covered up by the essential part 
of the demand: the request for the application of the law. 
Ultimately, the subject hopes to see the law enforced and the particularity of his 
case recognised, but there is a limit to what the law can do in this regard: 
[the subject’s relation to law] is one of being abandoned to the force of its own performance, 
of being transformed into bare life, at least for those who are excluded from its domain. 
This exclusion is always present as potentiality, a sine qua non of the law and the state as 
an embodiment of its form. (Aretxaga, 2003, 407) 
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Law appears limited in its capability to provide the subject with any recognition 
beyond that of his role as citizen and whatever legally relevant attributes the subject 
may have. The “rest” of the subject, that which differentiates “the man of flesh and 
bone” from its façade as citizen, is potentially excluded. Law introduces a 
negativity in the subject, a divide between legally relevant and legally excluded 
aspects of his life that reflects, in turn, law’s own division between its ideological 
dimension and its actual enforcement, following from a logic of modern efficiency: 
ideologically, it is the citizen that matters; but practically, it is the body, the 
excluded and bare life of the subject that endures its effects. In order to remain in 
force, it requires the citizen to obey but it also needs “the man of flesh and bone” 
not to obey. However, the institutions in charge of enforcing the law cannot afford 
to have everyone disobeying it. Overwhelming as their power may be compared to 
that of an individual subject, the resources and instruments of law enforcement 
institutions are not unlimited and, in order to maximise their efficiency, their 
demands for obedience must be backed –at an ideological level– by a discourse 
capable of posing it as infallible and omnipotent: as an unavoidable and 
unsurpassable force. And, as Aretxaga points out, in order to do so modern law 
requires subjects potentially reducible to bare life, legible and manageable “docile 
bodies” (Foucault, [1975] 1995, 135-139) upon whom legal norms can be 
efficiently applied: it requires subjects who have internalised the inescapability of 
judgement and punishment along with a certain degree of trust and dependency on 
the capacity of legal institutions to provide them with justice. It is not enough to 
have “courts of law” or “ministries of law”: it is necessary to have courts of justice 
and ministries of justice capable of ensuring, at the level of ideology, the production 
of docile bodies. A discourse in which the subject who hopes to attain justice from 
the law must participate: a discourse by means of which the man of flesh and bone 
is trained, tamed, educated and disciplined to believe the law to be an omniscient 
and omnipotent Other. 
[t]he categories used by state agents are not merely means to make their environment 
legible, they are an authoritative tune to which most of the population must dance (Scott, 
1998, 83) 
 But even if the use of these categories and the term “justice” itself is not 
innocent, law as an authoritative Other is just as lacking as the subject himself. A 
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less-than-omnipotent character that is revealed in its very application. Through its 
enforcement mechanisms, law can satisfy the need of the subject once it has been 
articulated in legal terms, but not the desire for justice arising from such process of 
symbolisation: it cannot satisfy the subject’s demand for love. It cannot recognise 
its radical particularity. Understanding love as “giving something you haven’t got 
to someone who doesn’t exist” (Philips, 1994, 39), we could arguably say that, in a 
certain way, the subject urges law to love him, to provide him with something that, 
ultimately, it cannot give due to its general character: full presence, the universal 
recognition of his particularity. From a legal perspective a subject is relevant only 
as the speaker of the language of the law, as a valid interlocutor in his functional 
role as citizen. That is, as “the body lost by the slave, which becomes nothing other 
than the body in which all other signifiers are inscribed” (Lacan [1991] 2007, 89). 
The constellation of factors that determine the particularity of the subject –including 
name, personality, tastes, fears or suffering among many others– are irrelevant from 
this point of view: ultimately, all that matters is the role of the subject as citizen. 
And thus, the possibility of being loved, of being recognised in one’s own 
particularity, is excluded. 
In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in 
the streets and steal loaves of bread.90 (The Red Lily, Anatole France) 
Reducing all differences among citizens to identity, the “majestic equality” of 
the rule of law, is, in the end, the quintessence of this form of generality. Before the 
law all citizens are equal, reduced to a shared identity in spite of their many 
differences.91 A forceful generality that makes it incapable of love insofar as it 
cannot give full presence to particularity nor recognise the subject behind the mask 
of the citizen. And it is precisely in this blindness to particularity that the 
functioning of law is revealed as a far cry from its ideological façade: it is at this 
point where it is revealed as an instrument capable of satisfying a demand for its 
application through its sheer enforcement, but also completely unable to satisfy the 
desire for justice of the subject. A desire that is disclosed as constitutive lack: as the 
                                                          
90 “La majestueuse égalité des lois, qui interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher sous les 
ponts, de mendier danss les rues et de voler du pain.” 
91 In the eyes of the law these citizens remain different from those belonging to other states. See 
Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of the relation between particularity, generality and 
universality.  
163 
 
impossibility of seeing one’s own particularity universally recognised in law. That 
is, as the lack experienced by the subject in the wake of law’s silent answer to the 
question “Who am I for you?” 
The imagined nation state, which is supposed to provide for its citizens seems remote and 
careless, not fulfilling its obligations and generating a discourse of state deficit, an 
insufficient state which has abandoned its citizens. […] The nationalist discourse of 
citizenship remains attached in the social imaginary to the state but clashes with the actual 
experience of marginalization, disempowerment, and violence. (Aretxaga, 2003, 396) 
The less-than-omnipotent character of the law revealed in its inability to give 
an answer other than “just another citizen” to the question “Who am I for You?” 
does not quench the desire for justice of the subject. Quite the contrary, it becomes 
reinforced and reproduced in its very disavowal, triggering the production of 
alternative narratives of justice. The disruptive effects of contingency put the 
subject on the path to reconstruct his symbolic universe: to find in the Other a 
master signifier capable of ordering his life and conferring meaning on it once 
again. The subject “expects to receive from the Other [law] the complement –the 
precise thing [justice]– that will fill this lack and complete it” (Bailly, 2009, 110), 
and yet, the Other is, as stated above, as lacking as the subject himself. The justice, 
the universal recognition of a particularity, which the subject expects to receive 
from the law is out of reach. The “majestic equality” of the law prevents it from 
putting any “extra effort” into the satisfaction of his demands since all must be 
treated equally. But “equally” is simply not enough for the subject: it is his life, his 
suffering, which is at stake. Not any others’. The disobedience of the law to the 
demands of the subject along with the absence of the exact thing, the imaginary 
object, theoretically capable of filling his lack only reinforces the belief in the 
capacity of this “imaginary justice” to restore meaning and stability to the life of 
the subject. His longing for meaning persists not simply in spite of the impotence 
of the law, but it is strengthened by it: “If I get the justice that has been denied to 
me, if I attain it, I will finally be able to rest and be at home with myself.”  
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In the quest for the missing object of desire, the subject becomes identified with 
this absence: with his lack.92 He is finally granted a sense of purpose in life, albeit 
in a “twisted” way: it is not the full-presence that he hoped to attain from the law, 
but the very absence of it that allows him to build a narrative capable of repairing 
his symbolic universe. It is not the absolute and complete defeat and disappearance 
of ETA, but the absence of it that allowed Ángeles Pedraza to reconstruct her 
symbolic universe around the “sacrifice” of her daughter. And, in the same manner, 
it is not the complete overcoming of the physical and psychological difficulties 
caused by her injuries, but the day-to-day tasks that it entails that allowed Irene 
Villa to carry on with her life. Over the following sections I will discuss in greater 
detail the differences between the two cases in relation to the question of desire, but 
for the time being it should suffice to say that both of them were able to restore 
meaning to their lives not because they saw their particularity recognised by the 
law, but precisely because they did not. The subject comes to identify himself with 
the absent object of desire, and it is around this absence that his narrative of justice 
is constructed. In the words of Lacan: “what gives support and consistency to the 
ego is this lost object” ([1991] 2007, 50). 
Revenge and justice’s uncomfortable need for the law 
At this point it may seem that law, in its radical generality, appears as an 
obstacle to the satisfaction of the desire for justice of the subject. The reality, 
however, could not be more different. The generality of law is the very condition 
of possibility for the emergence of these desires in the first place. Without entering 
the Symbolic, without an Other capable of satisfying the needs that we cannot cover 
by ourselves and to whom we can address our demands there cannot be such a thing 
as desire: 
language is acquired by the child in order to fulfil need –if there was never a need to ask 
for something, it would not need to ask for something, it would not need to speak; another 
way of looking at it is that need justifies the demand, which is, in fact, usually aimed at the 
satisfaction of something […] for which there is no proper justification (Bailly, 2009, 117). 
                                                          
92 A lack or absence that in some cases can be transformed into loss by means of narrative, 
“inviting the generation of scapegoating and sacrificial scenarios” (LaCapra, 2001), as seen in 
the case of Ángeles Pedraza. 
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However flawed it may be, the rule of law appears as a necessary intermediary 
and essential component in the emergence of desires for justice. An incident that 
recently occurred in Khajuri Khas, India, can be enlightening in this regard: that is, 
concerning the necessary role of law as an intermediary in the emergence of desires 
for justice. According to a BBC report,93  in October 2014 a 36 year old man 
kidnapped, mutilated and murdered his tenant before willingly turning himself in 
to the police: the man had raped his 13 year old daughter, making her pregnant. The 
story generated great sympathy for the father in India, where the reporting of rape 
cases went up from 24,923 in 2012 to 33,707 in 2013, and many considered him “a 
hero” who “did what he had to do”:  
“Any father would do that. […] What’s the point of going to the police and courts? They 
ask for all kinds of evidence. In our country, justice takes too long. Justice should be done 
in two months, but here cases go on for six-seven years.”94 
The manifest impotence of the law in this regard, its inefficiency and flawed 
enforcement, disqualifies it as an ideologically viable Other capable of satisfying 
the needs of the subject. The idea of justice remains attached in the social imaginary 
to law, but it clashes with the actual experience of abandonment, marginalisation, 
disempowerment, and violence derived from its shortcomings. In this regard, and 
whether we find the case above justifiable or not, what is truly remarkable about it 
is the complete silence of the father until the deed was done: for him, there was no 
need to interact with the law in order to do this. He was aware of the limited 
capacities of legal institutions in this regard. He knew that they could not provide 
him with that which he needed. There was no need to articulate a demand; and, 
consequently, no desire either. 
Thus, the emergence of desires for justice requires the presence of law (1) as a 
potential space of recognition where we can give testimony and present our 
demands, and (2) as an external agent –an authoritative Other– theoretically capable 
of satisfying them. And yet, these desires and subjective understandings of justice 
that they underpin pose a challenge, putting into doubt the might of law and making 
evident the abyss between its ideological façade and its actual functioning. 
                                                          
93 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-29901304 
94 Ibid. 
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The troublesome relation between law and the justice-seeking subject 
Interesting in its own right as it may be, so far it would seem that the emergence 
of desires for justice does not present any significant differences with the emergence 
of other kinds of desire: there is a need, there is a necessary entry into a given 
symbolic structure, and there is something that, while escaping the symbolic, also 
demands recognition and satisfaction. In principle it does not present any relevant 
deviations with regard to the general Lacanian theory of desire. And yet, this 
apparent correspondence fades away once we take into consideration the 
particularities of the law qua Other. For that purpose, in this section I will compare 
the emergence of desires for justice in relation to law as a singular Other to the more 
traditional emergence of desires in early childhood in relation to the development 
of the hypothesis of the phallus and the access to the paternal metaphor as part of 
the process of symbolic castration.95 
The already mentioned “Who am I for you?” used by the subject to urge the law 
to universally recognise his radical particularity is not so different from the 
questions that arise when an infant forms the hypothesis of the permanence of 
objects. A hypothesis closely related to the appearance of the concept of ‘Mother’ 
as a primary act of symbolisation by means of which the maternal figure comes to 
stand for a sensation of comfort, satisfaction or care, but also of discomfort and 
uncertainty when she is not present. This hypothesis is formed as a consequence of 
the periodical disappearances and reappearances of the mother, eventually leading 
the infant to understand that, as an object, she persists even when she is not within 
view. And it is in the wake of the formation of this hypothesis that we can witness 
the emergence of a series of questions: Where does she go when she is not with me? 
Why does she leave me?  What could be so important? 
These are questions that resonate not only with the urging of the justice-seeking 
subject, but even with the biblical “Father, why have you forsaken me?” But as I 
will argue, there is a closer connection between the latter and our subject’s “Who 
am I for you?” than between any of them and the kind of questioning resulting from 
                                                          
95 As stated earlier in this chapter, the use of elements from psychoanalytic theory such as 
“symbolic castration” is not meant to psychologise an eminently political problem but to 
illustrate and allegorise it with the purpose of bringing forth a psychosocial approach to the 
study of justice.  
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a ‘regular’ process of symbolic castration. According to Bailly (2009, 75), the first 
obvious explanation for the absences of the maternal figure is the Father: 
He is the other thing in the baby’s world which might account for Mother’s going away –
and proof of it comes when she says to the child: ‘It’s time to sleep. Mummy and Daddy 
must have their dinner now.’ Father occupies a place in the child’s world as the single 
biggest distraction for Mummy and therefore the single greatest rival to itself. […] The 
hypothesis made by the child to explain Mother’s ‘choice’ of Father is necessarily that 
‘Father has something I haven’t got.’ But equally, sometimes Mother is with the baby, with 
the baby, who might then quite naturally think ‘Whatever it is, maybe I have it too.’ The 
baby has now hypothesised the existence of ‘the thing that satisfies Mother’, or in Lacanian 
terms: the object of Mother’s desire. (Ibid.) 
That is to say, the first answer to the questions arising at the beginning of this 
process is the Phallus: the signified of the object of the Mother’s desire, the idea of 
the object that can keep her close at hand for as much as the infant may want her to 
be. Eventually, the maternal figure, the primordial Other, may explain her absences 
by means of what Lacan calls the ‘paternal metaphor’ –also known as the Name-
of-the-Father. A metaphor that consists in blaming her absences on duty, on the 
submission to rules (law), and not on a desire to leave the infant. The consequences 
of this explanation, the consequences of the use of such metaphor, are key to 
understanding the singularity of the law as a necessary Other in the emergence of 
desires for justice. If the mother –that overwhelming primordial Other– must submit 
to certain rules beyond and above her control, that entails that she is not the Other: 
the Other must be someone else, the one that possesses that which she cannot ignore 
(the Phallus), something so powerful that it can make her follow its commands even 
against her will. In other words, this metaphor entails that there must be something 
–the father, work, or any other kind of rule or authority– capable of keeping her 
under its control. 
In this way the child undergoes castration and enters the register of the 
Symbolic: first, forming the hypothesis of the Phallus as an explanation for the 
motives behind the disappearances of the mother; and then, recognising the Name-
of-the-Father as the holder of the Phallus: as the possessor of that which the child 
does not have. Therefore, the process of castration is “the acceptance that one is 
less-than-perfect, limited, not all powerful and able to control the world […], a 
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process which allows the child to situate itself within the Law, and to accept that its 
own desires are not paramount” (Ibid., 80). 
The law as (m)Other 
This process presents us with three particularities of the law qua Other. The first 
of them would be that law plays a dual role in the process of symbolic castration 
taking place within its limits: as environment or field of recognition, and as Other 
of the justice-seeking subject. On the one hand, we could arguably say that law 
plays an environmental role as field of recognition –or even that law is language– 
insofar as it establishes the parameters of interaction between the subject and his 
Other. And, on the other, it also acts as Other of the subject insofar as it appears as 
the agent capable of satisfying and comforting the subject in the wake of the 
existential instability following the irruption of contingency in his life. An agent 
ideologically depicted as a source of comfort, care, and satisfaction that, 
nevertheless, can also appear as a cause of distress, frustration, and disappointment 
when it is “absent”: when there is something more important than the requests of 
the subject and his wishes are contradicted. 
The second particularity of law stems from the first one: it allows the formation 
of the hypothesis of the Phallus. That is to say that, if the law sometimes attends 
and sometimes dismisses the grievances and claims of different subjects on a case 
by case basis, there must be something that captures its attention. There must be 
something that it desires, and maybe the subject has it too. The nature of this object 
of desire is not difficult to imagine. It is that which the law requires from the subject 
regardless of his personal situation: obedience. And such obedience is manifested, 
first and foremost, in abiding by the law and speaking its language if the subject is 
to be recognised as a valid interlocutor and see his demands taken into 
consideration. Hence the process of symbolic castration undergone by the subject 
permits the formation of the hypothesis of the Phallus and a partial entry to law qua 
field of the Symbolic. 
The third and final particularity of the law is by far the most relevant one, and 
also the one that makes the emergence of desires for justice significantly different 
from the emergence of other types of desire. Namely, that the law has no Other, and 
therefore it does not permit the emergence and acceptance of the paternal metaphor. 
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Saying that the law has no Other entails that it does not recognise any rule or any 
reason beyond and above itself: it can only be under its own control, and therefore 
its power is absolute insofar as it is only its own restraint that prevents it from falling 
into arbitrariness, if not outright tyranny. In the case of Western countries this is 
arguably quite straightforward: the rule of law implies that no one is above the law, 
that all citizens are equal before it, and that it must be equally applied to all of them. 
In sum, it implies that the law obeys nothing except its own designs, and even if it 
is changed or abolished, it has to be done following the procedures and institutional 
arrangements established by law itself. However, there are at least two possible 
counter-arguments against this claim that the law has no Other: human rights, on 
the one hand, and theocracies on the other. We can agree that human rights are, in 
theory,96 above national positive law: they are the pinnacle of the legal pyramid. 
Nevertheless, this purported superiority of human rights does not invalidate the 
argument presented here: as part and pinnacle of the legal pyramid, there is no 
authority above or beyond them, nothing that could legally justify their violation. 
Something similar occurs in the case of theocracies, where a perfect concordance 
is established between positive and religious commands. And yes, just as in the case 
of human rights, there is nothing beyond or above the law insofar as it is literally 
the word of God.97 In both cases, however, the non-recognition of an authority 
above or beyond the law –the denial of the existence of any Other than law itself– 
follows suit and results in the same scenario as in the case of the superiority of the 
rule of law.98  
 
 
                                                          
96 This theoretical superiority of human rights over national positive law is critically questioned 
in works such as Against Human Rights (Žižek, 2005), Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life (Agamben, 1995), and State of Exception (Agamben, 2005). 
97  In this regard, the relation between Halakhah and Aggadah in Judaism constitutes an 
incredibly interesting case study due to its parallelisms with the relation between law and justice 
as it is being developed in this research project. 
98  We may also consider the widespread use of constitutionally established pardons as a 
counter-argument against the claim that law has no Other. However, there are two caveats 
against this possibility: on the one hand, they are constitutionally established, inscribed in the 
law, and thus part of law itself; and, on the other, they can only be given after a final court 
ruling. That is, pardons do not entail a non-application of the law but only a suspension of its 
effects. 
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The law as Phallic Mother 
One of the ideological consequences of the statement “law has no Other” has 
been discussed already: law presents itself as an omnipotent, omniscient, 
inescapable and unavoidable quasi-natural phenomenon. And yet, sometimes it falls 
short, sometimes it is absent. In some cases the courts of justice may take into 
consideration the requests of a citizen and enforce the law accordingly. In some 
others, however, they may take such requests into consideration only to dismiss 
them later on in favour of more legally relevant arguments. And in other cases, in 
those situations in which the subject fails to articulate his demand in the terms 
established by the law, the courts of justice may dismiss in toto without even 
considering them. That is, a series of ostensibly whimsical “disappearances” and 
“reappearances” of the law, in the guise of its enforcement, that have the potential 
to give rise to a series of questions resembling those of the infant bearing with the 
absences and reappearances of the mother: Why does law ignore me even if I have 
been so obedient and I haven’t done anything wrong? Who is it satisfying when it 
chooses to dismiss my requests? Why that person and not me? 
Such questions reflect the formation of the hypothesis of the Phallus permitted 
by the law: “that person must have something that I may or may not have that makes 
the court rule in his favour.” However, and unlike what happens in the case of the 
symbolic castration undergone in early childhood, the law does not permit reaching 
the next stage in this process: it does not permit the emergence and acceptance of 
the paternal metaphor. Yes, there is something –an imaginary Phallus built around 
the idea of the disciplined, obedient, and law-abiding citizen– that sometimes keeps 
it close at hand and sometimes draws it away. However, there is no clear 
explanation for such behaviour other than the internal logic of law itself: there is no 
clear explanation other than its own will. And it is in this apparent mismatch 
between law’s ideological façade and its actual enforcement –its overwhelmingly 
whimsical behaviour– that the law appears as a phallic mother obeying no reason 
or logic beyond its own, leaving no room for an explanation within the framework 
of the paternal metaphor. 
The anxiety arising from this dyadic relation between the subject and the law in 
its role of the phallic mother cannot be easily dismissed: 
171 
 
This situation of the Other in a third party outside the dyadic relationship is experienced 
both as a loss of power for the child (which may still hope to control the mother) and also 
as a great comfort –for it explains the mother’s otherwise frightening behaviour, which 
previously appeared whimsical and persecutory. Imagine how much less terrifying for the 
child to be able to think ‘She’s refusing me this because of something’, rather than simply 
‘She’s refusing me’ (Bailly, 2009, 81) 
Lacking a Name-of-the-Father, a metaphor or explanation that could account 
for such behaviour, the subject may find himself trapped between the fantasy of 
controlling law in its role of phallic mother through even greater submission to its 
dictates –thus becoming an even more docile body– and the persecutory feeling 
stemming from its inexplicable disappearances and dismissals. Hence the relation 
between law and the subject –along with its implications regarding the formation 
of desires for justice– is marked by a failure in castration: 
If, however, the child does form the hypothesis of the Phallus, but the mother never speaks 
the paternal metaphor, then the child may remain in a fantasy that it has or is the Phallus 
for the mother. In this case as well, the relationship remains dyadic, but now the child may 
fantasise that it is the lawmaker, the omnipotent and omniscient. This leads to a psychotic 
structure but not necessarily pure psychosis; this structure is characterised by its difficult 
relationship with the Law in all its forms, some paranoid elements (as a failure of its will 
is experienced as persecutory rather than logical in a wider context), and a certain 
inflexibility with language (Ibid., 82). 
Insofar as the abovementioned dyadic relation between the subject and the law 
persists, the ideological dimension of the latter becomes reinforced, strengthening 
the dependency of the subject on it. On the one hand, it induces the subject to 
believe that he is “the lawmaker,” that his interests and those of the law are one and 
the same (Althusser, [1970] 2001) provided that he believes himself to be the 
imaginary Phallus: the obedient and docile citizen that the law so desires. And, on 
the other, any failure of the law to satisfy the demands of the subject is not presented 
as such, but as a failure of the subject to prove himself worthy of securing a more 
favourable ruling at court. In consequence, if the shortcomings of the law are 
experienced as a failure of the will of the subject, the latter is expected to either 
accept the superiority of the law regardless of his personal opinions on the matter, 
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or go before the law once again and try to prove himself more deserving of a better 
ruling.99 
If we wonder about the persistence of this kind of relation, about the enduring 
refusal of law to abide to any form of external rule or principle, it is necessary to 
ask ourselves ‘cui bono?’ Who is profiting from this situation? Given the 
dependency that it causes and strengthens in relation to the subject, the one 
benefitting from this would be law: it sees its authority self-legitimised and 
augmented while freeing itself of any responsibility derived from its own failure to 
satisfy the demands of the subject, who becomes progressively more dependent on 
it. Indeed, and in spite of its self-purported role as ultimate Other, it would seem 
that law requires increasingly high levels of dependency in order to secure –or at 
the very least improve– its own functioning: 
Lacan’s claim that there is no Other of the Other means that the Other and the statement 
have no guarantee of their existence besides the contingency of their enunciation. […] The 
subject of the enunciation does not and cannot have a firm place in the structure of the 
Other (Zupančič, 2000, 30) 
This entails that even if law presents itself as having no Other, it cannot 
guarantee its own existence beyond the constant flow of particular subjects 
knocking on its doors in search for justice. Without them, without the endless series 
of contingencies that leads these subjects to seek help from its institutions, the law 
would see itself as purposeless.  
the cause of the cause can only be the subject itself. In Lacanian terms, the Other of the 
Other is the subject. […] the will precedes all its objects. The will can be directed towards 
a certain object, but this object is not in itself its cause. (Ibid., 34) 
Law appears in the guise of the phallic mother in its relation with the particular 
subject, increasing his dependency and submission while also freeing itself of all 
responsibility. But the truth is that this ideological operation in which law addresses 
the subject in his functional role as citizen is meant, in the end, to conceal its own 
lack: it is meant to cover up for its dependency on the contingent subject along with 
                                                          
99 This is the way in which the law portrays its relation with the subject. The latter may perceive 
an unsatisfactory resolution as a failure of the law, and request the sentence to be reviewed by 
a higher tribunal. 
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its less-than-perfect functioning. As in the Discourse of the Master, law appears as 
the agent of communication that is “addressing the other not as a Subject but in his 
functional role” (Bailly, 2009, 157) and enjoys his production: its own recognition 
as a valid authority and the growing dependency of the subject on it.  It enjoys “the 
body lost by the slave [that] becomes nothing other than the body in which all the 
other signifiers are inscribed” (Lacan, [1991] 2007, 89). 
At this point we already know that the relation between the law and the subject 
follows the logic of the Discourse of the Master. We also know that, more 
particularly, the law seems to operate in a way analogous to that of the phallic 
mother within this dyadic relation. But there is something that still requires our 
attention: the effects of this dynamic on the emergence of desires for justice, and 
the role played by justice in this equation.  
Justice: in search for a Name-of-the-Father 
In order to clarify these issues it is important to remember the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of such desires: a feeling of dissatisfaction with the 
law when it structurally fails to recognise the particularity of the subject and the 
circumstances that led him to seek its help in the first place. That is to say that we 
may start making claims about justice when this Other proves itself too capricious 
or less-than-omnipotent. We may start to do this when the law fails and we want it 
to act in accordance with rules and principles more elevated than itself. Principles 
that may provide us with the kind of recognition that we seek and we have been 
denied. In other words, we may start making claims about justice when we realise 
that, in order to attain what we want, we need an Other of the Other: a higher 
authority that could make the law qua phallic mother less whimsical and more 
reliable. We start using “justice” as the Name-of-the-Father that we expect the law 
to obey. 
Such use of the idea of justice appears as the result of the disavowal of the 
desires of the subject. Even if the subject is heard and acknowledged as a legitimate 
interlocutor, the gap between the enforcement of the legal norms and the 
recognition of the radical particularity of such desires pushes the subject to query 
the law further and further in an attempt to unravel the reasons behind law’s silent 
response to the question “Who am I for you?” 
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In other words, if the law’s interactions with the subject mirror the logic of the 
Discourse of the Master, the enquiries of the subject appear equally coherent with 
the Discourse of the Hysteric: 
It is to the master signifier that the Hysteric addresses his/her questions, but he/she receives 
as an answer only the knowledge of that person, which the Hysteric enjoys for want of 
anything better, although these answers never constitute a satisfactory response to his/her 
desire. The Master’s willingness to answer the questions of the Hysteric is not fuelled by 
his/her wish to teach but is an effect of the unconscious connection with the object petit a 
of the Hysteric […]. The hysterical questioning pushes the master signifier up to the limits 
of its knowledge and leads to the Hysteric’s frustration when this limit is reached. […] It 
is only [those] who take up the Hysteric’s discourse –who put their castratedness on the 
line, as it were, who truly gain knowledge. (Bailly, 2009, 156-158) 
Expecting to be recognised in the extra effort put into the application of the law, 
the subject turns to the institutions meant to enforce it in order to discover the 
reasons for the dismissal of his desire. The subject questions the law in order to 
discover the object of its desire, that which could catch its attention and bind it to 
the will of the subject. In other words, the subject interrogates the law in order to 
attain the Phallus: in order to attain that which could grant him dominion over the 
law. Or, as Lacan puts it regarding the Discourse of the Hysteric: “The hysteric 
wants a master she can reign over: ‘she reigns, and he does not govern’” ([1991] 
2007, 129). 
Nevertheless, since the law seems to operate as a phallic mother that obeys no 
reason or cause other than its own, such questioning is doomed to reach an impasse: 
the tautological character of the authority of the law. 
The master must be obeyed –not because we’ll all be better off that way or for some other 
such rationale– but because he or she says so. No justification is given for his or her power: 
it just is. […] The master must show no weakness, and therefore carefully hides the fact 
that he or she, like everyone else, is a being of language and has succumbed to symbolic 
castration. (Fink, 1995, 131) 
The subject may disagree with and argue about the reasons for the disavowal of 
his desire –e.g. “Why is this formality so relevant?”, “Why aren’t these crimes 
punished more severely?” or “Why does the law establish this specific 
requirement?”– but, in the end, the answer will always be the same: “because it is 
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the law.” The discourse of the Hysteric –the justice-seeking subject– aims to attain 
recognition and to dominate the master signifier –law– but instead it only produces 
knowledge: knowledge of the functioning –and limits– of the law itself. The 
frustration experienced by the subject and the subsequent process of questioning 
may not lead to the recognition that the subject expected to attain from the law in 
the first place, but it opens the gate to something else. It opens a window of 
opportunity for a questioning of law itself: of its current functioning and limits. It 
opens the door to something other than law that stands for the recognition denied 
to the subject in the first place; something above and beyond the law that could act 
as a binding criterion for its actions and make them less arbitrary once its limits 
have been made clear. As Walter Benjamin puts it: “The law which is studied but 
no longer practiced is the gate to justice” ([1934] 2005, 815). 
Justice as object petit a, justice as jouissance 
The gap between the ideological façade of the law and its actual enforcement 
allows the emergence of desires for justice. In turn, these desires are shaped and 
affected by the particularities of the law qua Other –metaphorically appearing in 
the guise of a phallic mother– along with the existing dynamic between the 
Discourse of the Master employed by law itself –addressing the subject in his 
functional role as citizen– and the Discourse of the Hysteric displayed by the subject 
–who interrogates the law about the reasons for the disavowal of his particularity 
and ends up not gaining recognition, but rather knowledge about the functioning 
and limits of the law. As a result of this process, the subject may formulate a 
narrative, a particular understanding of justice, meant to provide him with the 
recognition that was denied to him by positive law. An understanding of justice that 
appears as the form taken by the desire of the subject in the wake of its dismissal 
by the law: as the struggle for a Name-of-the-Father capable of taming the law, and 
as that which could finally offer solace and recognition for the circumstances that 
led the subject to seek help from the law in the first place. 
Considering that desire appears simultaneously as the ‘production’ or result of 
the Discourse of the Master, and as the ‘truth’ or driving force of the subject in the 
Discourse of the Hysteric, it becomes possible to establish a connection between 
the previous section and some of the ideas developed throughout Chapter Three. 
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And, more particularly, with Pedraza’s narrative structure of fate. That is, the 
connection between her attempt to inscribe her own narrative in the law, and the 
idea of justice as Name-of-the-Father. 
Desires for justice 
Pedraza’s dissatisfaction with the law, along with her view on Myriam’s death 
as a sacrifice, results in an understanding of justice that would require the complete 
and total disappearance of ETA: a fateful and almost messianic understanding of 
justice whose goal is eternally displaced onto the future but simultaneously required 
by the past, by the sacrifice of her daughter. An understanding of justice that, in the 
context of the permanent ceasefire declared by ETA in 2011, can be seen not only 
as an attempt to oppose the law, but also to change it: as the attempt to inscribe her 
own suffering in it and ensure the survival of the fate that conferred meaning to her 
loss, and validate it as a sacrifice. Rather than opposing the rule of law, she 
identifies herself with it: “No one has done more to reinforce the rule of law in 
Spain than the victims of terrorist attacks.”100 
In her dyadic relation with the law as a phallic mother, enhanced by the 
ideological use of the Association of Victims of terrorism by the Spanish People’s 
Party, Pedraza may have fantasised that she was –or at least, could have been– the 
lawmaker, that she was –or could have been– the Phallus of the law, oscillating in 
her relationship with it between feelings of omnipotence –the will of the victims is 
the rule of law– and persecutory delusions –the fact that the Parot Doctrine was 
repealed and that the Spanish Government might find a negotiated end to the 
conflict with ETA is part of a conspiracy to undermine the rights of the victims of 
terrorist attacks. A conspiracy that seems too capricious and makes no sense in the 
light of her sacrifice: her political benefactors have double-crossed her, the political 
party representing the interests of her ‘enemies’ has been legalised, convicted 
terrorists are being released in spite of all her efforts, and now even the Government 
is negotiating with them. The institutions meant to restore meaning to her life had 
failed her and thwarted her desire for justice. A desire that aimed to punish –as 
                                                          
100 Demonstration in Madrid against the repeal of the Parot Doctrine (27/10/2013): “No hay 
nadie que haya hecho más para reafirmar el estado de derecho en España que las víctimas del 
terrorismo.” 
177 
 
severely as possible– all members of ETA and to bring about the complete 
disappearance of this organisation. 
Making visible their disappointment with these events, Pedraza and the 
Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT) organised a series of demonstrations to 
demand justice –even if the European Court of Human Rights had ruled against 
them and the “justice” delivered by the Spanish tribunals. In contradiction with the 
rule of law that she had identified herself with up until that point, Pedraza and her 
association called for ever harder punishments under the label of “justice”: they 
expressed their demand for punishment as the principle that should guide the 
application of the law. For her, no sentence would ever be severe enough, and a 
ceasefire and the virtual defeat of ETA would not suffice… However, and in her 
own words, her demand was for justice, not vengeance. In order to reflect on 
Pedraza’s rejection of the permanent ceasefire, her ongoing disappointment, and 
the thin line that seems to separate her desire for justice from an apparent wish for 
vengeance, it might be useful to consider Wendy Brown’s reading of Freud’s A 
Child is Being Beaten ([1919] 1963) in her book Politics out of History (2001). A 
reading that: 
[does not aim] to psychologize political life directly, nor to reflect on the ways that sexual 
life bears on political life, but rather to allegorize a historical-political problem through the 
story of desire and punishment that Freud constructs […]. My aim is to reflect on the ways 
that problematic […] attachments function as a historically specific constraint upon 
emancipatory projects. (ibid. 47) 
According to Brown, Freud concludes that this fantasy of punishment is 
developed in three successive phases: “a child is being beaten,” “I am being beaten 
by my father,” and “a group of children are now being punished” (ibid. 48-50). In 
the first one, the subject appears neither as agent nor object of the beating: 
presenting no masochistic nor sadistic elements, and resembling something similar 
to sibling jealousy –“my father is beating the child whom I hate.” The second phase, 
however, is masochistic and marked by guilt –caused by the desire for the beating 
of a sibling, and as a consequence of the repression of the incestuous love for the 
father– and appears both “as a punishment for the forbidden relation and also as the 
regressive substitute for it” (ibid. 49). Finally, the third phase covers for the 
previous masochistic one, reverting it into sadism once again. 
178 
 
Brown relates the origins and evolution of this fantasy to the unfulfilled 
promises of the symbolic and the emergence of identities containing “persisting yet 
thwarted desires.” More particularly, she points, on the one hand, to “the discovery 
[…] that the world to which they had presumed they belonged, and to which their 
fealty and passion are originally directed, did not in fact hold them in esteem” (ibid. 
52). And, on the other, to the fact that politicized identities may arise if the liberal 
promise of “universal personhood” is found hollow, causing a foundational injury 
that may not contain only jealousy and disappointment “but also persistent, yet 
thwarted desires” (ibid. 53). Moreover, she goes on to say that an identity rooted in 
such an injury may have to be re-enacted over time, and that, “if it has been formed 
in part out of trauma, then there would also be a certain reassurance, and possibly 
even erotic gratification, in restaging the injury, either at the site of our own body 
[…] or the site of another” (ibid. 55), necessarily oscillating between sadism and 
masochism. 
The case of Ángeles Pedraza presents some remarkable similarities with 
Brown’s account of A Child is Being Beaten. On the one hand, it is relatively easy 
to relate the origins of this fantasy in the unfulfilled promises of the Symbolic with 
Pedraza’s own disappointment with the shortcomings of the institutions that had 
enshrined her as a martyr of democracy, and promised to bring a police-based end 
to the activity of ETA. Institutions that, once the circumstances had changed, 
proved that the Association of Victims of Terrorism was not that important to them 
after all, and finally decided to restrain the enforcement of legal norms to that which 
was permitted by the rule of law and the European Court of Human Rights. And, 
on the other, Pedraza’s own identity as the personification of the struggle against 
ETA also has its origin in an injury caused by an arguably traumatic experience. An 
injury that was aggravated by the disavowal of her demands for ever harder 
punishments and that has led her to restage it periodically since 2004 in 
demonstrations, speeches, and interviews. A re-enactment that would be impossible 
for her and other victims if ETA finally disappeared. 
Nevertheless, the similarities between her case and Brown’s account of Freud’s 
work appear to go further, to the origins and enduring character of this fantasy, 
making it possible to establish some parallelisms with its different phases too. For 
instance, the sibling jealousy crystallised in the statement “a child is being beaten” 
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resonates with the feeling of abandonment, and even betrayal, experienced by 
Pedraza when the European Chart of Human Rights and the Spanish Constitution 
were enforced for the sake of protecting the human rights of former members of 
ETA against her own views. After all, for years she had been told that they –the 
victims– were “the good ones,” and that they embodied the effort of the Spanish 
Government and the rule of law in their struggle against ETA…hence why had the 
law forsaken them to protect the rights of a ‘bunch of terrorists’?  
But again, it is important to remember that in the dyadic relation between the 
subject and the law qua phallic mother, the latter does not obey any will but its own: 
the law had not forsaken the victims because of something, it had simply forsaken 
them. An ostensibly whimsical behaviour that also led to the persecutory delusions 
that characterise such a dyadic relation with the phallic mother –a relation in which 
the hypothesis of the Phallus has been formed, but for which there is no Name-of-
the Father. And, if there is no clear reason for such ‘abandonment,’ then, the only 
possible explanation for the ostensibly capricious behaviour of the law is that it has 
been corrupted, and that even if Pedraza had been exploited for political purposes 
when it was convenient, it is necessary to change the law in order to serve ‘those 
terrorists’ the justice, the punishment, that they deserve. A line of thought and a 
wish to inscribe in the law one’s own understanding of justice as punishment and 
retribution that, when combined with the feeling of being punished –forsaken– by 
the law, echoes the oscillation between masochism and sadism that defines the 
second and third phases of the fantasy. 
This is an oscillation that mirrors, in turn, the dyadic relationship with the 
phallic mother between fantasies of omnipotence and persecutory delusions: “If I 
manage to bind the rule of law to my will, then I am the lawmaker; but if I don’t, it 
has abandoned me for no reason whatsoever.” 
One may wonder, though, to what extent Pedraza did really bind the law to her 
will and why it was not enough to satisfy her desire: why the punishments inflicted 
on former members of ETA were never sufficient –even if her association and the 
People’s Party had managed to have the rule of law trample itself for seven years 
by means of the Parot Doctrine.  
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The first of these points –the extent of her dominion over the law– was partially 
answered during the discussion about the emergence of fantasies of omnipotence 
as one of the effects of the dyadic relation between the subject and the phallic 
mother. As Bailly puts it: “the fantasy of possessing the Phallus is too powerful to 
banish entirely, especially when it is reinforced from time to time by proofs of how 
very satisfactory the parents find the child” (2009, 84). Between 2006 –when the 
Spanish Supreme Court made the decision that would later on be known as the Parot 
Doctrine– and 2013 –when the European Court of Human Rights repealed it– 
Pedraza had been led to think that they, the victims, actually possessed the Phallus: 
that they were the most valuable people in the eyes of the law. Spanish political 
parties and the Supreme Court had made an extra effort to satisfy their demands: 
they had not only enforced the law, they had enforced it beyond the limits of the 
rule of law. And all that because of their sacrifice and their suffering. They had seen 
their value recognised and their demands attended to. 
The problem, however, is that when it comes to desire and fantasy, no 
satisfaction is ever truly sufficient. The proof of love, that extra effort that the 
subject obliquely requires from the Other in order to disclose their relation –‘Who 
am I for you?’– is intangible: it appears as an inessential part of the demand, 
justified by the need, the actual object of it, and can never find full satisfaction. 
Even if the state had side-stepped the rule of law in its application of it, the 
sentences were still ‘too short,’ and the terrorists were being treated ‘too well.’ The 
plain application of the law was not enough: they kept needing further proofs of 
their special status in the eyes of the law, they needed to be reassured that justice 
would be served, that the wicked would be punished, and, in the end, that ETA 
would be utterly defeated. That ongoing struggle for higher and higher levels of 
‘justice’ kept Pedraza’s hopes alive: it kept alive the fantasy that ETA would be 
completely defeated. 
Her identity, her ego, may have been reconstructed around this fantasy and the 
constitutive lack at its core: around a fateful narrative of justice with an eternally 
postponed defeat of ETA meant to confer meaning on the contingency that had 
dismantled her symbolic universe and changed her life. A fantasy and a narrative 
structure of fate that carried within themselves the promise of restoring what she 
had lost once ETA had been defeated. In other words, her identity in the wake of 
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the 2004 bombings had been built on the promise that attaining her object of desire, 
the defeat of ETA, would finally grant her The Thing, the object of loss, after her 
sacrifice. 
And yet, attaining the object of desire –the defeat of ETA– that is supposed to 
restore the object of loss –a sense of wholeness and purpose in life lost as a 
consequence of the death of Pedraza’s daughter– may not be as appealing as it may 
seem in the first place since getting it would entail: 
a dismantling of the Symbolic. […] Because the Subject is brought into being by signifiers, 
and The Thing exists out of the Symbolic realm, absolute jouissance in The Thing would 
require an exit from the realm of signifiers, which is the realm of subjectivity, and the 
subject itself would be erased, annihilated. (Bailly, 2009, 139) 
In other words, accepting the defeat of ETA after the permanent ceasefire and 
finding enjoyment in it would have been unacceptable for Pedraza insofar as it 
would have entailed the disappearance of her own identity: the disappearance of an 
identity underpinned by her struggle against this group. A struggle that conferred 
meaning to the loss of her daughter. Defeating ETA may have been her object of 
desire, but not her object cause of desire: that role was reserved to the extra effort, 
the caring attitude, displayed by the institutions meant to provide her with meaning 
and recognition once again. The object of desire sustaining her fantasy, a fateful or 
even messianic disappearance of the Basque separatist group, had to be eternally 
postponed in order to be effective: as an imaginary object, it had to remain absent 
in order to preserve the symbolic function of her fantasy. 
Pedraza’s denial of the disappearance of ETA along with her calls for justice 
during the demonstrations that took place in the aftermath of the repeal of the Parot 
Doctrine respond to this logic. On the one hand, accepting a non-cathartic end of 
the struggle against ETA would have forced her to traverse her fantasy and accept 
the contingent character of her narrative structure. That is, it would have forced her 
to deny the necessary and fateful character of the narrative that had restored 
meaning to her life. And, on the other, her demands for justice during the 
demonstrations in 2013 point not to her object of desire –a messianic disappearance 
of ETA– but to the object cause of her desire: to the ongoing attention and 
recognition that she had received from the law since 2004.  
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Due to the failure in castration caused by law’s phallic character, along with the 
absence of a proper Name-of-the-Father or higher reason capable of ruling over it, 
the treatment that she had received from Spanish political parties and legal 
institutions may have led her to think that the law was there entirely for her 
satisfaction, omnipotent and omniscient, as a powerful part of herself with which 
she could become identified (ibid. 121-122). Her demands for justice were a call to 
recover that Otherly enjoyment (l’Autre jouissance): a call to ensure the persistence 
of an attention crystallised in the ongoing approval of ever harder legal 
punishments. Ultimately, they were an appeal to a principle ideologically –and 
falsely– embodied by law, and that law itself had ostensibly bestowed upon the 
victims of terrorism when it decided to trespass its own limits. 
Combined, Pedraza’s denial of the disappearance of ETA along with her regular 
calls for justice appear as an attempt to ensure the survival of the narrative structure 
of fate that had turned the death of her daughter into a meaningful loss: into a 
sacrifice. They appear as the enduring will to preserve the absence of her imaginary 
object of desire so that her object cause of desire and her fantasy may persist: as a 
desire to sustain desire. But also, and this is important, they appear as a way of 
bending to her will a now fanciful and capricious Other: as the demand for a Name-
of-the-Father able to reduce and keep in check the anxiety caused by law’s arguably 
arbitrary behaviour. 
Just enjoyment 
Pedraza wants a law that she can reign over –an omnipotent and omniscient 
Other completely bound to her will. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, the case 
of Irene Villa is radically different in this regard: whereas Pedraza wanted to 
inscribe her pain and her suffering in the law, Villa suspended it through the plain 
acceptance of its less than perfect functioning. And, in the same way, if we agree 
that Pedraza’s understanding of justice is built on an unquenchable desire to control 
the law and ensure the persistence of her narrative, Villa’s understanding of justice 
is not defined so much by desire as it is by jouissance: 
Not as the satisfaction that arises from the attainment of a goal, but a form of enjoyment 
derived from the usage of something in its legitimate (intended) way. […] Jouissance is 
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the enjoyment of a sensation for its own sake, and is linked with the death drive, which 
goes beyond the pleasure principle. (ibid. 118-119) 
Just as character, history becomes an excuse for the display of the individuality 
of the subject and his unique traits, in the case of jouissance every goal and every 
object becomes an excuse for the exercise of a given function in its intended way: 
for its own purpose. For Villa, the enjoyment derived from the overcoming of an 
obstacle caused by the injuries suffered during childhood –e.g. walking again, 
skiing, or having children– is not so much rooted in the overcoming of that 
particular obstacle, as it is in the very act of overcoming it. In the same manner, the 
enjoyment that Villa may obtain from sharing her experiences with others in public 
talks and interviews is not necessarily dependent on the public she is addressing, 
but on the very act of sharing her experiences. 
This kind of enjoyment, dependent on the act itself rather than its object, leads 
to a form of repetition that presents some similarities with Pedraza’s ongoing calls 
for justice but also stands in stark contrast with it. In the same way that Calvinists 
see professional success and wealth as a confirmation of their fate –if they have 
been granted them in this life, that possibly means that God loves them and, in 
consequence, they are predestined to go to heaven– Pedraza’s constant appeals for 
greater levels of justice and harder punishments stand for a demand for proof: proof 
that the Other actually holds her in esteem and proof that the fate that confers 
meaning to her life remains intact. The repetition that we see in the case of Villa –
a constant restaging of the contingency that changed her life along with an enduring 
will to overcome the difficulties derived from it– responds to the logic that connects 
jouissance and the death drive: a logic that, with the overcoming of every obstacle 
and the attainment of every partial object, always tries to push the sensation a step 
further.  
Unlike what happens in the case of desire, which preserves the symbolic 
universe –history– of the subject through its unfulfillment and aims to perpetuate 
itself through the absence of its object, jouissance perseveres through its very 
exercise: having internalised loss and having accepted that no object is truly the 
object –The Thing– it embraces the enjoyment derived from the achievement of 
every partial object, calling for ever more objects to attain and obstacles to 
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overcome. An enjoyment that, in stark contrast to pleasure, does not seek to reduce 
tension but to entice it. The subject makes use of the Symbolic –language and the 
law– in order to push its limits: in order to annihilate the history that structured his 
ego up until that point and overcome –or even reinvent– himself as a subject with 
every new achievement –that is, the death drive. The struggle that may follow the 
irruption of contingency in the life of the subject is not “endured” for the sake of a 
given outcome that could stabilise and reaffirm his ego. Making visible the split 
between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated, this type 
of confrontation appears, as will be explained over the following pages as source of 
enjoyment in and by itself: as an instance in which the subject is presented with the 
opportunity to reaffirm a form of subjectivity beyond the symbolic structures 
constituting his persona. 
Villa’s narrative is not structured by fate, but by character. Justice does not 
appear as a fateful and quasi-messianic ideal whose attainment is awaiting her in 
the future, the present is not a space of suffering to be painfully endured until the 
wicked are punished and the just are rewarded in some distant future: it is something 
that –imperfect and limited as it might be– has already befallen her, something that 
she enjoys in the recurring experience of the same in every obstacle, in every 
moment, and in every contingency. 
In the same manner, her narrative and her identity are not sustained by desire 
and its eternally postponed object, but by jouissance: not by gaining dominion over 
the Symbolic, but by understanding its limitations and pushing its limits; not by the 
attainment of an imaginary object such as a messianic disappearance of ETA, but 
by the enjoyment of the symbolic function represented by the restatement of her 
own experiences; not by the need to confirm her fate, but by the enjoyment of her 
own character; not by the need to preserve a particular identity, but by the will to 
reinvent it; not by a desire to control the law and find full recognition in it, but by 
the enjoyment of derived from the constant re-enactment of her subjectivity. 
The roles of desire and jouissance as opposite poles in both cases (Braunstein, 
2003, 102-114) represent entirely different ways of experiencing justice; but even 
if the contrast between them has been made clear, the origins of Villa’s jouissance 
in relation to her interactions with the law are not as manifest as the origins of 
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Pedraza’s desire. The reason for this is that, as I will argue in the following section, 
jouissance can also be seen as the result of taking the logic of desire to its ultimate 
consequences. That is, as the enjoyment experienced by the subject of the 
enunciation once he has traversed the fantasy of his identification with the subject 
of the enunciated: the enjoyment caused by the realisation that, in spite of his ego, 
the subject has no firm place in the structure of the law as Other (Zupančič, 2000, 
30). 
From symptom to sinthome, from pleasure to jouissance, from desire to 
drive 
The relation with the law in the cases of Pedraza and Villa are remarkably 
different. And, while the latter seems to have suspended it through sheer acceptance 
of its imperfect character and functioning, the former has become ever more 
dependent on it in her striving to gain control over the law. 
The definitive experience of the subject of freedom, the subject who believes himself to be 
free, is that of the lack of freedom […]. The more she tries to specify the precise moment 
at which freedom is real, the more it eludes her. (ibid. 31) 
While fate unfolds the immense complexity of the guilty person, the complications and 
bonds of his guilt, character gives this mystical enslavement of the person to the guilt 
context the answer of genius. Complication becomes simplicity, fate freedom. […] The 
character trait is therefore not the knot in the net. It is the sun of individuality in the 
colourless (anonymous) sky of man, which casts the shadow of the comic action (Benjamin, 
[1919] 1978, 310-311). 
Mutatis mutandis, the quotes by Zupančič and Benjamin could be applied 
respectively to the cases of Pedraza and Villa: in the former, the more she tries to 
specify the exact moment at which the law would finally be just, the more it eludes 
her; and, in the latter, fate –law– becomes freedom through the acceptance of the 
contingent and less than perfect character of law itself. One of these understandings 
of justice opposes the imperfection of the law and, by doing so, ends up making the 
subject even more dependent on it. The other accepts the law as it is –necessarily 
imperfect and contingent– and, by doing so, reduces his degree of dependency on 
it through an unbinding and rebinding movement that allows the subject to 
reposition himself in relation to the law. 
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Perhaps Wendy Brown is correct when she affirms that “desire is not inherently 
emancipatory” (2001, 46-47). There may be cases where an unquenchable desire 
for justice that ostensibly challenges the shortcomings of the law results in an ever 
increasing relation of dependency on it. Maybe in others it is not the “just law” that 
we may be tempted to seek, but the law which is studied and no longer practiced, 
that appears as the gate to justice (Benjamin, 2005, 815). We may even entertain 
the possibility that justice may not be a goal to be achieved but rather an action to 
be enjoyed in its own right. But, if that is correct, we need to investigate how could 
it be possible to evolve from an understanding of justice rooted in the false promises 
of the law to one capable of suspending its authority: we need to investigate how to 
move from an understanding of justice underpinned by satisfaction and desire, to 
one marked by jouissance and drive; from symptom to sinthome; from law to 
justice. Ultimately, we would have to investigate the logic of suicide –the symbolic 
destruction and rebirth of the subject driven by jouissance– from one pole of the 
spectrum to its opposite –or, at least, to an intermediate position. 
From symptom to sinthome 
Finding such a stance –one that may allow the subject to confront the 
shortcomings and false promises of the law while also avoiding the increasing 
dependency that such confrontation may provoke– is not an easy task. It requires 
accepting that our particular struggle for recognition is very likely, if not almost 
certain, to be fruitless. Not because our case, our personal circumstances, our 
frustration, or our suffering are not worthy of recognition but because such 
recognition cannot be attained within the limits of an Other for whom such things 
are not relevant: an Other for whom such things do not even exist. But it not only 
requires accepting the structural impossibility of attaining justice from the law, it is 
also necessary to acknowledge that, even if futile, our struggle for recognition may 
be worthy of recognition in and by itself. In other words, the task of finding a 
position that could allow the subject to face the structural failure of the law to 
deliver justice while not falling into the trap of dependency is also the task of 
unravelling the constitutive lack in the Other: the task of unravelling the 
symptomatic character of our particular case until we are left with nothing but our 
sinthome. 
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In Freudian psychoanalysis, the symptom –briefly sketched in Chapter Two– 
appears as a consequence of repression: as the sign of and as a substitute for an 
instinctual satisfaction. And that which is repressed in any institutionalised justice 
system –that is, law– is the possibility of a direct interaction between both 
conflicting parties: the possibility that a particular subject may decide to take justice 
in his own hands and take revenge on the offender. However, the object of 
repression is not the potential damage that a subject could inflict on another, but the 
possibility that in this process the state itself may lose its monopoly on violence and 
thus incite future challenges to its authority. 
Hence, insofar as it appears as a threat to the state and the authority of the law, 
revenge constitutes an object of repression. The satisfaction that the subject may 
obtain from an act of vengeance, however, remains unclear. Revenge is eminently 
reactive: it sprouts from suffering and is aimed at the person or institutions 
perceived as responsible for such suffering. Especially in cases in which the subject 
has suffered severe losses as a result of someone else’s actions, it might be difficult 
to find words that could convey the depth of his or her agony: an agony that not 
only threatens to escape the reach of language and thus the sphere of the Symbolic, 
but that also challenges its very consistency. When suffering escapes description, 
when its intensity appears as ineffable and threatens to isolate the subject from other 
human beings who could not possibly understand what he is going through, this 
very subject may seek to repair his symbolic universe by making himself 
understood at the site of the Real. That is, he may seek to create a bond with the 
person responsible for this pain by inflicting an arguably similar –real– pain on that 
person: he may seek to make himself understandable and understood by making the 
offender go through an equally painful experience.101 
                                                          
101 The problem is, of course, that insofar as the depths of such suffering are unfathomable to 
the subject himself, there are no limits to the suffering that we may want to inflict on the person 
that we perceive as responsible for it: 
(Seekers of justice). There are those who, if science ever made it possible, would like to extend 
the lifespan of criminals by up to 1,000 years, so they could serve 1,000 years in prison. Wasn’t 
it God who did that when he founded eternity, so the damned could eternally suffer in hell? 
(Sánchez Ferlosio, 1993, 127, my translation). 
In this regard, even if the law of Talion –“an eye for an eye”– is widely considered as a vengeful 
practice it also appears as a significant development aimed to restrain the punishment inflicted on 
the perpetrator to the kind and degree of injury suffered by the victim. 
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In other words, the satisfaction that the subject may hope to attain from 
vengeance is nothing other than full understanding and recognition from the 
offender. The structural limits to the possibility of obtaining such recognition from 
offenders are worth further discussion but go beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, it is worth noting that regardless of such limits, seeking direct recognition 
from offenders by means of vengeance is precisely what is repressed by law in order 
to preserve its authority. And, as a result of that repression, the subject may seek an 
alternative source of recognition: a substitute Other. That is, the law. 
Under the threat of punishment, the subject seeks in the law the recognition that 
he “cannot” obtain from the person or institutions at fault for his suffering. Hence 
if we consider for a moment the case of Ángeles Pedraza in the light of the 
paragraphs above, we could arguably say that what is symptomatic about her as a 
subject is her relentless demand for justice: she seeks not only to be recognised as 
a valid interlocutor –citizen, speaker of the language of the law– but also to see her 
suffering recognised by the law as a substitute Other. She seeks to see the ineffable 
Real of her suffering recognised in and by the law. And, ultimately, it is the hope 
for this –imaginary– full recognition in the law that binds together the Real of her 
experience and the Symbolic of her role as citizen, thus constituting her symptom. 
Undoubtedly, there are limits to the extent to which we can study the cases of 
Villa and Pedraza by means of psychoanalysis: even if we consider them as 
symptomatic of a broader political and social reality, they are not patients. And even 
if they were, the use of an intimate knowledge of their cases and their experiences 
for the purpose of illustrating a broader discussion on the relation between law, 
justice, and subjectivity would raise severe ethical concerns. With these caveats in 
mind, if we agree to proceed with the psychoanalytic allegory we could arguably 
say that this study aims –albeit in a necessarily limited and flawed way– to unravel 
the symbolic component of the symptom: to make visible –although not necessarily 
seen– the fundamental lack in the law as Other –its structural incapability to provide 
                                                          
Also, it may be argued that any form of understanding or recognition must necessarily take place 
within the domain of the Symbolic. However, it should be noticed as well that according to 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967) communication and understanding only 
became possible insofar as there are “shared experiences.”  
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the subject with justice– through the scrutiny and demarcation of its constituent 
limits. As in Lacan’s Taoist metaphor of the jar in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
(1992, 120-123), it aims to elaborate a symbolic constellation capable of delineating 
the location of the Real of the drive in the subject: his struggle for full recognition 
in the name of justice, and the impossibility of obtaining it from a law –an Other– 
that is just as lacking as the subject himself. 
If this point is reached, if the constitutive lack in the Other is made visible, the 
subject is faced with something that he could not or did not want to see, even if only 
at an unconscious level: the possibility that the justice that he sought may be 
impossible to attain within the law. Ultimately, the subject is faced with a choice: 
either accepting this possibility and embracing a form of jouissance that he had 
previously refused, or persisting in his refusal. Either he accepts that the full 
recognition that he hoped to find in the law is impossible to obtain and thus seeks 
supplementary forms of recognition, or he refuses to acknowledge the structurally 
flawed character of the law and persists in his struggle to purge from it its 
imperfections so that “true absolute justice” can be achieved within its limits. 
As Verhaeghe and Declercq (2002, 59-83) put it, in the end the subject has to 
choose between becoming identified with his symptom or believing in it. To believe 
in one’s symptom is to believe in the existence of a final signifier –a perfect and 
absolutely just law– capable of disclosing the ultimate meaning of the Symptom of 
the subject –capable of providing him with full recognition and understanding. That 
is, the belief that in spite of its current and apparent shortcomings, the law is not 
structurally flawed and can be perfected –through endless calls for ever harder 
punishments– to the point of actually being able to provide the subject with the full 
recognition that he so desires. Identifying with one’s symptom, on the other hand, 
is tantamount to becoming identified with one’s own particularity: with the fact that 
the failure of the law to recognise it is not a matter of impotence, weakness or 
corruption, but a structural impossibility. Namely, an identification of the Real of 
the law –its constitutive lack– and with the Real of the subject himself: a real 
identification with his drive –his particular form of enjoyment, his singular struggle 
for recognition, and ultimately his sinthome, the real foundation of the subject left 
behind after unravelling the symptom. An identification that supplements the lack 
in the Other through partial and alternative forms of recognition arising from the 
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very struggle of the subject to obtain it, leading to a form of jouissance that is 
“situated in the Real of the body” (ibid.): in the radical particularity of the subject 
that the law could not acknowledge; in the specificity of his circumstances and 
experiences rather than in his role as citizen; in his particular struggle for 
recognition rather than in the recognition that he may have hoped to obtain from 
the law. 
From satisfaction to jouissance 
Becoming identified with our sinthome, finding self-recognition in one’s own 
struggle for recognition without expecting full recognition from the Other, 
represents a turning point. The subject ceases to await justice to befall him and, 
instead, finds it in the very act of making visible its absence. Giving up on the 
possibility of obtaining satisfaction, the subject finds enjoyment in the very strife 
necessary to achieve that impossible goal. As in Nietzsche’s metaphor of the sand 
castles ([1873] 1998, 61-63), instead of expecting to find satisfaction in the 
achievement and endurance of his ultimate goal, the subject becomes like the child 
who finds joy in the very process of building them only to see them undone 
moments later. 
In forsaking the possibility of finding full satisfaction for his desire the subject 
also gives up on his ego. Or, at least, on the way in which his ego had been 
structured up until that point. He ceases to cling to a particular form of being102 and 
embraces Being103in an intransitive way: as a form of becoming. Metaphorically 
speaking, the subject who believes in his symptom and thus expects to receive full 
recognition or absolute justice from the law is like a person who has suffered a 
severe injury but does not want it to leave a scar on his skin: he wants to stay the 
same as before, so the moment the injury begins to heal he starts scratching and 
digging at the scab out of fear that it will leave a scar behind. And, in the process 
of trying to prevent the appearance of the scar, that wound grows bigger and bigger 
while never finishing to heal. The subject who becomes identified with his 
symptom, on the other hand, is like the person that accepts that that wound will 
                                                          
102 As Seiende (Heidegger, [1927] 2010) 
103 As Sein (ibid.) 
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necessarily leave a scar –that his skin will look different than it was, that he will 
never be the same as before. 
As with any form of becoming, this process entails the acceptance of a loss and 
even mourning it. But as Judith Butler puts it: 
Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a transformation […] the full result 
of which one cannot know in advance. There is a losing, as we know, but there is also the 
transformative effect of loss, and this latter cannot be charted or planned. (2004, 21) 
The passage from satisfaction to jouissance –from the belief in the symptom to 
our identification with it– and the acceptance of the loss of the Thing requires not 
only accepting that we are not who we were, but also that we may not be(come) 
who we are at this moment. It requires accepting being strangers in our own house 
(Zupančič, 2000, 23). 
From desire to drive 
Insofar as the subject believes in his symptom and expects satisfaction, he is 
also persisting in his desire: in his wish to be fully recognised by the law qua 
substitute Other. In this endeavour, and continuing with the previous metaphor, the 
subject perseveres in the belief that it will be possible for his wounds to heal without 
leaving a scar behind: he continues to believe –and wish– that he can return to a 
previous state. He desires to return to a state, a symbolic universe, which had been 
the foundation of his very identity until it was turned upside down by the actions of 
others. And, in doing so, the subject not only persists in his wish to “stay, awaken 
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed” (Benjamin [1940] 1970), but 
also in his wish to remain unchanged: his wish to be the same person that he used 
to be before the universe that conferred him his identity was undone. In other words, 
he clings to a particular form of being, to his ego –and to the possibility that through 
its recognition by the Other it may actually be preserved, as in the case of Ángeles 
Pedraza. 
Thus the desire for justice of this subject appears as “a defence [défense], a 
prohibition [défense] against going beyond a certain limit” (Lacan, 1989, 332), 
keeping alive his ego even if only in a ghostly fashion: as the hope that it might yet 
be possible for it to return. Going beyond this limit, mourning and accepting that 
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loss, identifying the symptom and the scar as one’s own, is tantamount to doing 
away with both: that particular ego and its spectre. Going beyond this limit is 
accepting the loss of the self and, ultimately, committing a symbolic suicide. It is 
the annihilation of the ego for the sake of the subject. It is standing on the threshold 
of becoming and the death drive. 
This is the transformative effect of loss: what comes after “cannot be charted or 
planned” (Butler, 2004, 21), but whatever it may be, it will not be the same as 
before. Accepting this is being willing to give up one’s object of desire for the sake 
of one’s object cause of desire: it is being willing to renounce the (im)possibility of 
obtaining full recognition from the law and recognising oneself in the very act of 
demanding it, making visible the lack in the Other. It is forsaking the (im)possibility 
of receiving justice from the law and, instead, doing justice to oneself in the very 
act of speaking it, in the very act of making visible its absence, as in the case of 
Irene Villa. 
Putting it differently, in Heideggerian terms, the subject’s passage from desire 
to the death drive, from satisfaction to jouissance, is also his transition from 
“expectation” (Erwarten) to “anticipation” (Vorlaufen):104 for him, what matters 
the most about his demand for justice is not what he may obtain from it –the kind 
of recognition that he would like to receive from the Other– but the very act of 
demanding justice and laying bare the limits of the law in this regard. It would be 
positive if his particularity received some form of recognition from the Other, but 
he harbours no expectations: it is the very fact of demanding such 
acknowledgement, the fact of recognising that one’s own particularity is worthy of 
recognition, that moves him.  
However, the subject who commits this form of symbolic suicide, who 
renounces his ego, does not repudiate his past. On the contrary, his previous life, 
his experiences, and the scars left behind on his skin are part of who he is now. The 
subject articulates his past historically: not recognising it in ‘the way it really was’ 
but reappropriating it in a different light (Benjamin [1940] 1970). The scars he 
wears do not appear anymore as wounds but as the living testimony of past 
experiences, and every new contingency, every new obstacle, every new struggle 
                                                          
104 These concepts are studied in further detail in Chapter Five. 
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becomes an excuse for the subject to rearticulate them and reaffirm himself in the 
recognition of his own particularity. 
His ego is transformed with the overcoming of each obstacle, destroyed and 
created anew from the ashes of the previous one. In the passage from desire to the 
death drive, the subject no longer identifies himself with the hope of being made 
“whole” again in some distant future but with its very opposite: with the acceptance 
that he is not the same person that he used to be, and that he will not remain the 
same person that he is at this moment. In this passage he does not cling anymore to 
a particular form of being, but rather to the real of being as such: to the fact that he 
just-is. 
From fantasy to the ethical act 
In this manner, justice always appears limited: either the subject awaits ad 
eternum for the law to grant him an absolute and quasi-messianic justice that in no 
manner it can provide, or he settles for partial and smaller “victories” –finding 
enjoyment in the very act of fighting those battles for recognition: 
The act differs from an ‘action’ in that it radically transforms its bearer (agent). After an 
act, I am not the same as before. In the act, the subject is annihilated and subsequently 
reborn (or not); the act involves a kind of temporary eclipse of the subject. [It is] therefore 
always a ‘crime’, a ‘transgression’ – of the limits of the symbolic community to which I 
belong. (Zupančič, 2000, 83) 
 The first part of this quote from Ethics of the Real resonates with what has been 
discussed above. However, Zupančič’s description of this “logic of suicide” as a 
crime or as a transgression offers the possibility of rethinking the relation between 
this ‘suicidal’ subject and the law from a different perspective: the return of the –
politically– repressed. 
It was said above that the object of repression of the law is the possibility that a 
subject may take justice into his own hands. Not because of the damage that this 
particular subject could ostensibly cause, but because it would threaten the state’s 
monopoly on violence. This form of prohibition responds to the logic of what 
Walter Benjamin defined as “law-preserving violence” ([1921] 1996), and is 
particularly severe in its application in those cases in which breaking the law is not 
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a mere side-effect of an action meant for the achievement of other goals –e.g. theft– 
but the sole purpose of such transgression: sedition, treason, terrorism, insurrection, 
etc. It is particularly severe in those cases in which the goal of the transgression is, 
in the end, to call into question the very authority of the law. 
Hence Zupančič’s account of the act as a transgression may not be too far-
fetched after all: the authority of the law is called into question and its inability to 
provide justice is made apparent the very minute the subject (1) publicly renounces 
any expectations of finding satisfaction in the law and (2) invests himself as an 
alternative source of recognition by declaring that his only purpose is to expose the 
contradictions and limitations of a law that is structurally flawed. 
The conceptualisation of justice as an act rather than as a goal to be achieved 
within law represents an “a-legal” –or at least, “non-illegal” – questioning of 
legality insofar as the subject chooses to speak the discourse of the law only to 
dismiss its validity: both as a place for recognition and as a meaningful Other. It 
represents a form of interaction with the law in which the latter is thoroughly 
studied, but no longer applied. 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to investigate the unconscious mechanisms behind the 
production of the narratives of justice described in Chapter Three. The first step 
was to make visible the gap between the ideological functioning of the law and its 
actual enforcement. A gap that, through an allegoric use of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and the study of the triad need-demand-desire, allowed us to see how the 
peculiarities of the law as Other may affect the emergence of subjective 
understandings of justice: the way in which they may affect the appearance of the 
desires underpinning the abovementioned narratives and understandings of justice. 
In this regard, it was argued that the law presented a series of characteristics in its 
relation with the subject that resembled those of the Phallic Mother. This chapter 
also defended the hypothesis that these characteristics of the law lead to a failure in 
the symbolic castration of the subject that makes visible the differences between 
the emergence of desires for justice and other forms of desire. More particularly, it 
argued that the resemblance between the law and the Phallic Mother, stemming 
from the abyss between its ideological façade of justice and its actual application, 
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may allow for the formation of the Hypothesis of the Phallus –there seems to be 
something capable of catching the eye of the law– but not the Name-of-the-Father 
–it being impossible to find a clear reason for an ostensibly whimsical behaviour in 
which the law seems to obey no designs other than its own. 
Following these discoveries, and making use once again of the cases of Ángeles 
Pedraza and Irene Villa, the last part of this chapter argued that the unconscious 
mechanisms driving the production of subjective narratives of justice oscillate 
between desire –with justice as an imaginary object of desire with the potential to 
make the subject whole again but whose attainment is eternally postponed into the 
future– and jouissance –entertaining the possibility such a thing as an ultimate or 
absolute justice may not exist, justice does not appear as the result of a struggle 
towards it but as the struggle itself, allowing the subject to find recognition not in 
the attainment of justice as an imaginary object of desire but in the very act of 
demanding it. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“When the Man Comes Around”:  
Justice after (and beyond) Judgement 
 
 
And killing time is perhaps the essence of comedy, just as the essence of tragedy is 
killing eternity. 
(Miguel de Unamuno, San Manuel Bueno, Mártir) 
 
 
While the previous two chapters considered contingency and desire as two key 
dimensions in the formation of subjective understandings of justice, the final part 
of this block will centre its attention on temporality: on the differences between the 
temporalities of law and justice, and the different ways in which time can be 
experienced as a result of a particular understanding of justice emerging from a 
missed encounter with the law. Roughly speaking, while the study of contingency 
and desire sought to describe the emergence  of subjective understandings of justice 
–the circumstances in which we start talking about justice and the role played by 
this concept in a series of meaning-making processes– and  their development –the 
mechanisms that underpin such processes and appear in response to the 
impossibility of finding justice in the law– this chapter seeks to cast some light on 
the outcome of such understandings: What is justice for the subject demanding it? 
What does it mean for the subject? What does it take for the subject to feel that 
justice has been served? 
This is not to say, however, that temporality itself appears as a result of a 
meaning-making processes born from our discontent with the law and driven by 
unconscious mechanisms that may range from desire to jouissance. In the same 
manner that a subject may have a narrative of life prior to an encounter with political 
violence or other forms of contingency, and in the same manner that a desire other 
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than a desire for justice may not require the interaction with the law in order to 
appear, the subject is always-already immersed in a form of temporality: in a certain 
experience of time resulting from the symbolic structures that he inhabits. And just 
like the narratives and desires of a given subject may be transformed through the 
processes studied over the last two chapters, such experiences of time may also be 
altered through the irruption of disruptive contingencies in the life of the subject, 
the interactions with the law that may follow them, and the subsequent realisation 
of the shortcomings of the law. 
The relation among these three dimensions of analysis will be discussed in 
further detail in the Interlude following this chapter. For the time being, however, 
there is another issue that requires our attention: the role of the particular subject in 
our present analysis of the temporality of justice.  
This entails, to a certain extent, a return to the origins of this research project: a 
return to the Unamunian “man of flesh and bone” and the way in which this subject 
–“the man who is born, suffers and dies –above all, who dies” (Unamuno, [1913] 
1972)– experiences time. Hence this chapter will study the way in which the 
temporality of the subject differs from the linear conception of time derived from 
the normative character of the law, as well as the form in which such subjective 
experiences of time can appear connected to one understanding of justice or another 
–with the potential to question the authority of the law and the limits of its power. 
A form of questioning that, as I will argue over the following pages, can assume a 
range of forms within a spectrum delimited by two distinct readings of the song 
giving its name to this chapter: a messianic interpretation in which justice can be 
seen as the outcome of a “final judgement” awaiting us in the future; and a second 
one, in which the expression “to come around” is not read as an allegory to the 
return of the messiah and the coming of the Kingdom of God, but as “regaining 
consciousness”: as  becoming aware of the gap between subject and citizen –
between actor and role. 
Nevertheless, considering that the study of the temporality of justice brings an 
end to this research project, it may be advisable to recapitulate and clarify the 
relation between this chapter and work done so far before going any further. In the 
first place, and taking “the man of flesh and bone” as its departing point, this 
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research sought to study how a particular subject, who goes before the law hoping 
to attain justice, can come to develop a subjective understanding of justice as a 
result of this interaction. The second chapter deepened into this issue, arguing that 
the abovementioned subjective understandings of justice emerge from an encounter 
with the constituent limits of the law: subjectivity, contingency, and justice itself. 
Limits which, in turn, became visible in the light of generality and normativity as 
law’s defining features.  
The next step, however, was to study the different ways in which such 
encounters could lead to the production of new understandings of justice: having 
located the constituent limits of the law, the point at which such understandings of 
justice may arise, it was necessary to investigate the process leading up to their 
production. For that purpose, the second chapter also identified three dimensions to 
be considered in their development: contingency, desire, and temporality. The 
second block of this project was devoted to the study of each of these dimensions. 
Consequently, Chapter Three put emphasis on the differences between the role of 
contingency in law and in the subject’s own narrative of justice, positing Walter 
Benjamin’s concepts of fate and character as opposite ways of articulating 
contingency in such narratives. Chapter Four, on the other hand, sought to 
investigate the role of desire and jouissance in the production of the 
abovementioned narratives and how, in turn, they seemed to appear as two possible 
ways of understanding justice in view of the less-than-perfect character of the law. 
Finally, and completing this triad, Chapter Five aims to clarify the differences 
between the temporalities of law and justice while also using Heidegger’s notions 
of expectation and anticipation –in correspondence with the two readings of the 
song mentioned in the previous paragraph– as opposite ways of conceiving justice 
in terms of temporality. 
This structure establishes clear boundaries between chapters: the first one 
located a blind-spot in the study of justice around “the man of flesh and bone” that 
allowed for the second chapter to build upon it the theoretical basis for this project. 
Each of the following chapters was devoted, in turn, to the study of a clearly defined 
topic: contingency, desire, and temporality. Nevertheless, these three dimensions 
are not completely isolated from one another. And, while throughout the previous 
two chapters it was already possible to see a certain degree of reciprocity between 
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the studies of contingency and desire, the same occurs with our present analysis of 
the temporality of justice.  
The basics for the study of this topic appeared outlined at the end of Chapter 
Two, making visible the chronological character of the law, and  describing the 
temporality of justice as its opposite: Kairos. Later on, the question of temporality 
also permeated the study of contingency and desire. At the level of contingency and 
the production of narratives of justice, the concepts of fate and character already 
suggest two different ways of understanding the temporality of justice: either 
conferring meaning to contingency on the basis of a fateful and quasi-messianic 
justice located in an eternally-postponed future, or through a narrative of character 
resulting in a permanent and recurring experience of the same. Similarly, desire and 
jouissance made way for two possible and diverging ways of conceiving justice: 
either as an imaginary object of desire that must remain perpetually absent in order 
to preserve the symbolic function of the narrative built around it, or as the 
enjoyment derived from the very act of demanding justice –and making visible the 
inability of the law to uphold its ideological promises of justice. 
Hence the three dimensions considered here –contingency, desire, and 
temporality– appear interlocked, as three ecstases standing out from a common 
underlying ground or as three aspects of the same phenomenon: justice and the way 
in which it comes to be understood by a particular subject. The introduction of the 
concepts of expectation and anticipation (Heidegger, [1927] 2010) in this chapter 
aims to complete and refine the study of these three dimensions, establishing a 
parallelism with the concepts of fate and character on the one hand, and desire and 
jouissance on the other. Hence this chapter will include (1) a description of the 
differences between the temporalities of law and justice, (2) and an introduction of 
the concepts of expectation and anticipation as opposite poles of the same spectrum 
in the study of the temporality of justice –which paves the way, in turn, for the 
analysis of the relation between contingency, desire, and temporality developed in 
the Interlude following this chapter. 
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Kairos rebelled, Chronos shrunk: the temporality of law and justice 
In the same manner that the study of desire and subjectivity appeared linked to 
the general character of the law and its inability to put any “extra effort” into the 
satisfaction of the demands for justice presented by a particular subject, the study 
of its temporality appears closely related to another of its basic features: 
normativity.  
Unlike the laws of physics, which aim to describe universally observable 
phenomena, legal norms are inherently prescriptive: they impose or forbid certain 
behaviours. This entails that such behaviours are neither impossible nor necessary, 
but purely contingent. For instance, if it were impossible to kill other people, there 
would be no reason to make murder illegal; and, in the same manner, if all human 
beings must breath in order to live, imposing “breathing” as a legal obligation would 
be unnecessary and redundant. Attempting to impose or forbid necessary or 
impossible actions by law would either transform law itself into a purely descriptive 
phenomenon or into a set of norms that would lack any form of enforceability, 
rendering it useless in the end. 
Disobeying the law needs to be possible insofar as only the act of breaking it 
makes room for its enforcement: only the act of breaking the law can make apparent 
its regulatory function. In stark contrast with the law of gravity or the laws of 
thermodynamics, legal norms must be susceptible of being broken if they are to 
retain their enforceability. But this too has an effect on the way in which the law 
produces its own temporality: on the one hand, the past escapes its reach due to its 
irreversible and thus necessary character;105 and, on the other, the rule of law also 
excludes the possibility of making ad hoc judgements –being possible to pass a law 
on the basis of a case but not for a specific case.106 Hence its regulatory capacity is 
                                                          
105 Ostensibly, some laws and legal institutions such as the Historical Memory Law (Spain), the 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Argentina) or the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (South Africa) could appear as exceptions to the impossibility of 
the law to regulate the past. Nevertheless, and regardless of the social and political value of 
such initiatives, the reach of their power is limited to the possibility of presenting past events 
in a different light –that is, without ever being able to undo what has been done nor to change 
the fact that such events actually happened. 
 
106 In this regard the Nuremberg Trials appear as the exception to this general prohibition. The 
study of the relation between the Nuremberg Trials and the three dimensions of analysis 
considered here would require a separate piece of work on its own right.  
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ultimately restrained to the future. It rules future actions on the basis of past 
experiences, creating mediation between them that entails a certain blindness 
towards the particularity of the present in which its intervention is required. 
The law gives prominence to and establishes a mediation between the past and 
the future which reflects, in turn, the chronological character of its temporality. In 
law time is presented as pure sequentiality: as a succession of moments in which 
the present always stands as the future of a past and as the actualisation of a near 
future, as the missed encounter between a “not yet” and a “too late” in which legal 
norms can be enforced back into existence. The law may very well rule the future 
on the basis of the past, but its enforceability becomes actual enforcement in the 
present and only in the present. Consequently, the latter plays a rather ambiguous 
role in the temporality of law: on the one hand, it appears as the ecstase of time that 
sustains and guarantees the very existence of the law; but, on the other, its radical 
particularity also escapes its domain. Each moment, each present, appears as 
necessary as it appears devoid of content: a mere excuse for the enforcement of 
legal norms, regardless of the particularity of the case and the subject demanding 
their application. Time itself becomes “homogeneous” and “empty” (Benjamin, 
[1940] 1970). Every single moment and every single case is seen in the light of past 
cases and considered as a precedent for future ones. Each of them is treated as 
equivalent to any other, deprived of the particularity of experience that could make 
them meaningful for the subject who goes before the law hoping to attain justice. 
Arguably, this impasse resonates with the work done in the previous two 
chapters. Just like the indistinct legal treatment given to each contingency gave 
origin to the production of subjective narratives of justice, and just like the 
consideration of each demand for justice as the demand of “just another citizen” 
made way for the appearance of particular forms of desire and jouissance, the 
disregard of the law for the present in which justice is required also entices the 
emergence of alternative forms of temporality. Justice “doesn’t wait […] a just 
decision is always required immediately. […] the moment of decision, as such, 
always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation” (Derrida, 1990). 
Considering my case as equivalent to any other cases that may have been judged so 
far is not enough. Treating my case as a mere precedent for future cases is not 
enough. Justice demands it to be recognised as mine here and now.  
202 
 
And while the temporality of law functions in a strictly sequential manner, the 
temporality of justice adopts the form of a time-lapse, a window of opportunity 
arising from the missed encounter between a “not yet” and a “too late” that requires 
to be recognised in its most radical particularity. Or, to put it differently, whereas 
the temporality of law takes the form of Chronos, the temporality of justice adopts 
that of Kairos: an instant of timefulness and timelessness in which everything 
happens and an opportunity may be seized. A kind of temporality that appears in 
stark contrast with that of law in its pure immediacy, differentiable from it insofar 
as it appears as a present that demands to become meaningful in and by itself –
instead of being subordinated to the past and the future. However, this only accounts 
for the way in which the temporality of justice becomes apparent and distinct from 
that of law: the form in which such temporality can be experienced by the justice-
seeking subject is an entirely different matter. 
“When the Man comes around”: expectation and anticipation 
Besides his musical accomplishments, Johnny Cash was also known for his 
strong religious beliefs. And more than any other, “The Man Comes Around” stands 
as a symbol of the deep influence of such beliefs on his work. The very title of the 
song along with its numerous biblical references appear, in principle, as a clear 
allusion to the apocalypse and the second coming of Christ: as a reference to a 
fateful and messianic future in which the wicked will be punished and the just will 
be rewarded. However, this song is also open to a second reading insofar as “to 
come around” can be understood not only as a form of “return” or “recurrence,” but 
also as the act of regaining consciousness. Hence the two possible interpretations 
of this song in the context of this research: on the one hand, it can be seen as a 
reference to a future in which the messiah will come for a second time, making a 
final judgement that will finally deliver justice and set things right; but, on the other, 
“when the man comes around” can also be read as “the man of flesh and bone” 
recovering consciousness of himself in his pursuit of justice. 
This “man of flesh and bone” –identified in this thesis as the particular subject 
who goes before the law seeking justice– is described by Miguel de Unamuno in 
The Tragic Sense of Life as “the man who is born, suffers and dies –above all, who 
dies; the man who eats and drinks and plays and sleeps and thinks and wills; the 
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man who is seen and heard; the brother, the real brother” ([1913] 1972). In 
Unamuno’s work, death stands as the end of life but also as a constitutive element 
of it: life itself is agony, we are dying from the very moment we are born, and we 
suffer because of this insofar as there is nothing more human than wanting not to 
die, than wanting to live forever. And yet, the fact that we are all doomed to die is 
what gives meaning to our existence. In other words, it is our experience of time 
and its existential finitude that makes our lives meaningful and worth living.  A 
more nuanced –although less intimate– version of this argument can be found in 
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time ([1927] 2010). Heidegger also identifies time 
–and ultimately death– as that which completes and allows us to understand our 
existence. For him, however, these are concepts that present us with a series of 
theoretical and even existential problems insofar as (1) we cannot die someone 
else’s death and (2) we cannot actually experience our own death.  
The first of these points entails that for as long as we live we may also bear 
witness to the passing of others, but experiencing “their death” is something entirely 
different. We may be “there” when they die, but we cannot die in their stead; and, 
in the same manner, no one else can die “our death.” This is what Heidegger means 
when he says that death is one’s ownmost possibility: no one can truly experience 
someone else’s death. However, this does not imply we can only experience our 
own death. Echoing Epicurus, Heidegger argues that even our own death is 
excluded from our experience: once death occurs to us, once it becomes actual, we 
cease to be.  We may very well die, but we cannot experience death as such. Hence 
Dasein –mutatis mutandis, the Heideggerian equivalent to “the man of flesh and 
bone”– can only relate to its own death as an unavoidable possibility that entails the 
end of everything else: “as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in 
general” (ibid, 251).  If “the man of flesh and bone” is above all the man who dies, 
Dasein’s existence is equally affected by death and the experience of time resulting 
from its inevitability. As one’s innermost particularity and as one’s ownmost 
possibility, death puts life into perspective casting a new light on Dasein’s being-
in-the-world: shaping the way in which we perceive our own past and project 
ourselves onto our surroundings. In other words, it constitutes Dasein –“the man of 
flesh and bone” – as a being-towards-death. 
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However, this being-towards-death can appear in two different modalities that 
reflect the two readings of “The Man Comes Around” discussed above, and also 
two diverging ways of conceiving the temporality of justice: “expectation” 
(Erwarten) and “anticipation” (Vorlaufen). 
Expecting justice 
In the first of these modalities Dasein confers meaning to its own existence on 
the basis of something other than itself: 
The publicness of everyday being-with-one-another “knows” death as a constantly 
occurring event, as a “case of death.” Someone or another “dies,” be it a neighbour or a 
stranger. People unknown to us “die” daily and hourly. “Death” is encountered as a familiar 
event occurring within the world. As such, it remains in the inconspicuousness 
characteristic of everyday encounters. The they has also already secured an interpretation 
for this event. The “fleeting” talk about this which is either expressed or else mostly kept 
back says: One also dies at the end, but for now one is not involved. […] “Dying” is levelled 
down to an event which does concern Dasein, but which belongs to no one in particular. 
[…] Dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly 
occurring event which the they encounters. (ibid, 243) 
In expectation Dasein struggles to imagine the actualisation of “the possibility 
of the impossibility of its own existence.” Its own death comes to be perceived as 
an external phenomenon, as “just another case of death”: How does it feel not to 
be? How will they remember me? Will they have the same thoughts that I always 
have when I go to a funeral? Grounded in actuality rather than in possibility, 
expectation turns death into an event awaiting us in the distant future –instead of 
something that could potentially occur at any moment as soon as we are born. In 
expectation, the subject sees himself as “another,” distancing himself from his most 
radical particularity. 
If time –in its existential finitude constituted by death– stands as the kernel of 
the being of the subject, as its most radical particularity, temporality appears as the 
way in which it can be experienced –and thus as the way in which the subject can 
confer meaning to its own existence. The moment one’s death comes to be 
perceived as an external phenomenon rather than as something constitutive of one’s 
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existence, the meaning of the latter becomes dependent on an event located in the 
future that we must await and yet never experience.  
In relation to the study of temporality as the third and final dimension in analysis 
of the formation of subjective understandings of justice, it is also possible to 
establish a connection between expectation, the first reading of “The Man Comes 
Around,” and the case of Ángeles Pedraza. On the one hand, expectation appears 
connected to the first reading of the song insofar as the second coming of the 
messiah stands as the future event that we must await: as the event in which God 
will finally set things right and confer true and everlasting meaning to our flawed 
earthly lives. But, on the other, it can also be connected to the case of Ángeles 
Pedraza inasmuch as her dissatisfaction with the flaws of the law along with her 
view of the death of her daughter as a sacrifice results in an understanding of justice 
that acquires equally messianic proportions. In her narrative of fate, justice appears 
as the future event that could validate and make meaningful the death of her 
daughter: as an event whose actualisation, nevertheless, depends on an Other and 
requires the complete and total disappearance of ETA – a disappearance eternally 
postponed and displaced onto the future but also required by the past, by the 
sacrifice of her daughter. However, if such disappearance ever became actual, 
Pedraza’s narrative –along with her identity as the embodiment of a police-based 
approach to the fight against ETA– would also reach an end.  Thus her narrative, 
the very meaning of her existence in the wake of the bombings, appears dependent 
on a future event that she awaits but may arguably never experience as such.107 An 
event that, for her, only the law can deliver. And, as a consequence of this, the very 
possibility of justice, the thing that could finally offer full recognition to the radical 
particularity of her experience, is handed over to the law. The meaning-making 
process embodied by her narrative becomes not only dependent on the future event 
that would finally fulfil her destiny –the complete and total disappearance of ETA 
in exchange for the sacrifice of her daughter– but also –and arguably more 
importantly– on the “they” that she hopes will deliver it: law. 
                                                          
107 Similarly to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s existence and death, it is the very absence of 
that event which sustains Pedraza’s narrative: as long as justice remains a mere and distant 
possibility, it also retains the capacity to confer meaning to her existence; however, if such 
justice ever became actual, the entire narrative built around the possibility of attaining it would 
crumble.  
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Anticipating justice 
In anticipation, on the other hand, Dasein becomes capable of conferring 
meaning to its own existence on the basis of its ownmost possibility –its death– and 
only on the basis of this possibility. In other words, it appears as a mode of 
temporality –an experience of time– that allows Dasein to step out of its daily 
presuppositions and assumptions about the world –the “actuality of its 
everydayness”– and become aware of its own potentiality-of-being. An awareness 
of the ways in which the subject interacts with his surroundings, of the finite and 
contingent character of such interactions, and also of the alternatives opened by 
such realisation. In anticipation: 
Dasein discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme possibility. But to project 
oneself upon one’s ownmost potentiality of being means to be able to understand oneself 
in the being [Sein] of the being [Seienden] thus revealed: to exist. Anticipation shows itself 
as the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and extreme potentiality-of-being, that 
is, as the possibility of authentic existence. […] Death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein. 
Being toward it discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is 
concerned about the Being of Dasein absolutely. Here the fact can become evident to 
Dasein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they. (ibid, 251-252) 
In contrast with expectation, anticipation does not appear as a continuous state 
of mind but as a sudden burst of existential conscience in which the subject becomes 
aware of his own being. In anticipation Dasein unbinds itself from the they: instead 
of becoming dependent on the actualisation of a future event that could give true 
and everlasting meaning to its being, Dasein takes responsibility for it –or, as 
Heidegger puts it, becomes guilty of it– assuming any possible consequences 
derived from its actions. In the understanding of its most radical particularity, 
Dasein becomes capable of tearing itself away from the they, showing reticence 
towards idle talk –e.g. since everyone dies at the end but for now one is not 
involved, there is no need to take care of it yet– and estranging itself from its own 
everydayness –that is, calling into question and reflecting on its previous 
assumptions and presuppositions about the world. In other words, anticipation 
provides the subject with a degree of awareness of his own transience that puts into 
perspective his particularity of experience; and just like his death is his own and no 
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one else can die on his behalf, his actions are his responsibility and only his to 
experience –regardless of their final outcome. 
As a mode of temporality, anticipation does not appear as the awaiting of a 
future and final event but as the constant projection of oneself onto the future. That 
is to say that unlike what occurs with expectation, where the subject strives and is 
even willing to make sacrifices in order to achieve a particular and clearly 
established goal –e.g. the complete and total disappearance of ETA in such and such 
manner– in anticipation the subject does not engage with the world solely on the 
basis of attaining this or that particular result but on the basis of –and for the sake 
of– the action itself and what it means for the subject. Whereas in expectation every 
action is subordinated to a higher and final goal, in anticipation any result of the 
intended action is accepted as “the price” that one must –and is willing to– pay for 
it.  
And, just like expectation could be related to a messianic interpretation of “The 
Man Comes Around” and the case of Ángeles Pedraza, this account of anticipation 
can also be connected to the second reading of this song and –to a certain extent– 
to the case of Irene Villa. Translating Heidegger’s lexicon into the terms used in 
this research project, disclosing oneself to oneself with regard to one’s most 
extreme and ownmost possibility entails, in the end, becoming aware of one’s most 
radical particularity. Anticipation allows the subject to become aware of the 
particularity that escapes the grip of the law and makes him that subject and not just 
any other subject. It appears as the mode of temporality of justice in which the 
subject comes to perceive himself as a particular subject and not just as “another 
citizen:” as subject of the enunciation and as subject of the enunciated; as the subject 
who demands justice, and not just as the citizen that appears in the demand for 
justice.  
As explained in previous chapters, the law cannot account for this kind of 
particularity since the justice-seeking subject only becomes legally relevant in his 
role as citizen. In this case, anticipation appears as the realisation of such 
impossibility: as the momentary realisation of the limited capacity of the law to 
articulate the particularity of the subject in a meaningful manner. A limitation that, 
once made fully visible, may lead the subject to take responsibility for himself as 
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well as for any possible outcome derived from his actions, allowing him to realise 
that the law cannot understand –and hence, cannot confer meaning to– what one is 
going through because it cannot experience what one experiences. On the one hand, 
the realisation of this incapacity plays down the importance of the possibility of 
attaining final and ultimate justice from it. But, on the other, the realisation that the 
subject demanding justice and only the subject demanding justice can truly 
understand the full complexity of what he is experiencing also turns the very act of 
demanding justice into a certain form of justice. It transforms the act of demanding 
full and universal recognition for one’s most radical particularity into a partial act 
of full recognition in and by itself. “Partial” insofar as it cannot deliver ultimate 
recognition since the subject –along with perception that he may come to have of 
himself– is necessarily transformed by the act of distancing and de-distancing 
himself from his role as citizen; and “full” insofar as only the subject himself can 
fully comprehend the full extent of his own particularity. In other words, 
anticipation as mode of temporality does not transform our experience of justice 
into the necessary consequence of a legal judgement, nor into something that we 
must await indefinitely, but into something that we do and, in turn, transforms us 
into who we are. 
Conclusion 
Considering the differences between the temporalities of law and justice, this 
chapter defended the claim that while in the case of law time is experienced as pure 
sequentiality –as a succession of empty and homogeneous moments in which every 
present appears as the future of a past and as the actualisation of a near future– in 
the case of justice our experience of time presents the character of Kairos instead 
of Chronos –it appears as a space of timelessness and timefulness in which 
everything happens at the same time and an opportunity may be seized. The 
temporality of justice requires the case of the subject to be recognised here and now 
as his own, not as “another case.” 
Nevertheless, this chapter also argued that the experience of this form of 
temporality changes from subject to subject and may affect the way in which the 
latter comes to understand the concept of justice. Mirroring the oppositions already 
presented in Chapters Three and Chapter Four, the last part of this chapter argued 
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that the way in which a subject may perceive and live the temporality of justice also 
oscillates between two poles: expectation and anticipation. The first of these 
extremes was identified with the case of Ángeles Pedraza and involved an 
understanding of justice in which the latter appears as an event taking place in a 
distant future, where the law will provide the subject with ultimate and everlasting 
recognition for his particularity of experience and his righteousness. In the second 
one –illustrated, in turn, with the case of Irene Villa– justice does not appear as an 
event whose befalling is dependent on the law, but as the very will of the subject to 
demand it: not as the outcome of his demand, but as the struggle conducted towards 
its achievement.  
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INTERLUDE 
Three Ecstases and One Spectrum of Justice 
 
 
 
Having posited expectation and anticipation as opposite ways of understanding 
the temporality of justice –and also having compared the latter with the temporality 
of the law– it seems only necessary to clarify, at last, the way in which the three 
dimensions of analysis studied throughout this theoretical block relate to one 
another, and how the two extremes considered in each of them cut across all three 
–establishing a spectrum between them in which intermediate understandings of 
justice could be located. That is to say that the purpose of this section is, in the end, 
to argue that even if contingency, desire, and temporality have appeared so far as 
separate and distinct dimensions in the formation of subjective understandings of 
justice, they are but three facets of the same phenomenon: three perspectives from 
which we can study the development of subjective understandings of justice as a 
result of our interactions and missed encounters with the law. 
With that purpose in mind, and before moving on to the conclusions, I will try 
to elucidate the connection between the extremes considered in the analysis of each 
of the abovementioned dimensions. And, highlighting the similarities between fate, 
desire, and expectation on the one hand, and character, jouissance and anticipation 
on the other, over the next few pages I will try to depict two extreme and opposite 
ways of understanding justice along with some of the intermediate positions that 
could be located in the spectrum that flows between them. 
Fate, Desire, Expectation 
If we are to approach this first triad and comprehend the connection between its 
constituting elements, the best course of action is arguably to synthesise, as briefly 
as possible, the kind of understanding of justice resulting from (1) the attempt to 
articulate contingency in a narrative of fate, (2) its appearance in such a narrative 
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as an object of desire, and (3) how it seems to induce a future-oriented experience 
of time in which the attainment of such an object of desire is eternally postponed. 
Justice as fate 
“The foal meant to go to war, is not eaten by the wolf nor miscarried by the 
mare.” In the sphere of fate there is no room for contingency as such: if a foal is 
meant to go to war, it will not suffer an untimely death before it reaches the field of 
battle; and if it does, it will be because it was never meant to go to war to begin 
with. In this sphere, causality supersedes possibility and coincidence, and every 
contingency appears but as a necessary stepping stone in the unfolding of a larger 
history. In the sphere of fate there is always an ultimate and hidden reason behind 
everything that happens. And, similarly, in a narrative of justice marked by fate the 
former appears as the future event with the power to overrule all contingencies and 
confer ultimate meaning to all the suffering and hardships undergone by the subject. 
Hardships that appear, in this kind of narrative, in the guise of a sacrifice: as a 
meaningful loss, as something given for the sake of a higher purpose that will make 
it worthwhile. As something given for the sake of a higher cause that, nevertheless, 
eventually subdues the particularity of the subject to the unfolding of its own 
history: to the future achievement of that cause. And, for as long as that cause 
remains to be achieved, it also remains as the cause and reason for all the 
experiences that led the subject to seek meaning and to form that narrative in the 
first place. Hence, if that kind of fateful and quasi-messianic justice were ever to be 
achieved by the subject, the latter would be left with but two options: either refusing 
to acknowledge that justice as the justice he hoped for or having to find a new way 
of conferring meaning to his life insofar as the element sustaining his narrative 
would fall apart through its very achievement. 
Justice as desire 
This tendency to postpone or even deny the recognition of a form of justice as 
the justice that the subject had hoped to receive, along with the way in which such 
postponement seems to prolong the duration of the meaning given to the life of the 
subject by a narrative of fate, is what allows us to establish a connection between 
this and the second element of this triad: desire. In this kind of narrative we are 
presented with justice as an imaginary object of desire: as the object capable of 
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making the subject “whole” again108 if it were ever achieved, and as the object that 
allows the subject to weather almost any adversity in pursuit of the promise of 
recognition and even redemption that justice –as an object of desire– carries within 
itself. Given the particularities of the law as Other –described in Chapter Four– the 
subject who comes to envision justice in such a way may also oscillate between 
fantasies of omnipotence and persecutory delusions depending on whether the law 
seems to be heeding his demands or not. And yet, the attainment of this kind of 
justice exceeds and escapes the realm of law insofar as, even when the latter seems 
to be taking into consideration the demands of the subject, the satisfaction that it 
can provide is never sufficient –and ultimately limited to the sheer enforcement of 
legal norms. Hence whether such demands are heeded or rejected, the desire 
underpinning the subject’s narrative remains structurally unfulfilled and reinforced 
in its unfulfillment: the attainment of its object eternally postponed onto the future, 
never to be experienced as such. 
Justice as expectation 
The quest for this missing object of desire allows the subject to become 
identified with its very absence, which only strengthens and reproduces such 
identification. It provides him with a renewed sense of purpose in life: attaining 
justice. Nevertheless, in this meaning-making process, the coming of the event that 
could make meaningful all the suffering and hardships undergone by the subject is 
handed over to an Other: law. An Other that, on the one hand, lacks the capacity or 
willingness to deliver it. But on the other, and even if the law could provide some 
form of justice, the subject may not recognise it as such insofar as the content and 
nature of such an event would have been previously surrendered to the Other in 
charge of delivering it. Hence the event that could finally fulfil the destiny of the 
subject and quench his desire for justice appears, in the end, as something that 
escapes his reach and can never be experienced: only awaited. 
Considering the brief summaries above it should be possible for us, at this point, 
to highlight a series of common elements in this triad: elements that point to the 
                                                          
108 According to Lacanian theory, however, this “wholeness” that the subject hopes to regain is 
but an illusion. Quite the contrary, the subject is not constituted by this wholeness but by the 
lack of it.  
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connection between contingency, desire, and temporality in this particular way of 
envisioning justice. Among them it is necessary to emphasise the appearance of 
justice itself as an absolute event or object capable of subduing and reducing to an 
accessory role all other objects due to its necessary character. Moreover, in this 
particular and rather messianic understanding of justice, the latter always appears 
located in the future while being required by the past and, at the same time, largely 
dependent on the law to deliver it. The importance of absolute character of justice 
in the life of the subject who envisions it in such a way cannot be easily dismissed; 
however, if there is something that could be considered to be even more important 
to the subject that would be the very absence of this form of “absolute” justice. 
Insofar as justice remains as something to await or as a goal to achieve, it also 
retains the power to hold together the narrative of the subject and confer meaning 
to his life –playing, in this manner, a role arguably similar to that of the big Other. 
Taking into account these two aspects –the absolute and overwhelming character 
of justice, on the one hand, the apparent structural impossibility of attaining it, on 
the other– one could arguably say that the understanding of justice emerging from 
this triad appears as a form of “unfulfilled Messianism”: carrying within itself the 
promise of ultimate recognition and satisfaction, but having to remain always-yet-
to-arrive in order to preserve its meaning-making function.  
In the first place, and at the level of contingency, this transcendental and 
unfulfilled Messianism manifests itself in the fact that the fulfilment of the fate 
underpinning the subject’s narrative also brings an end to the unfolding of the 
history in which the latter had inscribed the meaning of all the contingencies leading 
up to the production of such a narrative. In other words, it would render them 
meaningless once again. Secondly, and without going into any further details in this 
respect, desire can never be fully satisfied. Insofar as justice is considered as the 
object that could bring everlasting satisfaction to the subject, no measure of justice 
that the law could provide would ever be sufficient: no justice can ever be the justice 
that the subject hopes for. Finally, in terms of temporality, the structural 
unfulfillment of this messianic understanding of justice stems from the fact that 
expectation refuses actualisation: the justice awaited by the subject can never be 
recognised as such insofar as its true content and meaning were handed over to the 
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law, hence whatever form of justice the latter could deliver will always appear as a 
distorted –if not outright corrupted– form of justice to the subject. 
Ultimately, this messianic understanding of justice gives lasting purpose to the 
life of the subject in exchange for the structural unfulfillment of its goal and a higher 
level of dependency on the law qua agent –purportedly– capable of delivering that 
goal. And, continuing with the religious metaphor, one could arguably say as well 
that in this form of envisioning justice the latter appears, in the end, as the 
cornerstone of a cathedral: it holds everything together, but if you take it everything 
falls apart –either the cathedral or your belief that that was the cornerstone. 
Character, Jouissance, Anticipation 
As in the previous case, in order to understand the relation among the three 
elements of this second triad we must consider the type of understandings of justice 
arising from (1) a narrative in which contingency is articulated as an excuse for the 
unfolding of the character and particularity of the subject, (2) the enjoyment found 
in the very act of demanding justice and making visible the limits of the law, and 
(3) the way in which such enjoyment seems to appear through the briefest 
realisation that the kind of recognition sought by the subject cannot be found in the 
law.  
Justice as character 
In contrast with the teleological articulation of contingency that marked the 
narratives of fate seen in the previous triad, the sphere of character tends to impose 
repetition and circularity of experience over causality and history. In a narrative of 
justice inscribed in the sphere of character, the unfolding of history no longer 
appears as a higher cause capable of subduing and overwriting contingency, nor 
does it reduce the subject to an accessory role in the achievement of a final goal. 
Quite the contrary, in this kind of narrative it is not possible to talk about history 
but about story: a story in which every contingency and every instance appears but 
as a sheer excuse for the persona developed by the subject to display its unique 
traits. In this kind of narrative it is not the achievement of a final and ultimate justice 
that matters, but the very struggle of the subject towards it: a struggle in which 
every contingency presents itself as a chance for a form of partial self-recognition 
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in which the subject invests himself. One could even say that for a subject who 
produces a narrative such as this there is nothing to set right, but a point to make: 
something to reaffirm, even if it can never be fully affirmed. Hence the persisting 
need for repetition in this particular type of narrative. 
Justice as jouissance 
It is precisely this form of repetition that permits us, in the end, to establish a 
link between character and jouissance. In a narrative such as the ones summarised 
above it is not so much the satisfaction found in the attainment of a final and fateful 
goal that moves the subject, but the enjoyment that the latter derives from the very 
striving towards it. While perceiving that goal –that “Justice” with a capital J– as 
an object as desirable as unattainable, the subject also recognises the limited 
character of each small “victory” that could be obtained in the pursuit of such a 
goal. Nevertheless, and far from dissuading the subject from even attempting to find 
justice, the realisation of his limited chances of finding it in the law act as an 
incentive for the subject to find a certain degree of enjoyment –as small as it may 
be– in the very act of demanding it and pointing out the shortcomings of the 
institutions which promised to deliver something out of their reach. Driven by 
jouissance, the subject is not as concerned with the final outcome of his struggle for 
justice as with the enjoyment found in the struggle itself. And yet, insofar as each 
and every little measure of justice achieved by the subject takes the character of a 
partial object towards a goal already assumed as unattainable, no degree of justice 
is ever sufficient for the subject demanding it. Not because that is not the justice 
that the subject hoped for –this subject hopes and expects nothing from the law– 
but because the struggling and even hoping for justice appear as a form of justice 
in and by themselves.  
Justice as anticipation 
The fact that the subject does not seek to find everlasting satisfaction in the 
future achievement of an absolute object but rather derives enjoyment from the very 
struggle towards that future goal already hints at a significant difference in terms of 
temporality with regards to our previous triad. Expecting and anticipating justice 
are not the same. The former entails, as explained above, that the subject must await 
–law willing– the coming of a future and final justice to befall him; in the case of 
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the anticipation, on the other hand, the subject becomes aware –even if only for an 
augenblick, for the briefest of moments– that the actual functioning of the law is 
but a pale shadow of its ideological façade, and that, in consequence, such justice 
is most likely never to befall him. This realisation throws all three ecstases of time 
–past, present, and future– into perspective and allows the subject to take 
responsibility for his actions –regardless of their ultimate consequences, 
commencing with the very act of demanding justice– hence reducing his degree of 
dependency on the law and the institutions that would otherwise be expected to 
provide him with justice. The anticipation of justice does not consist in waiting for 
the law to provide it, but in understanding that the law can only do so much in this 
regard. It consists, in other words, in understanding that the subject himself is far 
more likely to find a certain degree of recognition of his particularity in the very act 
of defending it before the law it than in whatever results the latter could arguably 
provide.  
As in the case of our previous triad, it should also be possible for us to point out 
a series of similarities between the three elements summarised above at this point. 
And yet, in contrast with the previous section, it should also be said that the 
interaction between character, jouissance, and anticipation does not result in a 
transcendental understanding of justice in which the latter appears as a final and 
ultimate object with the power to set things right and bring everlasting satisfaction 
to the subject. Quite the contrary, justice does not appear on this side of the 
spectrum as much as a goal to be achieved as it appears as something to be done: 
not as an outcome, but as an action worth the effort put into it in and by its own 
right. In other words, and in opposition to the pole of the spectrum described above, 
the understanding of justice that we find here is not transcendental nor messianic, 
but deeply marked by immanence. Nonetheless, this form of envisioning justice 
also entails a whole series of effects of its own: and first and foremost amongst them 
that no recognition and no justice obtained from the law will ever be sufficient for 
the subject demanding it. Not because no-thing is the thing that the subject hoped 
for, but because the subject can only find a certain recognition of his particularity 
in the very act of demanding it and hence no recognition obtained as a result can 
ever be enough for him. 
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At the level of contingency this entails that the purported actualisation of an 
appointed fate is overshadowed, when not outright superseded, by the role of the 
subject in the striving towards it. The struggle of the subject –when not the subject 
of the struggle himself– takes a protagonist role, relegating history, argument, and 
causality to a secondary function if not to a sheer excuse for the display of the 
characteristics of the subject. Similarly, at the level of jouissance this entails that 
no enactment of such unique traits can ever bring into existence the character of the 
subject to its full extent. Instead of denying any satisfaction for the sake of an 
ultimate and everlasting satisfaction, the subject comes to find a certain degree of 
fulfilment in each conflict, but its limited character stirs the need for further 
conflicts and objects with which to satiate that need for recognition of his 
particularity. Hence in this paradigm the law as Other ceases to appear as the agent 
that can provide the subject with what he sought to achieve in the first place, and 
manifests itself as a castrated but necessary Other with whom to quarrel for that 
purpose over every object and contingency. Not as a saviour or as an enemy, but as 
an adversary. And finally, in terms of temporality one could arguably also say that 
this change in the subject’s perception of the law, seeing it in a necessary yet limited 
role, allows him to consider himself not as an accessory or complement to the 
function of the latter but as the protagonist of his own struggle for justice: 
becoming, through this realisation, responsible for his actions regardless of their 
final outcome. 
In the end, through this immanent understanding of justice the subject comes to 
achieve a strong driving force in his life in exchange for an unquenchable thirst for 
new circumstances in which to reaffirm and re-enact his quest for justice. 
Typology 
Having characterised the two three-dimensional extremes of the spectrum 
within which it becomes possible to locate intermediate understandings of justice, 
it is time, at last, to attempt a typology of the latter. For that purpose, nevertheless, 
I would like to make a series of disclaimers before presenting it. First and foremost, 
I would like to clarify this typology has an ideal character. This means that, as in 
the case of the two extremes described above, none of the intermediate positions in 
the spectrum presented here fully represent all the characteristics of a given 
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understanding of justice. There are as many of the latter as there are, have been, and 
will be, subjects who demand it. Quite the contrary, this typology seeks to present 
a series of clear and easily identifiable intermediate positions that could add clarity 
and an illustrative value to the study of the formation of particular understandings 
of justice. And, in this regard, I would like to add that without a minimum 
understanding of the specificities of the investigation developed throughout this 
research project the use of such a typology could be misleading. 
Secondly, it is also necessary to highlight that this typology has a preliminary 
character. The first two chapters of this project sought to clear the ground for the 
construction of a new theoretical apparatus in the study of the formation of 
subjective understandings of justice, and the three following ones have aimed to 
analyse in depth what I have considered to be the most basic and indispensable 
dimensions in the study of this phenomenon along with their origins and 
implications. This does not mean, however, that these are the only three dimensions 
to be considered: only the most basic ones. Hopefully this study will open the gate 
for future projects seeking to investigate justice not as a moral principle or as an 
ideal that the judiciary should pursue, but as a deeply complex political and 
psychosocial phenomenon with several layers in its process of formation. 
And last but not least, regarding the typology itself I would like to say that given 
the deep interconnection between the dimensions of contingency, desire, and 
temporality considered here it would seem unlikely to find or think of intermediate 
understandings of justice presenting significant divergences between them in one 
or another direction. Hence the types presented hereafter present a minimum degree 
of synchronicity between these dimensions. 
The Hermit 
In the wake of a life-disrupting contingency, this subject finds himself so 
devastated and driven by loss that even the possibility of contesting that things 
could be otherwise seems too otherworldly. There is no mundane justice that could 
repair the wreckage left behind by the suffering endured by the subject; in 
consequence, the latter virtually retires from such a life, leaving all hope of 
recognition and justice to a power even higher and beyond the reach of law. The 
subject knows that the power of the latter is limited, but that does not prevent him 
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from hoping final and everlasting satisfaction from a different and more elevated 
power that could bear witness to the value of his particularity, even if only beyond 
this vale of tears. Therefore justice remains as something which the subject may 
hope to befall him in a distant –and otherworldly– future, just as in the case of the 
abovementioned unfulfilled Messianism. 
The Ascetic Job 
Not to be interpreted as “the work of the ascetic” but as a form of envisioning 
justice that combines elements from both the biblical figure of Job and Ascetism, 
this intermediate position also appears, in principle, significantly closer to a form 
of unfulfilled Messianism than to an immanent understanding of justice. It presents 
some differences with respect to the Hermit, though. In the first place, it is worth 
noticing that the sphere of fate plays a major role in the form of articulating 
contingency in both cases. Nevertheless, and instead of commending himself to an 
otherworldly justice lying above and beyond the reach of law with the potential to 
set things right at last, the Ascetic Job comes to envision justice in an equally quasi-
religious and non-negotiable way which requires him to weather all sorts of 
setbacks and hardships while remaining faithful, not to the possibility of attaining 
justice, but to the possibility –of the existence– of justice itself. No measure of 
suffering or disappointment endured by the subject could make him even question 
justice: it is non-negotiable and above him and the law, both. For the Ascetic Job 
justice appears as an unfathomable fate that can be wished but not properly 
expected; and yet, it also appears closer to jouissance than to desire itself. All 
difficulties and troubles are experienced as a test in which the subject must prove 
himself worthy of a justice that, nevertheless, he may never attain: as a series of 
tests in which the subject becomes capable of reasserting his worthiness even if he 
may never receive full confirmation of it. 
The Avenger 
Among all the positions considered here, the Avenger stands out as the most 
peculiar one. The main reason for this is that this subject does not take part in a 
direct interaction or confrontation with the law that could give rise to the emergence 
of a new understanding of justice. Thus this position cannot really be found within 
the spectrum demarcated in these pages but apart from it. The Avenger, the subject 
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who openly, secretly, and wholeheartedly seeks revenge without even daring to hide 
it behind the mantle of justice knows and accepts that the law cannot provide him 
with that which he wishes for. Hence there is no real need for him to enter into a 
dialogue or conflict with the latter. The reason behind this, as open to debate as it 
may be, was hinted at already in Chapter Four. Successful communication and 
understanding is based on the existence of shared experiences (Wittgenstein [1953] 
1967) and this subject is in need of recognition and understanding, just as any other. 
For him, however, this recognition cannot come from the law or any other third 
party, but only from the person or institution who took part in the occurrence of the 
contingency that shattered his life into pieces. And, for this avenger, the only way 
to make them understand is to inflict upon them the same suffering at the level of 
the Real. For him, once that has become part of the basis upon which they have 
built their world, they will be able to understand, at last, all the pain that he had to 
endure because of them. A pain that, nonetheless and insofar as it is experienced at 
the level of the Real, is unmeasurable and thus may also lead to the infliction of 
disproportionate suffering in the hope of being understood.  
The Crusader 
In the already-classical Lacanian reversal of Dostoevsky’s “If God doesn’t 
exist, then everything is permitted,” it is said that “If God doesn’t exist, then nothing 
is permitted.” Its complement, as one may imagine, is that “If God exists, then 
everything is permitted…and anything is possible” Our Crusader lives by this rule: 
if such a thing as justice does exist, then any action of the subject carries within 
itself the potential to and the possibility of bringing about justice. Just like 
Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, our Crusader anticipates the possibility of justice even 
if he knows that it is something that he cannot expect from the instances from which 
he demands it. He is ready to do what he feels is right even if he knows that the law 
may not set things right in the end. And yet, even if he is ready for the worst, he 
hopes for the best. This entails that for this subject justice does not appear as an 
inescapable fate but as a possibility, as something that may or may not befall him. 
In spite of the odds, he is willing to fight the good fight for its sake, because not 
doing so would mean renouncing the very possibility of justice. It may or may not 
be attained, our Crusader is not completely sure of this because he is aware of the 
less-than-perfect character of the law, but insofar as he wants to believe that 
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something such as justice may exist it may yet not be “all for nothing” for him.  For 
this subject demanding justice and pointing out the flaws of the law is not only 
another stepping stone or obstacle to be overcome in his quest to display the unique 
traits of his character, but also an act of faith insofar as taking such a leap in the 
dark also implies a leap of faith: he wants to believe in justice even if everything he 
has ever seen goes against this belief. For the Crusader justice is not his fate but 
part of his character; not something that he can expect but only anticipate; and also, 
in the end, something that he expects to receive and simultaneously enjoys doing.  
The Zealot 
In this position the subject appears uncompromising: absolutely determined to 
bring about justice. It is the reversal of the Crusader. For the Zealot, justice is a fate 
that cannot be escaped, and also an event to be expected that can set things right, at 
last. In this, the way in which the Zealot envisions justice does not differ much from 
the form of unfulfilled Messianism that constitutes one of the extremes of this 
spectrum. And yet, there is a significant difference between them. In the latter the 
subject postpones, when not directly denying, the possibility of acknowledging as 
justice whatever resolution the law may see fit to bring forth in response to his 
demands. Our Zealot does the exact same thing, and not only because no justice is 
the justice that he hoped for, but also because he finds a certain degree of enjoyment 
in making visible the lack of justness of the law and any Other who may think of 
questioning his uncompromising views on justice. 
The Mystic 
If a mystic approach to religion entails becoming one with the God or the 
absolute, this position reflects a bipolar approach to justice in which the subject 
perceives himself not only as a demander and potential recipient of justice but also 
as its agent. On the one hand, and as a justice-demanding subject, the Mystic accepts 
the difficulty of obtaining the justice he seeks while also making clear that the less-
than-omnipotent character of the law is not an excuse for the latter not to attempt to 
provide it. On the other, and as an agent or justice-providing subject, the Mystic 
acknowledges that even if it may be out of his reach to provide others with the 
degree of recognition that they hope from him, it is still his duty to do his best to 
meet such expectations. 
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The Agnostic 
This subject, as its very name suggests, is someone who does not affirm or deny 
the possibility of justice. For the Agnostic it is not an inescapable fate nor something 
that is constitutive of his own character, but something that he may obtain to a 
certain degree if he but dares to ask for it when required. For him it is something 
desirable, but not necessarily something that he desires. And, in the same manner, 
justice does not appear to the Agnostic as something that he should expect or as 
something that he can truly anticipate, but as something that may or may not exist 
and, even if it does, may only befall him to a certain extent. 
The Apostate 
The Apostate is a subject who has taken a transcendental –and unfulfilled 
messianic– understanding of justice to its ultimate consequences, and when denied 
the kind of recognition he strives for prefers to deny, outright, the possibility of 
justice in toto rather than to accept that his faith in the law may have been 
misplaced, or that his struggle lacked enough basis for the claims it presented before 
it. 
The Atheist? 
In all honesty, and given the religious metaphors used to illustrate all other 
intermediate ways of envisioning justice, it seemed necessary to consider the 
possibility of a subject who denied justice altogether. A subject who did such a 
thing would be someone who would not see the reason for exacting revenge nor 
demanding justice in the wake of a life-shattering contingency. A subject for whom 
things would simply occur as they occur, with no need of even discussing the 
possibility that everything may have happened otherwise. A subject for whom, in 
the end, the most mundane need for meaning and recognition would be uncalled 
for. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Justice Just Is 
 
 
Having its origin in the sense of perplexity arising from the demands for justice 
articulated by a series of victims of terrorist attacks and the apparent inability of 
legal and judicial institutions to fully satisfy them, this research sought to study the 
formation of subjective understandings of justice as a result of our encounters and 
missed-encounters with the law. That is to say, the way in which a subject may 
come to use and understand this term as a result of his interactions with the legal 
and judicial institutions from which he hopes to attain recognition for a particularity 
of experience born from arguably life-destabilising circumstances. 
The preliminary study of the body of literature produced by liberal theorists of 
justice and four different schools of legal thought transformed the first questions to 
appear as a result of the perplexity that followed the events described earlier on in 
this thesis: the protests associated to the approval –and later repeal– of the Parot 
Doctrine in 2006, and the permanent ceasefire declared by ETA in 2011. The 
discovery that the abovementioned disciplines had respectively focused on justice 
as a given balance between freedom and equality, or on its relation with and the 
figures of the law-maker and the judge revealed a lacuna that this project aimed to 
fill: they had paid little to no attention at all to the role of the particular subject who 
goes before the law in the hope of attaining justice. The questions driving this 
research at first –e.g. Is the enduring character of certain demands for justice a 
symptom of an unsatisfied desire for vengeance?– necessarily evolved into more 
basic but pressing ones: When do we start talking about justice? What 
circumstances have the potential to move us to do so? What meaning-making 
processes and unconscious mechanisms may lead to the production of a new 
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subjective understanding of justice? What do we need in order to feel that justice 
has been served? How does it affect our relationship with the law? 
In consequence, the answers that this research has sought to offer in response to 
such questions do not respond to an attempt to provide a substantive definition of 
justice, nor suggest ways to improve the functioning of our political and legal 
system. Quite the contrary, these answers enjoy an arguably genealogical character. 
Instead of trying to pinpoint an exact definition of justice above and beyond 
economic, social, political, and historical developments, this thesis has aimed to 
investigate the way in which our knowledge –our use and understanding– of justice 
as a concept can be affected by a milieu of power relations formalised and 
crystallised in the law through a metonymic operation. 
Following the Introduction and starting with the study of the role of justice and 
the particular subject in liberal theories of justice and four schools of legal theory –
Natural Law, Legal Positivism, Legal Realism, and Critical Legal Studies– the first 
chapter of this dissertation determined that while justice had either been considered 
as an ideal equilibrium between freedom and equality that changed from author to 
author, or as an ideal which our political, legal, and judicial institutions should 
aspire to and in the name of which they should be transformed, the possibility that 
a particular subject may have an understanding of justice significantly different 
from the sheer enforcement of “legal justice” or those expressed by the authors 
working in both fields had been largely overlooked.  
With the goal of filling this lacuna, the relation between the particular subject 
and the law was taken, in Chapter Two, as the foundation for the construction of a 
theoretical apparatus aimed at studying of the production of subjective 
understandings of justice. This involved, in the first place, considering two basic 
characteristics of the law in its relation with the abovementioned subject: generality 
and normativity. The study of generality revealed that while the law necessarily 
produces subjectivities, such subjectivities are considerably contingent and change 
from case to case, leading to a virtually endless variety of particularities that entails 
the necessary exclusion of the particularity of experience of the subject from the 
domain of the law. The analysis of normativity, on the other hand, showed that 
while the eventual breach and subsequent enforcement of legal norms is required 
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by the law in order for it to continue to exist and remain in force, its application can 
never be directly conducted towards the resolution and recognition of the 
particularity of the case it is to be applied to: it is based on previous experiences 
and has the potential to set a precedent for future cases and norms, but the possibility 
of passing a legal norm solely for the resolution of a specific case and the 
recognition of its particularity is absolutely excluded. Secondly, the study of these 
two characteristics and the power relations that they generate between the law and 
subject revealed what appeared to be three constituent limits of the law: 
contingency, reflecting the structural incapability of the law to recognise the 
particularity of experience of the case presented by the subject; subjectivity, 
appearing as the clash between the general character of the law and the subject’s 
wish to see his particularity universally recognised by it; and justice, the point de 
capiton that holds both unbridgeable gaps together and underpins the will of the 
subject to find recognition in spite of the shortcomings of the law. 
The importance of these limits in the conflictive relation between the subject 
and the law called, in turn, for the consideration of three basic and matching 
dimensions of analysis in the formation of subjective understandings of justice: 
contingency, desire, and temporality. These three dimensions were investigated in 
the second half of this thesis, where the cases of Ángeles Pedraza and Irene Villa 
were introduced with an illustrative purpose, devoting one chapter to the study of 
each of these dimensions –along with a final Interlude meant, on the one hand, to 
clarify the relation between them, and, on the other, to propose an ideal typology of 
subjective understandings of justice on the basis of their study. 
Chapter Three sought to investigate the circumstances under which a subject 
may start talking about justice. With that purpose in mind, it revolved around the 
role of contingency in the functioning of the law as well as on its destabilising 
potential in the life of the subject. On the one hand, contingency appeared as a basic 
requirement of the law insofar as without it there would be no room for law-
enforcement; and hence, without contingency, the continued existence of law itself 
would be in jeopardy. On the other, the occurrence of unexpected and potentially 
life-disturbing events in the life of the subject may not only shatter to pieces the 
symbolic universe holding it together, but also carries within itself the promise that 
other equally unexpected and dangerous events may follow. In the wake of such 
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uncertainty, the subject may seek stability and normality once again in the norms 
that so far had regulated his life. Norms that the subject hopes will be able to put 
together the pieces of his symbolic universe and meaningfully articulate the 
contingency that destroyed it in the first place. Nevertheless, the articulation of 
contingency that the law may provide in this regard is far from meaningful in the 
eyes of the subject: every case and every contingency moving a subject to go before 
the law is treated as any other, and thus the particularity of experience and the 
suffering undergone by the subject are left largely unrecognised. Following the 
encounter with this shortcoming of the law, the subject may end up producing a 
new narrative capable of articulating contingency and restoring meaning to his life. 
A narrative that not only seeks to overcome the destabilising effects of contingency 
but also an unavoidable sense of disappointment with the law. A narrative that, as 
was exemplified through the study of the similarities and radical divergences 
between the cases of Pedraza and Villa, may oscillate between two extremes 
respectively identified with the Benjaminian concepts of fate and character: 
between a teleological when not ostensibly messianic understanding of justice, and 
a self-referential and subject-oriented rather than law-oriented one. 
Chapter Four centred its attention on the unconscious mechanisms driving the 
production of such narratives. Making use of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, this 
chapter studied the emergence of subjective understandings of justice through the 
analysis of the triad need-demand-desire in relation to justice and the way in which 
the particularities of law qua Other may affect the appearance of desires for justice. 
In this regard, law presented a series of characteristics, analogous to those of the 
Phallic Mother, which led to the formation of the Hypothesis of the Phallus –“there 
must be something that makes the law pay attention to your demands and give you 
the kind of justice you seek”– but not the paternal metaphor or Name-of-the-Father 
–“there is no clear reason for the law’s ostensibly whimsical behaviour, no clearly 
identifiable ‘something’ that could grant its attentions”– since, in order to preserve 
its ideological function, it cannot admit the existence of an authority above and 
beyond itself. Following this line of reasoning, and continuing with the structure 
used throughout the analysis of all three dimensions of analysis, the unconscious 
mechanisms driving the production of a narrative of justice were found to oscillate 
between desire –justice as an imaginary object of desire whose attainment would 
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offer full recognition of the particularity of the subject but is also eternally 
postponed onto the future– and jouissance –the subject admits that such a thing as 
an ultimate or absolute justice may not exist and thus does not seek to obtain it. 
Justice does not appear as the potential outcome of a struggle towards it but as the 
struggle itself, and hence the subject finds recognition not in the attainment of 
justice as an imaginary object of desire but in the very act of demanding it while 
pointing out the castratedness of the law in this regard. Desire and jouissance: two 
extremes that were respectively identified with the cases of Ángeles Pedraza and 
Irene Villa once again. 
Finally, Chapter Five, addressed the differences between the temporalities of 
law and justice. It argued that while the temporality of the former presents a 
chronological character in which every case and every present appears as the missed 
encounter between a “not yet” and a “too late,” the temporality of justice requires 
of immediacy and hence adopts that of Kairos: an space of timelessness and 
timefulness in which everything happens at the same time and an opportunity may 
be seized. A space in which justice demands my case to be recognised as mine here 
and now. Nevertheless, it was also stated in this chapter that the way in which a 
subject may come to perceive and live the temporality of justice changes from case 
to case and affects the form in which this subject may come to use and understand 
this concept. An understanding of justice that, once again, oscillates between two 
opposing poles: expectation and anticipation. The former, exemplified in the case 
of Ángeles Pedraza, entails that the subject sees justice as an event actually taking 
place in a distant future –having made significant sacrifices for its attainment– 
where the wicked will be punished and the just will receive everlasting recognition 
of their righteousness. An event whose occurrence is, nonetheless, handed over to 
the law –which comes to occupy a position analogous to that of God in a messianic 
narrative of justice. Anticipation, on the other hand, presented us with a very 
different form of conceiving the temporality of justice. For the subject, identified 
here with the case of Irene Villa, the possibility of attaining justice is not dependent 
on the capability or will of the law to deliver it, but on the very will of the subject 
to demand it: it does not appear as a final outcome whose befalling the subject must 
await, but as the very action conducted towards the achievement of that outcome. 
That is to say that, in anticipation, instead of hoping for the law to offer final and 
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everlasting recognition of the particularity of the subject, the latter finds partial yet 
full recognition for it in the very act of demanding justice: “partial” insofar as it 
does not provide any form of ultimate recognition, but also “full” insofar as only 
the justice-demanding subject can fully comprehend the extent of his particularity 
of experience. 
The Interlude sought, on the other hand, to link the last three chapters of this 
dissertation together. It sought, in other words, to present them as three separate yet 
deeply intertwined aspects of the same phenomenon: the production of subjective 
understandings of justice in relation to law. With that purpose it posited a series of 
similarities between the extremes considered in all three dimensions. That is to say, 
the connection between fate, desire, and expectation, on the one hand; and the 
parallelisms between character, jouissance, and anticipation, on the other. At last, 
and having constituted the two three-dimensional poles of a spectrum of possible 
understandings of justice –which were previously illustrated with the cases of 
Ángeles Pedraza and Irene Villa– it aimed to propose an ideal typology of such 
understandings in which it became possible to identify, at least, nine intermediate 
positions: the Hermit, the Ascetic Job, the Avenger, the Crusader, the Zealot, the 
Mystic, the Agnostic, the Apostate, and the Atheist. Among them, it is perhaps the 
Avenger that is more deserving of a special mention insofar as, unlike the others, it 
cannot be directly inscribed into the spectrum considered here. Quite the contrary, 
and against the original presuppositions of this research, in which it was considered 
that the persistence of certain demands for justice may have their origin in a 
sublimated and unfulfilled wish for vengeance, it appears as a position alien to the 
discursive production of narrative understandings of justice since the interaction 
with the law originally propitiating their appearance never takes place. In this 
position, the subject seems to presume the inability of the law to provide him with 
that which he seeks, and thus avoids any unnecessary interactions with and potential 
interferences of the judicial system that may get in the way of his revenge: in the 
way of the goal of seeing his particularity of experience recognised by the 
perpetrator, the only other person who may have taken part in, and thus be able to 
comprehend, the contingency leading up to the overwhelming sense of 
meaninglessness that invades him. Something that takes place at the level of the 
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Real and may lead to the infliction of punishments escaping any measure of 
proportionality inasmuch as the Real is without fissure but also without measure. 
And yet, notwithstanding the relevance of this discovery, with the potential to 
turn inside out some of the questions and premises initially driving this research, 
the main findings of this project could be roughly summarised as follows: a new 
subjective understanding of justice arises as a result of and in response to the 
shortcomings of the law in the articulation of potentially life-disturbing 
contingencies; in the wake of such contingencies the subject may seek solace and 
help in the law, but the latter is structurally incapable of providing the subject with 
that which he seeks –the universal recognition of his particularity of experience– 
and, in consequence, the subject is moved to produce a narrative of justice capable 
of offering a complementary articulation to the abovementioned contingencies. The 
meaning-making processes and discursive interactions that take place between the 
subject and the law, and eventually lead to the production of a narrative of justice 
by the former, are driven by a series of unconscious mechanisms –oscillating 
between desire and jouissance– that are, in turn, generated by such interactions and 
marked by the similarities between the law and the Phallic Mother. Whatever 
understanding of justice the subject may have come to develop before the 
contingency triggering this kind of process is profoundly altered by the evolution 
of the latter, leading to experiences of time in relation to justice that may oscillate 
between the expectation of an ultimate justice with the potential to finally set things 
right, and a more immanent way of conceiving this concept in which justice arises 
from the very act of demanding it. 
This incursion on a subject traditionally reserved to political theory and liberal 
theories of justice entailed an attempt to bring the field of psychosocial studies 
closer to these two disciplines, while also trying to fill some of the gaps that they 
seem to present in the study of this topic. On the one hand, it aimed to go beyond 
the idea of “justice as fairness,” which tends to equate justice to a given balance 
between freedom and equality, by addressing the question of justice head on: 
looking at the way in which a particular subject may come to develop an 
understanding of this concept not only diverging from the current legal, economic, 
social, and political status quo, but also from the normative definition of justice 
provided by any of the scholars working in this field. On the other, it sought to 
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complement legal theory by addressing a series of questions preceding any potential 
suggestions of improvement for the current legal and judicial system: we may want 
to increase the level of satisfaction of the citizens of a given country with the current 
functioning of legal justice…but in order to do that we must first understand what 
it is that they mean by justice and how that may differ from the sheer enforcement 
of currently existing legal norms. In other words, this thesis has not aimed to 
invalidate the postulates made by authors working in either of these fields, but to 
propose what one may understand as a meta-theory of justice in which any 
normative definition –when not outright application– of the latter should be 
preceded by a deeper degree of comprehension of the way in which a justice-
seeking subject may understand this concept. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical apparatus presented here for the study of justice is 
not strictly restricted to the analysis of this concept. It has undoubtedly been tailored 
for this purpose, but it may also be adapted to the study of other emotionally-
charged and politically-relevant concepts such as democracy, corruption, freedom, 
equality, tolerance, etc. For instance, if we consider for a moment the relevance of 
the concept “democracy” in the protests following the Great Recession –especially 
from 2011 onwards– and appearing in response to the inability of national and 
global elites to tackle this problem, it seems clear that the idea of “democracy” more 
or less explicitly implied in these protests differed quite significantly from the sheer 
fulfilment of the rules regulating the voting system in each country: What did the 
Indignados mean by “Real Democracy”? How is it possible that the protests were 
followed by an astonishing victory of the conservative party in Spain? Where can 
we locate the origins of this moment in which the Spanish public sphere became 
significantly re-politicised? Has this wish for “Real Democracy” endured? And, if 
so, under which form? Does that form of understanding of democracy match the 
way in which thousands of Spaniards conceived it when they brought this demand 
for democracy to the streets and public squares of the country following the 15th of 
May of 2011? 
Notwithstanding the findings and potential implications of this thesis, it is worth 
noticing its limitations and the way in which they may be complemented by other 
fields, with which it hopes to start a dialogue. First and foremost among them is the 
inability of this inquiry to provide a clear substantive definition of justice. Other 
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disciplines have attempted to do so in the past but, as stated above, it was not the 
goal of this research project to offer another definition of justice but to complement 
such normative approaches with a deeper understanding of the ways in which a 
particular subject may come to conceive and use this concept. Secondly, this project 
only took into account three dimensions of analysis in the production of subjective 
understandings of justice –contingency, desire, and temporality. This does not mean 
that they are the only ones to be considered or that there could be no other 
dimensions to be investigated in this regard. In consequence, and insofar as the ideal 
typology of ways in which justice may be conceived by a particular subject may as 
well be altered by the introduction of new dimensions of analysis, such a typology 
is inherently limited. Moreover, it is also important to remember that the 
abovementioned typology had an ideal character –it sought to provide a series of 
clearly identifiable ways in which a subject may come to understand justice– 
something that entails queries of its own: there may be as many different 
understandings of justice as there have ever been subjects who have ever demanded 
it, but in the spectrum demarked by the abovementioned three basic dimensions 
these ideal types only appear as the most easily identifiable ones. Finally, it may be 
worth noticing, yet again, that while the question of justice may have been put in 
relation to spheres other than law (e.g. politics), the latter also enjoys a metonymic 
character in the study of the relation between justice and these other fields; and thus, 
the theoretical apparatus developed here would equally require to be tailored to the 
study of phenomena more clearly belonging to them. 
Going beyond the analysis of contingency, desire, and temporality as three basic 
aspects in the study of the formation of subjective understandings of justice, future 
research projects conducted along the lines of this thesis could investigate the role 
and potential implications of further dimensions of analysis in the study of this topic 
(e.g. Are there any other unconscious mechanisms, besides desire and jouissance, 
involved in the production of these understandings? Where do they stem from and 
how do they interact with these other dimensions?). Their inclusion would also 
entail a significant change in the ideal typology of subjective understandings of 
justice presented here, requiring a revision of the latter in order to accommodate 
any new findings. However, this does not mean that the current configuration of 
this typology could only be changed through the inclusion of new dimensions of 
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analysis. Quite the contrary, and insofar as the ideal types considered in this study 
are but arguably stereotypical and easily identifiable understandings of justice, it 
would also be possible to complement the two extremes and nine intermediate types 
presented in this thesis with further intermediate positions without having to 
consider any other dimensions of analysis. 
Following this line of thought, the theoretical apparatus built in this thesis may 
also offer a point of departure for more empirically-oriented studies with the goal 
to investigate in detail cases similar to those presented here or even others that may 
gain visibility due to new political scenarios, such as Colombia’s newly 
commenced peace process –which ostensibly appears as a mix between the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, the Nuremberg Trials, and the 
respective cases of ETA and the IRA in Spain and the UK. Moreover, and given 
that this research can arguably be considered as a meta-theory of justice, the 
combination of this theoretical apparatus with more archival and biographical 
studies could also make possible the study of normative theories of justice produced 
by relevant authors in the field as more elaborated and theoretically-oriented 
versions of the very narratives discussed here. 
Another possibility is deepening the clarifying potential of this study, in regard 
to the several layers of arguments that may appear mixed together in the attempt to 
build a normative theory of justice, through a more head-on analysis of its relation 
with political and legal theory –the very disciplines that it aimed to complement 
through a psychosocial approach. And last, but not least, the emancipatory potential 
of some of the findings of this thesis may also require further discussion. On the 
one hand, the ideological façade of justice presented by legal and judicial 
institutions seems to equally foster an image of omnipotence –meant to mask the 
structural impossibility of the law to provide justice beyond the mere application of 
legal norms– and the emergence of narratives of justice –closer to the spheres of 
fate, desire, and expectation– that, in spite of appearing in response to the 
shortcomings of the law, may reinforce that very false visage of omnipotence. The 
fourth chapter of this thesis related this issue to the discourses of the Master and the 
Hysteric, and the way in which the interactions between the law and the justice-
seeking subject seem to be marked by them: the law addresses the subject in his 
functional role as citizen and enjoys his production –the very recognition of the law 
233 
 
as a valid authority along with the growing dependency of the subject on it to attain 
that which he wants– and the subject seeks a master –the law– he can control 
through his very subjection to it. But…what would happen if the law publicly 
admitted its own castratedness? What would happen if legal and judicial institutions 
declared that all they have to offer is sheer enforcement of legal norms? And if they 
asked the justice-seeking subject “What do you want? Because this is all we can 
provide. Do you still want it?” In other words, what would happen if the law 
abandoned the Discourse of the Master and adopted one closer to the Discourse of 
the Analyst? 
The second aspect of the emancipatory potential of this thesis that could be 
studied in further depth in future research projects stems from the previous one. 
Concepts such as democracy, representation, equality or freedom appear as 
controversial, emotionally-charged, and politically relevant as justice. Hence an 
analysis of these concepts inspired by the theoretical apparatus developed 
throughout this thesis may lead, in turn, to the appearance of questions resembling 
those described in the previous paragraphs: What did the demonstrators in 
Syntagma Square, Zuccotti Park, or La Puerta del Sol mean when they said that 
they wanted “real democracy”? Would  it be possible to imagine a similar transition 
from the Discourse of the Master to the Discourse of the Analyst in politics? What 
would happen if our ruling institutions were to publicly admit that all they have to 
offer is the replacement of one political elite for another? What would happen if 
they were to admit, as in Lampedusa’s The Leopard, that everything needs to 
change so that everything can stay the same? What is, and what could be, the role 
of the particular subject, the Unamunian “man of flesh and bone,” in each case? 
Perhaps the major contribution of this research project relates to the last 
question. A psychosocial approach to the study of justice has the potential to bring 
this discipline closer to the work of scholars operating in the fields of political and 
legal theory; and, as explained above, it also aims to complement the studies of 
justice conducted in these fields through a transdisciplinary approach with the 
potential to fill in some of the lacunae already described in this thesis. However, 
the uniqueness of this analysis of the formation of subjective understandings of 
justice lies in the fact that it aimed to situate the subject at the forefront of an 
eminently political problem through a metonymic movement that posited the law 
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as the formal crystallisation of the political, social, and economic status quo. Going 
beyond the feminist motto “the personal is political,” this thesis has not only aimed 
to highlight the prominent role of the subject in politics but also, and more 
importantly, the role played by politics in the psychic and social life of the subject. 
In other words, this study has emphasised that the personal is political, but also that 
the political is equally personal. The degree of influence of politics on the psychic 
life and well-being of a particular subject cannot be easily underestimated. Either 
because it operates as an overarching framework with the power to set the basics 
for our social interactions or because it is the sphere we turn to when our private 
lives have become dismantled by a series of unexpected circumstances, politics 
appears as a force with the power to shape the psychic and social development of a 
particular subject not only as citizen, but also as “the man of flesh and bone; the 
man who is born, suffers and dies –above all, who dies; the man who eats and drinks 
and plays and sleeps and thinks and wills; the man who is seen and heard; the 
brother, the real brother” (Unamuno, [1913] 1972). 
This subject, this “man of flesh and bone,” is someone for whom his recognition 
as a valid interlocutor at a political level –as citizen, as voter, as tax-payer– may not 
suffice. His part as citizen is but a role that, as any professional actor, he may have 
to play every now and then. But that role does not and cannot comprehend the 
entirety of his subjectivity. The citizen, defined by a series of legal and political 
parameters, is but an aspect of the subject. He is more than that: he is the actor 
behind the mask of the citizen, with all the joys and miseries which that entails. And 
thus, when the life of this subject becomes disturbed not only in its role as citizen 
but also in other dimensions, he may seek a type of recognition for his particularity 
of experience that goes beyond such a role. A type of recognition that the subject 
may seek in spite of the inability of the law to provide it.  A type of recognition that 
leads, in the end, to a questioning of the law and the political status quo –deepening 
into the already-problematic relation between them and the subject. 
Mirroring Kierkegaard’s existential reaction to the prominence of Hegel’s 
systematic philosophy in the early 19th Century, the importance given in this thesis 
to the particular subject –along with the potential implications of his troublesome 
relation with the law and politics– differs, quite significantly, from the emphasis 
put in the fields of political and legal theory on more institutional aspects of justice. 
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Without dismissing the relevance of the law-maker or the judge in this respect, this 
“anthropolitical” approach aimed to complement and inform such studies –chiefly 
centred around the role of these two parties– with a more thorough focus on the role 
of the ostensibly forgotten justice-seeking subject. Therefore, the implications of 
this research are not exclusively limited to its most theoretical aspects. It may 
inform further studies on justice in such and such manner, but it may also offer 
some guidance in policy insofar as the gap between the ideological promise of 
justice visible in the law and its actual functioning –rooted in the sheer enforcement 
of legal norms– lies at the core of the any potential discontent of the particular 
subject with it.  It is not that legal and judicial institutions are dysfunctional, 
corrupted, or incompetent: they do what they have been designed to do. And what 
they have been designed to do is not the same as what they have been designed to 
promise to do. 
This, however, cannot be fully disconnected from politics. And, more 
particularly, from phenomena such as the ongoing tendency towards over-
legislation, in which different political actors may seek short-term electoral profit 
through the promise of higher levels of justice. A promise that is ultimately 
translated into an ever-growing and ever-more-punitive legal body that threatens to 
encompass and tame each and every single form of human activity in the name of 
justice. That is to say, a form of over-legislation that, rather than magnifying the 
authority of the law through the delivery of higher levels of “justice” –a concept 
that, at a political level, seems to carry ever more punitive connotations with every 
passing year– results in a public display of powerlessness in which every attempt 
of the law to micro-manage the lives of the subjects it is supposed to regulate 
happens to reflect its own inability to do so. An inability that stems, in the end, from 
the unbridgeable gap between the citizen –the subject of the law, the subject of the 
enunciated who demands the application of legal norms– and the particular subject 
–the subject of the enunciation, the man of flesh and bone who not only seeks the 
enforcement of the law but also the universal recognition of his particularity of 
experience. There are as many justices and as many ways of understanding this 
concept as there have been subjects who have ever demanded it, and any attempt to 
provide an all-encompassing administration of it through an ever-growing legal 
body is ultimately doomed to fail. 
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At this point, and having built the theoretical apparatus necessary for the study 
of the formation of subjective understandings of justice, I would like to emphasise, 
once again, the structural inability of the law to provide the universal recognition 
of a particularity of experience sought by the subject under the name of justice. 
And, in consequence, to invite our institutions to abandon the Discourse of the 
Master along with any further promises of justice –potentially leading to an ever-
expanding legal body that does not and cannot do away with that which is structural 
and consubstantial to the law itself: normativity. I would like to invite these 
institutions to publicly abandon their ideological mantle of omnipotence and admit 
their own limitations, their castratedness, and adopt an approach closer to the 
Discourse of the Analyst in their relation with the subjects whose lives they are to 
decide by simply saying: “You are seeking justice, but this, the sheer application of 
legal rules, is all we have to offer. It may not be enough, but it is something. Do 
you still want it?” And let them decide.  
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